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Abstract
This thesis comprises three chapters. In the first chapter, I analyze three main
facts from the recent experience of capital flows in the European monetary union.
First, core and periphery countries ran widening current account surplus and deficit
positions. Second, core countries intermediated gross capital flows from the rest of
the world, which financed deficits in the periphery. Finally, a pervasive sovereign
debt crisis took place. I argue that institutional features of the Economic and
Monetary Union have contributed to these facts. First, I show in a theoretical
model that subsidies on holdings of euro-denominated assets contribute to all three
phenomena. Second, I build a dynamic model of an economic union. The model
generates predictions for net and gross asset flows that quantitatively replicate the
EMU experience. Finally, I propose a novel theoretical mechanism magnifying the
severity of a debt crisis in an economic union. In the second chapter, I study the
interaction between sovereign default risk, firm-level financial frictions, and fiscal
policy. This research is motivated by the severe contraction observed in Italy during
the euro area sovereign debt crisis. I show that a sovereign debt crisis causes a
reduction of credit to firms, occurring through the channel of domestic fiscal policy.
A fiscal tightening in the country in crisis causes a reduction of firms’ profits and
an increase in their default risk. Secondly, I show that firms are heterogeneous
in the degree to which they are affected by a crisis: Firms in the non-tradable
sector are more vulnerable, as demand for their output falls in a crisis. In the
third chapter, I study the determinants of time-varying volatility in interest rates
on emerging market economies’ external debt. I show that a baseline model of
endogenous sovereign default quantitatively replicates the pattern of time-varying
volatility observed in the data. The model features a key non-linearity in the policy
function for the interest rate on external debt. In the absence of shocks to the
second moment of stochastic variables, the model generates a path of interest rates
that is more volatile in bad times, when output is low and debt is high.
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Chapter 1
External Imbalances, Gross
Capital Flows and Sovereign Debt
Crises
1.1 Introduction
External imbalances, large gross capital flows and a pervasive sovereign debt crisis have
characterized recent experience in the European monetary union. I introduce a framework
to analyze jointly the determinants of these phenomena. This chapter shows that by
focusing on the introduction of policy distortions in the institutional framework of the
European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), we can shed light on important aspects
of this experience. A specific feature of the monetary union, the presence of subsidies on
cross-border asset holdings, plays a crucial role in generating widening current account
deficit and surplus positions, an expansion of gross capital flows with the rest of the world
and pervasiveness and severity of a sovereign debt crisis. In addition, in an economic
union, trade integration among member countries contributes to the transmission and
amplification of a debt crisis.
Three major facts can be isolated as the most salient in the recent experience of euro
area economies. First, current account deficits and surpluses widened for members of the
monetary union, from its inception in the early 2000s until the global financial crisis in
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2008-09. Second, gross financial positions expanded in magnitude, with surplus economies
in the euro area issuing gross liabilities to the rest of the world and intermediating re-
sources to deficit countries.1 Third, a sovereign debt crisis took place in deficit countries.
The crisis led to severe recessions in many countries, and to a collapse in net capital flows.
What role did institutional features of the EMU have in generating widening current
account deficits, surpluses, and the expansion of gross asset and liability positions of
euro area economies? How does trade integration among countries in an economic union
affect severity and transmission of a debt crisis? This chapter addresses these questions
by developing a theoretical framework of capital flows and policy distortions in a union
of countries. In addition, I introduce an infinite-horizon, heterogeneous-countries model
to quantitatively assess the importance of the channels highlighted by the theoretical
framework, in relation to recent experience in the EMU.
The theoretical framework highlights the main channel through which policy distor-
tions affect capital flows in a union of countries. First, intermediation of gross capital flows
emerges as union residents leverage a subsidy they enjoy on assets issued within the union
by expanding their gross liability position against the rest of the world. Second, countries
in the union run wider deficit and surplus positions due to the subsidy. Debtor countries
benefit from lower borrowing costs, while savers are induced by policy distortions to fur-
ther accumulate net assets. Importantly, the result of a widening current account surplus
in saving countries is not mechanically due to the larger deficit of debtors, as the union
is fully integrated in international financial markets. Finally, this framework highlights a
novel mechanism leading to amplification of a debt crisis in an economic union. Financial
linkages in the form of cross-border exposures transmit the crisis within the union. The
interaction of financial linkages with trade integration, in turn, exacerbates the recession
in debtor countries. Amplification arises as export destinations of crisis countries coin-
cide with the creditors on whom they default, hampering the ability of debtors to export
during a crisis. The economic intuition behind this channel is related to the “secondary”
burden of a transfer suggested by Keynes (1929), following from a feedback effect between
1This intermediation pattern has been documented by Waysand, Ross and de Guzman (2010)
and Chen, Milesi-Ferretti and Tressel (2013). Hale and Obsfeldt (2014) document how borrowing
from the rest of the world by banks in saving countries of the euro area helped fund their lending
to deficit countries.
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international transfers and changes in relative demand for goods.
I develop an infinite-horizon model of an economic union, represented by a continuum
of countries trading in heterogeneous goods and assets, both internally and with the
rest of the world. The model allows for a quantitative analysis of the effects of policy
distortions in the euro area, and it is calibrated to replicate key features of countries in
the monetary union. First, the model replicates the widening of the net foreign asset
distribution observed after the inception of the EMU. Second, predictions of the model
for net and gross capital flows replicate the experience of external imbalances and gross
capital flow intermediation observed in the euro area. In the model, the introduction
of a subsidy on cross-border asset holdings has non-linear effects on endogenous choices
of the heterogeneous countries that constitute the union, depending on their position in
the net foreign asset distribution. Finally, the model can be employed to analyze general
equilibrium transmission and amplification of a debt crisis in an economic union, taking
place via the external balance sheet of savers and through trade among union members.
The phenomena at the center of this analysis have been very significant in terms of
their size, including the occurrence of a rare sovereign debt crisis in advanced economies.
First, current account surplus and deficit positions in the core and periphery of the euro
area both approached at their peak 3% of GDP of the monetary union.2 Second, the
expansion in gross flows brought the sum of gross asset and liabilities of the euro area
against the rest of the world to 350% of GDP in 2007, a figure 50% higher than the
one observed in the United States. Third, the output contraction associated with the
debt crisis in peripheral countries amounted to 5% of GDP, between 2011 and 2013. The
recovery in core countries slowed down significantly as well, with GDP growing by 1%
only in the three years to 2013. In comparison, in the United States, GDP grew by 7%
in the same period. Finally, I provide concrete examples of distortions subsidizing resi-
dents’ purchases of assets issued by union-member economies in the EMU. These implicit
subsidies take the form of financial regulation provisions on holdings of sovereign debt,
the ability to use certain types of assets as collateral in transactions with the European
Central Bank, as well as implicit expectations of bailouts on the part of asset holders.
2Throughout this chapter, the definition of core and periphery countries adopted will be the
conventional one, with surplus countries Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands
in the former group and deficit countries Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain in the latter.
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An important contribution of this chapter lies in the analysis of trade in financial
assets between a union of countries and the rest of the world. Capital flows between the
euro area and the rest of the world have largely been overlooked by the literature on the
Eurozone debt crisis. Current account surplus and deficit positions of core and peripheral
countries were similar in magnitude in the period leading up to the crisis. Papers in
this strand of the literature, then, have typically analyzed the crisis episode by modeling
the monetary union as a set of open economies trading solely among each other.3 The
euro area, however, is closely integrated with international financial markets, displaying
large gross asset and liability positions against the rest of the world. The analysis of
trade in financial assets with the rest of the world allows for an investigation of two
important issues. First, what factors induced core countries to save in the periphery,
intermediating in addition resources borrowed from the rest of the world? Second, what
are the implications of large gross external positions, as distinct from those of net ones?
This latter issue appears to be especially important in the context of the euro area, where
the external balance sheet of core countries featured asset and liability sides that were
mismatched along important dimensions, notably in terms of nationality of counterparties.
The next subsection reviews the contribution of this chapter to the existing literature.
Section 2 presents evidence on net and gross capital flows in the euro area, on the presence
of distortions affecting trade in euro-denominated debt and on heterogeneous exposure
to intra-union trade for European countries. In Section 3, I introduce the theoretical
framework and I analyze the implications of a subsidy on asset holdings on current account
imbalances, intermediation of gross capital flows and crisis. Section 4 presents the infinite-
horizon model with heterogeneous countries, and quantitative results on the effects of
policy distortions and of a debt crisis in an economic union. Section 5 concludes.
Literature review. A growing body of research has recently analyzed the European
experience of current account imbalances, gross capital flows and sovereign debt crisis.
This chapter contributes to that literature, focusing on the role of policy distortions in
generating intermediation of gross capital flows by the core to the periphery and widening
current account deficits and surpluses. In addition, I analyze how the interaction between
3Notable examples are Martin and Philippon (2015), Corsetti, Kuester, Meier, Mu¨ller (2014)
and Guerrieri, Iacoviello and Minetti (2013).
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financial linkages and trade integration in an economic union generates contagion and
amplification of a debt crisis.
The emphasis in this chapter on the effects of policy distortions on capital flows
in the euro area is motivated by the evidence on gross external positions presented by
Waysand, Ross and de Guzman (2010) and Chen, Milesi-Ferretti and Tressel (2013). The
latter suggest that core countries’ intermediation behavior may have been induced by the
presence of regulatory distortions in the EMU, leading them to issue gross liabilities to
extra-euro area economies to finance lending to the periphery. Following that suggestion,
I investigate in the context of a model the ability of subsidies on cross-border holdings of
assets in an economic union to explain the observation of intermediation of gross capital
flows and current account imbalances.
Hale and Obstfeld (2014) also provide evidence on the impact of the introduction of
the EMU on international debt flows. In addition, they present a model where a reduction
in financial transaction costs induces intermediation of capital flows by banks in the core.
I describe here the implications of a similar distortion on intra-EMU trade in financial
assets on net and gross financial positions. I analyze, in addition, crisis transmission
and amplification effects of such a distortion, as well as providing an assessment of the
optimality of its introduction.
The modelling approach adopted in my infinite horizon model is to describe the world
economy as a continuum of countries subject to idiosyncratic income shocks, analyzing
current account and external financial positions in this setting. I extend the traditional
framework introduced by Clarida (1990) to allow a continuum of small open economies
to trade risky assets with a large rest of the world. This extension, motivated by the
observation that European economies engage in extensive financial trade with global fi-
nancial markets, allows me to analyze motives inducing countries in the euro area core to
hold positive financial positions against partners in the EMU, while being gross debtors
with respect to extra-union economies. Fornaro (2014) employs a similar framework to
analyze the effects of a deleveraging episode taking place in a monetary union. Here, the
introduction of trade in goods and assets with the rest of the world allows me to analyze
gross capital flows and the heterogeneous effects of a debt crisis on countries with varying
exposure to trade with their union partners.
By analyzing transmission and amplification of a debt crisis in an economic union, this
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chapter is related to a rich literature on the Eurozone debt crisis.4 Two key features define
the economic union presented in this chapter. First, the presence of regulatory distor-
tions affecting trade in assets issued within the union induces in equilibrium the creation
of financial linkages among union members. A similar feature characterizes the economic
union introduced by Broner, Erce, Martin and Ventura (2014). There, residents of a
union share the preferential treatment given to domestic creditors by a sovereign debtor
in default. Arellano and Bai (2014) also analyze contagion of a debt crisis when several
countries borrow from a common lender. Secondly, countries in an economic union are
tied in my model by close trade integration. In the model, asymmetric trade integra-
tion follows from lower transport costs that apply to trade in goods within the union.
Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) document the presence of large variability in trade
costs across goods and country pairs. Following Sachs (1982), I introduce heterogeneous
goods, characterized by differences in transport costs. In my model, countries in the union
differ in terms of specialization in output goods characterized by different degrees of trad-
ability. Heterogeneous specialization determines different exposure of member economies
to trade with union partners. In turn, asymmetric exposure to trade with union part-
ners determines asymmetric amplification effects of a crisis episode. A similar feature is
present in Benigno and Romei (2014), where fluctuations in the real exchange rate arising
during a debt deleveraging episode have heterogeneous effects on countries specialized in
production of different goods.
In my model, distortions on cross-border holdings of assets affect households’ portfolio
allocation problem. In particular, households that are offered a bailout promise fail to
internalize the risk of losses associated with their purchases of gross assets. In Mendoza
(2010), Bianchi (2011) and Benigno, Chen, Otrok, Rebucci and Young (2013) a similar ex-
ternality is present. In those papers, however, a pecuniary externality arises as households
do not take into account effects of their borrowing decision on a key relative price, deter-
mining in turn the severity of a borrowing constraint. Here the externality mainly affects
countries with a positive net foreign asset position, where households’ saving decision is
critically affected by the presence of a bailout promise.
4A non-exhaustive list includes Aguiar, Amador, Farhi and Gopinath (2015), Guerrieri, Ia-
coviello and Minetti (2013), Martin and Philippon (2015), Corsetti, Kuester, Meier and Mu¨ller
(2014) and Lane (2012).
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1.2 Empirical evidence
I present in this section the main empirical evidence that motivates this chapter. First,
I detail facts related to the widening of current account deficit and surplus positions
observed in the euro area in the 2000s. Second, I describe evidence on the expansion of
gross external asset and liability positions of euro area economies and on the pattern of
intermediation of international capital flows. Third, I will present specific features of the
regulatory and policy framework that have contributed to subsidize cross-border holdings
of assets within the euro area. Finally, I present a measure of euro area economies’
exposure to trade with European partners. This indicator will be crucial to determine
the direction of the effect, in a crisis, of the interaction between financial linkages and
trade integration.
Current account imbalances in the euro area. Current account dynamics of
economies in the euro area displayed significant imbalances in the years preceding the
global financial crisis, an observation that has been widely documented in the literature.5
Figure 1.1 displays the sum of current account balances for countries in the two groups
of core and periphery members of the monetary union, expressed as ratios to euro area
GDP.6 The gap in current account balances between countries in these two groups widened
substantially in the period from the inception of the EMU to the global financial crisis.
The current account surplus in core countries approached 3% of euro area GDP in 2007,
from a balanced position in 2000. In the periphery, the current account deficit doubled
in the same period, rising above 2% of euro area GDP in 2007.
Disaggregated data for individual countries are reported in Figure 1.2. In the periph-
ery, the current account deficit rose in all countries but Portugal between 2000 and 2008.
Prior to the global financial crisis, the current account deficit was above 10% of GDP
in Portugal and Greece and above 5% in Ireland and Spain. Among core countries, the
largest rise in current account surplus was observed in Austria, Germany and the Nether-
5For a detailed review of the pattern of capital flows in the EMU, see Lane (2013). The
pattern of current account imbalances in the euro area has been recently analyzed in the context
of a theoretical model by Siena (2015) and Jaccard and Smets (2015), among others.
6As already mentioned, the core includes Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and Netherlands.
The periphery includes Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain.
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lands. At its peak, in 2007, the German current account surplus amounted to 7% of GDP.
A different pattern was observed in France and Belgium, where the surplus diminished in
magnitude throughout this period.
Financial linkages and intermediation. Two key facts emerge from the analysis
of bilateral international investment positions of euro area economies.7 First, strong finan-
cial linkages tied together economies in the EMU, with large, and growing, cross-border
positions among euro area economies. Second, euro area economies traded extensively in
financial assets with the rest of the world, with an emerging pattern of intermediation by
core countries of capital flows from outside the euro area.
Data on net and gross financial positions of euro area economies reveal the presence
of close interdependence among these countries. First, the fraction of total gross external
positions of economies in the EMU accounted for by euro area counterparties was equal
to approximately half of their total gross positions. Second, economies in the euro area
core represented major financial partners for peripheral countries. Gross liabilities of
peripheral countries held by Germany, France and the Netherlands in 2008 ranged from
40% of GDP for Italy to 69% of GDP in Portugal.8 Gross liabilities held by the three
major core countries were even higher for Ireland, amounting to 268% of Irish GDP.9
Finally, global international investment positions of peripheral countries could largely be
explained by the bilateral positions of these countries against euro area partners. The
fraction of the global international investment position of peripheral countries represented
by their bilateral position against euro area partners ranged between 61% for Portugal
to 80% for Greece, in 2008, highlighting how the majority of these countries’ trade in
7All figures reported in this subsection are drawn from the dataset and paper presented by
Waysand, Ross, de Guzman (2010).
8In addition, substantial amounts of liabilities corresponding to counterparties in the United
Kingdom and Luxembourg are likely to partly reflect claimants ultimately based in the euro area
core. Waysand, Ross, de Guzman (2010) discuss the merits of alternative residence reporting
principles.
9The pattern observed in Ireland, however, is substantially different from the one of Italy,
Spain, Portugal and Greece. Ireland, in fact, held a substantial amount of gross assets outside
the euro area, amounting to approximately 400% of GDP just for the United Kingdom and the
United States.
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Figure 1.1: Current account balances of core and periphery countries in the euro
area
Data are presented as fraction of total euro area GDP. Core includes Austria, Belgium, France,
Germany and Netherlands. Periphery includes Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain.
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Figure 1.2: Current account balances of selected countries in the euro area
Data are presented as fraction of individual countries’ GDP. The left-hand side panel represents
so-called core countries, while the periphery is displayed in the right-hand side panel.
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financial assets took place within the EMU.10
Trade in financial assets by economies in the euro area with the rest of the world
was characterized by two main features. First, the evolution of gross financial positions
of core euro area economies can be interpreted as describing intermediation of interna-
tional capital flows by these countries. The bilateral international investment position
of core economies with respect to the rest of the euro area rose between 2002 and 2007.
This increase ranged between 30 percentage points of GDP for Belgium to 12 percentage
points in France. At the same time, the global international investment position was
deteriorating for some of these countries, signalling that they were funding gross saving
in the euro area by borrowing from the rest of the world, rather than by increasing their
net savings.11 In Germany, the global international investment position was also growing
at the time, but by less than the bilateral one with the euro area, so that the bilateral
investment position with respect to the rest of the world was deteriorating.
Second, the magnitude of gross external positions of the euro area with the rest of the
world was large by international standards, highlighting its financial openness and close
integration with world financial markets. While the external net foreign asset position of
the euro area was small when compared to that of the United States or Japan, the sum of
its gross external asset and liabilities amounted to 350% of GDP in 2008, compared with
less than 250% of GDP for the United States and 175% for Japan. Given the presence of
large gross capital flows between the euro area and the rest of the world, it is important
to consider the implications of financial trade by countries in the union with economies
located outside of it, in order to conduct a comprehensive analysis of their pattern of
external positions since the inception of the monetary union.
Distortions on asset holdings in the European Monetary Union. Several
aspects of policy and regulation in the European Monetary Union are likely to have
10Again, the pattern is different in the case of Ireland. Given substantial holdings of gross assets
outside the euro area, its global international investment position amounted to -56% of GDP, while
its bilateral position against the rest of the euro area amounted to -123% of GDP.
11In France, Belgium and Austria, the global international investment position deteriorated by
14, 10 and 7 percentage points of GDP, respectively, between 2002 and 2008. In the Netherlands,
on the other hand, a substantial improvement in the global international investment position was
matched by a smaller one in the bilateral one with euro area partners.
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contributed to the pattern of intermediation of capital flows observed in the euro area.
I will briefly discuss here some aspects of banking regulation and collateral eligibility
rules in transactions with the European Central Bank that subsidized holdings of euro-
denominated assets, for institutions based within the monetary union. In addition, I will
review ex-post policy actions in the context of the sovereign debt crisis that, similarly to
a bailout, reduced losses suffered by holders of peripheral countries’ debt.
First, financial regulation in place in the EMU has provided incentives for banks in
the euro area to hold large amounts of euro-denominated sovereign debt. In the Euro-
pean Union, the Capital Requirements Directive allowed financial institutions to assign
a “zero-risk weight” to government debt of member states denominated and funded in
own currency.12 According to Nouy (2012), the zero risk weight mandated by the Capital
Requirements Directive, implied that local currency debt was largely regarded as risk-
free by regulators. In addition, the author expressed a concern that banks were actively
encouraged to accumulate sovereign debt by these aspects of regulation.13
Secondly, the ability to use sovereign debt issued by euro area governments as collateral
in transactions with the European Central Bank has provided an additional incentive to
financial institutions based in the monetary union in holding these assets. As suggested
by Buiter and Sibert (2005), operational practices on collateral eligibility at the ECB
have subsidized holdings by European banks of risky, short-maturity government debt.
In particular, according to these authors, the eligibility as collateral of debt issued by all
euro area governments has contributed to the compression of borrowing costs observed
among euro area governments.
Third, actions taken by policy institutions in the euro area during the sovereign debt
crisis, in the form of explicit bailouts or non-standard monetary policy, have contributed
to reduce the adverse effects of the crisis on financial institutions with large exposures
to peripheral governments. To the extent that banks in the euro area expected similar
measures to be taken in the event of a crisis, such expectations induced them to exert less
12Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, Part Three, Title II, Chapter 2, Section 2, Article 114.4 con-
tains the most recent version of relevant legislation.
13Ms. Nouy was then General Secretary of the Prudential Supervisory Authority at the Banque
de France. She is currently Chair of the Supervisory Board of the Single Supervisory Mechanism
at the European Central Bank.
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caution regarding the occurrence of future crises, as they expected, to some degree, to be
bailed out in such circumstances.14 A concrete bailout example is reported by Acharya
and Steffen (2013), who discuss the case of the Franco-Belgian banking group Dexia. The
size of the sovereign bond portfolio of this institution amounted to “almost three times
of its book equity”, and it was largely composed of Italian and Greek government debt.
In the second half of 2011, as sovereign bond prices fell and this bank found it harder
to access sources of funding, Dexia was rescued by the governments of Belgium, France
and Luxembourg. In addition, the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme
launched by the ECB in 2012, with the aim of “safeguarding an appropriate monetary
policy transmission and the singleness of the monetary policy”, was successful in reducing
yields on government debt of peripheral countries, thereby increasing the market value
of such assets on financial institutions’ balance sheets (Altavilla, Giannone and Lenza,
2014).
In the model presented in this chapter, I introduce a bailout promise to represent
institutional distortions giving preferential treatment to residents of an economic union
when purchasing risky assets issued by union partners. This modelling choice allows me
to characterize in a simple way a wide range of subsidies and distortions leading residents
of an economic union to perceive returns on union-issued assets to be higher, or safer,
than what perceived by outside residents.15
Trade integration and specialization. Trade with partners in the European
Union accounted in 2005 for approximately two thirds of total trade by EU economies.16
Geographical proximity, similarity in tastes and explicit trade liberalization make it an
unsurprising fact that European economies largely trade with each other, highlighting the
high degree of goods market integration characterizing the Union.
Economies in the European Union, however, differ significantly in terms of relative
specialization in those industries whose output is more extensively traded internationally.
14Acharya and Steffen (2013) document European banks’ behavior of betting on the survival
of the euro area, “choosing to hold peripheral sovereign bonds and financing their investments in
short-term wholesale markets.”
15Clearly, this assumption does not allow for a separate analysis of the individual channels
suggested in the literature. Such analysis is left for future research.
16Source: Eurostat, International trade data.
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Manufacturing accounted in 2005 for 23% of Gross Value Added (GVA) in Germany, while
representing only 10% and 16% of GVA in Greece and Spain, respectively.17 Peripheral
economies, on the other hand, are relatively specialized in industries characterized by a
lower degree of tradability of output. In the same year, construction accounted for only
4% of GVA in Germany, rising to 6% and 12% in Greece and Spain.18
In order to document the asymmetric pattern of specialization of European economies,
accounting for heterogeneity in tradability of output produced by different industrial
sectors, I construct a country-level measure of average tradability of output.19 I define
tradability of individual industrial sectors as the ratio, for each sector, of total exports
and imports attributed to that sector in a sample of advanced economies, to total Gross
Value Added (GVA) of that sector. Formally, tradability of sector s is defined as
TDTYs =
∑
i∈I EXPs,i + IMPs,i∑
i∈I GVAs,i
where EXPs,i and IMPs,i represent total exports and imports attributed to sector s in
country i. I represents the set of all countries in my sample. Hence,
∑
i∈I GVAs,i repre-
sents total GVA of sector s in the entire sample.
At country level, average tradability of output is given by the average of tradability
in all industrial sectors, weighted by the shares of GVA represented by each sector in the
economy of each country.20 Formally, this is given by
TDTYi =
∑
s∈S
TDTYs
GVAs,i
GVAi
where S represents the set of all sectors that compose the economy and GVAi =
∑
s∈S GVAs,i
represents total GVA in economy i.
Figure 1.3 presents values of average tradability of output for EU economies. Con-
sistently with the observation that tradable sectors such as manufacturing are under-
represented in these economies, Greece, Spain and Portugal feature low average tradabil-
ity of output. On the other hand, average tradability is high in Germany, especially in
17In the System of National Accounts, GVA “is defined as the value of output less the value of
intermediate consumption and is a measure of the contribution to GDP made by an individual
producer, industry or sector.”
18Data are drawn from the OECD Structural Analysis (STAN) database.
19A complete description of the data used to construct this measure is presented in Appendix
1.A.
20This measure is analogous to that of tradedness in Betts and Kehoe (2001).
18
comparison to other very advanced economies. This variable, in fact, is closer in Germany
to the level encountered in recent accession countries such as Hungary and Slovenia than
in the United Kingdom or France. Low values for average tradability of output observed
in Southern European economies are due to relative specialization in these countries to-
wards those sectors characterized by lower sectoral tradability. Detailed evidence on EU
economies’ sectoral specialization is presented in Appendix 1.A.
In the context of the model presented in the following section, I will study how spe-
cialization in industries characterized by lower tradability determines an amplification of
the adverse effects of a debt crisis, when debt is owed to partners in an economic union.
The ability of a country to generate trade surpluses through exports, in fact, is ham-
pered by weak economic conditions in union partner economies if industrial specialization
determines a high degree of exposure to export demand from these countries.
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Figure 1.3: Average tradability of output in the European Union
This measure is computed as the weighted average of sector-level tradability of output, with
weights given in each country by the shares of total GVA corresponding to each sector. Data
source: OECD STAN and TiVA databases, year 2005.
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1.3 A simple model of default, intermediation and
trade
This section presents a formal analysis of net and gross capital flows between countries in
an economic union. I analyze, in particular, the implications on current account balances
and gross external positions of a subsidy on cross-border holdings of assets. In addition,
I study under what conditions the interaction between trade integration and financial
linkages introduced by the subsidy amplifies the severity of a debt crisis. Finally, I examine
the rationale for the introduction of a subsidy on cross-border asset holdings, by assessing
the implications of this distortion for welfare in the economic union. To this purpose,
I introduce a simple model featuring trade in risky assets between two countries in an
economic union and the rest of the world. To capture trade integration among members of
an economic union, I introduce two types of consumption good, subject to heterogeneous
transport costs across different country pairs.21
1.3.1 Model
Consider a two-period world economy. Time is discrete and indexed by t ∈ {1, 2}. The
world economy is inhabited by two small open economies, H and F , and by the rest of
the world, ROW . I will use the expression “economic union” when referring to the set of
countries H and F . All countries receive endowments of two types of consumption good,
A and B. Goods are tradable among all countries, subject to transport costs that are
heterogeneous across country pairs and good types. All countries can issue one-period
debt. H is subject to a limited commitment friction, and it cannot promise to always
repay external debt issued in the initial period. F is not subject to limited commitment
frictions.22 Households in F enjoy a subsidy when purchasing H-issued assets, in the
form of a bailout promise in the event of default by H. ROW is characterized as a large,
21Appendix 1.E presents a one-good version of this model. Main results on current account
imbalances and intermediation of gross capital flows will be present in that version as well. In
addition, the one-good framework serves as a benchmark case to evaluate the effect in a crisis of
trade integration among members of a union of countries.
22This assumption, which is not essential, will be relaxed in the infinite-horizon model presented
in Section 1.4.1, where all economies issue risky debt.
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risk-neutral agent.
Country H. H is inhabited by a continuum of identical households and by a benevolent
fiscal authority. Lifetime utility of the representative household is given by:
u (c1) + βE [u (c2)] , (1.1)
where 0 < β < 1 is the subjective discount factor and E [·] is the mathematical expectation
operator. Consumption in each period is given by ct. The period utility function, u (·), is
increasing and concave. I will impose that u (·) takes a logarithmic form: u (c) = log (c).
In each period, consumption of the representative household, ct, is given by an aggregator
of two consumption goods, A and B:
ct =
(cA,t)
a (cB,t)
1−a
aa (1− a)1−a . (1.2)
The parameter a ∈ (0, 1) governs the utility weight of consumption good A, cA,t. cB,t
denotes consumption by the representative household in H of good B. Good A is the
nume´raire in the economy.
H receives a constant stream of endowments of good B: yB,1 = yB,2 = yB. The stream
of good A received by H is stochastic and its profile is skewed towards the terminal period:
yA,1 = yA − ǫ
where yA,1 denotes initial-period endowment of good A and ǫ > 0 represents the amount
by which it falls short of a long-run value given by yA. In the terminal period, H faces
income risk: it only receives the amount yA with probability π and, with probability 1−π,
a lower amount yA,L < yA:
23
yA,2 =


yA w.p. π
yA,L w.p. 1− π.
(1.3)
Households in H do not have access to financial markets. Their problem is simple:
As they cannot trade in financial assets, they act as hand-to-mouth agents, consuming in
each period their endowment of both goods and net transfers they receive from the fiscal
authority.
23I will limit attention to cases where the expected value of terminal-period resources is higher
than the initial-period endowment: yA,1 < E [yA,2].
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The fiscal authority in H can issue debt on international financial markets in the
initial period. Debt is denominated in units of nume´raire, good A, and it is subject to a
limited commitment friction. Bond holdings in H are denoted by bH , which takes negative
values when the fiscal authority issues debt. In the terminal period, the fiscal authority
can choose to default on its debt, suffering a default cost ζ. The default cost takes the
form of a reduction in the amount of good A endowment. I assume that default costs are
increasing in the realization of the endowment process.24 In particular, default costs are
nil in the event of a low output realization and positive otherwise:
ζ =


0 if yA,2 = yA,L
ζˆ > 0 otherwise.
(1.4)
The fiscal authority in H maximizes welfare of the representative household, (1.1), by
issuing debt in the initial period and choosing between default and repayment in the
terminal period. Resources raised on international financial markets are rebated in lump-
sum fashion to the representative household.25 Formally, the problem is given by:
VH (ǫ) = max
bH ,c1,c2,
D∈{0,1}
u (c1) + βE [u (c2)]
s.t. p1c1 + qHbH = yA − ǫ+ pB,1yB,
p2c2 = yA,2 + pB,2yB − [Dζ − (1−D) bH ] ,
(1.5)
All quantities are denominated in units of the nume´raire good A. The relative price of
good B to good A is denoted by pB,t. pt is the price index of the consumption bundle
ct.
26 The fiscal authority takes good prices as given. The amount of debt issued by H in
the initial period is given by −bH , while qH denotes the price of a unit of debt. D is an
indicator taking value of unity in the event of default. The fiscal authority internalizes
the effect of its choice for debt issued on the probability of terminal period default and
on the debt price qH .
24This is a common assumption in the endogenous sovereign default literature. Mendoza and
Yue (2012) study how frictions in markets for imported inputs give rise to endogenous default
costs that are increasing in TFP.
25The choice for initial-period debt determines, from the budget constraint, plans for initial and
terminal-period consumption of the representative household.
26Given intratemporal preferences, the price index of the consumption bundle is given in each
period by p = (pB)
1−a
.
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Proceeding backwards from the terminal period, it is optimal for the fiscal authority
to repay debt when −bH ≤ ζ. When debt is positive, default occurs in the event of a low
output realization, which is accompanied by the absence of default costs. Default would
occur with certainty if debt were to be higher than the upper bound of default costs,
ζˆ. The following proposition establishes optimality, from the point of view of the fiscal
authority in H, of issuing debt carrying positive but not certain default probability:
Proposition 1. H’s optimal choice for bH lies in the interval
[
−ζˆ, 0
)
for a sufficiently
low realization of the initial-period good A endowment, yA − ǫ, given values for yA,L, π,
and β.
Proof. See appendix 1.B.
Given this choice, as default in the terminal period only occurs in the event of a
low output realization, the probability of terminal-period default is given by 1− π. The
solution to the problem of the fiscal authority can be summarized by the optimality
condition:
qH
u′ (c1)
p1
= βπ
u′ (c2,R)
p2,R
. (1.6)
where p2,R and c2,R denote the price index and consumption by H, respectively, in the
terminal-period state of the world where repayment is optimal. The benefit of issuing a
marginal unit of debt is equal to its marginal cost, at an optimum. The cost of repaying
debt in the terminal period is only borne by the representative household in the state of
the world where it is optimal not to default. Finally, demand for the two individual goods
is given in each period by:
cA = apc and cB = (1− a) p
pB
c. (1.7)
Country F. As is country H, F is inhabited by a continuum of identical households.
Preferences of households in F are identical to those of households in H, as defined in
(1.2) and (1.1). Variables pertaining to country F are indexed by an asterisk, so that c∗t ,
c∗A,t and c
∗
B,t indicate aggregate consumption and consumption of the two types of good
by the representative household in country F in period t.
Households in F can trade assets on international financial markets in the initial
period. In particular, households in F can issue risk-free debt bF to ROW and purchase
assets issued by H. Again, all assets are denominated in units of nume´raire good A.
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F -households are promised by their domestic fiscal authority that they will be bailed
out of losses incurred on assets issued byH in the event of its default. The extent of partial
bailout offered to households in F is captured by the parameter ξ ∈ [0, 1]. Individual
households have full information on the state variables determining the solution to the
problem in H, (1.5), and they correctly understand what is the optimal default policy by
H. Due to the presence of the bailout promise, the return on an asset issued by H in the
event of default, as perceived by a resident of F , is equal to ξ. Absent a bailout promise,
the return on debt issued by H in the event of default would be zero.27 In the event of
default by H, bailout transfers received by individual households in F are financed by
a lump-sum tax T on all households in the country. Consumption of the representative
household in the terminal period then fully bears the negative wealth shock implied by
default of H. Each individual household, however, perceives that it will be bailed out of
any losses on its bond holdings.
The problem solved by the representative household in F in the initial period is the
following:
VF (ǫ) = max
c∗
1
,c∗
2
,
bF ,bHF≥0
u (c∗1) + βE [u (c
∗
2)]
s.t. p1c
∗
1 + qF bF + qHbHF = y
∗
A + pB,1y
∗
B,
p2c
∗
2 = y
∗
A + pB,2y
∗
B + bF + [D (ξbHF − T ) + (1−D) bHF ] ,
(1.8)
The amount of H-issued assets purchased by the representative household in F is denoted
by bHF . Liabilities issued to ROW at price qF are denoted by −bF . The representative
household in F acts as a price taker with respect to good prices. Debt prices qH and qF
are also taken as given, as is the value of the lump-sum tax T . In equilibrium, tax receipts
finance bailout payments in the default state of the world, T = ξbHF .
Restricting attention to cases where H issues risky debt and gross assets purchased
by F are positive, bH ∈
(
−ζˆ, 0
)
and bHF > 0, the solution to the problem in F can be
27I restrict the bailout promise ξ to take a value of zero if −bH > ζˆ. Absent this restriction,
a positive price for bH would be bid by households in F even when default would occur with
certainty. The problem faced by the fiscal authority in H would not have a finite solution, as the
choice of debt issued by H would be unbounded.
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summarized by the following system of first-order conditions:
qF
u′ (c∗1)
p1
= βE
[
u′ (c∗2)
p2
]
qH = qF − β (1− π) (1− ξ)
u′
(
c∗2,D
)
/p2,D
u′ (c∗1)/p1
.
(1.9)
The subscript D denotes the terminal-period state of the world where default by H is
optimal and, again, R denotes the one where repayment is preferred. The first equation is
standard and it simply describes the optimal intertemporal allocation of consumption by
F . The second equation characterizes the price qH at which households in F are willing to
purchase a positive amount of H-issued assets. F -households need to be compensated for
default risk, given by the probability of default times the loss suffered on each unit of asset:
(1− π) (1− ξ). In addition, households need to be compensated for volatility in terminal-
period consumption that default risk induces, as captured by the term
u′(c∗2,D)/p2,D
u′(c∗1)/p1
. Note
that if a full bailout promise is offered, ξ = 1, the price that F -households are willng to
bid for H-issued assets equals the one of risk-free liabilities, qF . This is the same price
they would bid on truly risk-free assets, if π = 1.
Finally, demand functions for individual goods are determined as in H:
c∗A = apc
∗ and c∗B = (1− a)
p
pB
c∗. (1.10)
ROW. The representative household in ROW has risk-neutral preferences over con-
sumption. Its intratemporal preferences are identical to those in H and F , as is its
discount factor, β. The economy in ROW is large when compared to H and F . In partic-
ular, endowments of either good in H and F are of negligible size when compared to those
in ROW . As in country F , the stream of endowments received by ROW is deterministic
and constant: yROWA,1 = y
ROW
A,2 = y
ROW
A , y
ROW
B,1 = y
ROW
B,2 = y
ROW
B . Bond holdings by
ROW of risk-free assets are given by bROW . The price of a risk-free asset issued by ROW
is given by qROW . Bond holdings by ROW of H-issued assets are given by bH,ROW .
28
Transport costs. Good A can be costlessly traded across all country pairs. Interna-
tional trade of good B is subject to an iceberg transport cost τ that only applies to trade
with ROW : For each unit of good B that is shipped by an exporter, only 1− τ units are
28The optimization problem solved by ROW is described in detail in Appendix 1.C.
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received by the destination country. Absence of transport costs affecting trade between H
and F captures strong goods market integration among members of an economic union.
Heterogeneous transport costs affecting goods A and B serve instead as a proxy for het-
erogeneous tradability of output of different industrial sectors. In the model, countries
that are relatively abundant in good B describe economies that are characterized by low
average tradability of output. Relative abundance of the two types of good in H and F
is captured by the ratios yAyB and
y∗A
y∗B
.
The relative price of good B to good A prevailing in H and F can be interpreted
as the terms of trade of the country that is relatively abundant in good B. Due to the
presence of transport costs, good prices in ROW may differ from those prevailing in the
union formed by H and F . The relative price of good B to good A in ROW is denoted
by pROWB .
World prices. In equilibrium, world prices follow from the solution of ROW ’s prob-
lem, given the negligible size of H and F compared to the world economy. The world
price of a risk-free bond is given by qROW = β, by risk-neutrality of ROW .
29 Bonds
issued by F are risk-free, so that their price is also given by
qF = qROW = β. (1.11)
If ROW holds a positive amount of bond issued by H, the price of this asset must
compensate ROW for default risk. Hence, bH,ROW > 0 implies
qH = βE [1−D] .
In particular, if bH ∈
(
−ζˆ , 0
)
, the probability of repayment is given by π and qH = βπ.
ROW is not willing to buy assets issued by H if qH > βE [1−D]. In this event, F
would be the marginal and sole buyer of assets issued by H: bH,ROW = 0 and, by market
clearing, bHF = −bH .
World good prices are also determined in ROW . When H or F export good B
to ROW , arbitrage and transport costs imply pB = (1− τ) pROWB . Symmetrically, when
29Since assets are denominated in units of numeraire good A, the first order condition in ROW
implies qROW = β
pROW1
pROW
2
. Given the constant endowment streams, pROW1 = p
ROW
2 , so that qROW =
β holds.
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ROW exports good B to eitherH or F , pB =
1
(1−τ)p
ROW
B . Finally, when τ > 0, a no-trade
equilibrium can arise, where price differentials are too small, compared to transport costs,
for intratemporal trade in B to emerge. Indeed, when pB ∈
(
(1− τ) pROWB , 1(1−τ)pROWB
)
,
no trade in good B takes place between H or F and ROW . When trade in good B
between H, F and ROW does not take place, the markets for good B in H and F and
in ROW have to individually clear:
yB + y
∗
B = cB,s + c
∗
B,s and y
ROW
B = c
ROW
B,s . (1.12)
Demand for good B by H and F is then satisfied entirely by supply within these countries.
Within this interval, the relative price of good B in H and F is determined by market
clearing within the economic union. From intratemporal preferences, this relative price is
given by:30
pB =
1− a
a
cA + c
∗
A
cB + c∗B
=
1− a
a
cA + c
∗
A
yB + y∗B
. (1.13)
Equilibrium. I will now proceed to define a competitive equilibrium in the world
economy.
Definition 1. An equilibrium is defined as a vector of quantities bH , bHF , bF , bROW ,
bH,ROW , cs, cA,s, cB,s, c
∗
s, c
∗
A,s, c
∗
B,s, c
ROW
s , c
ROW
A,s , c
ROW
B,s , prices qH , qF , qROW , pB,s,
ps, p
ROW
B,s , p
ROW
s and default indicator D such that, given values for the bailout promise
ξ, transport costs τ and output realization ǫ, in all time periods and states of the world,
as indexed by s ∈ {1; 2, R; 2, D}:
• bH and {cs}s solve the intertemporal allocation problem in H, (1.5), given qH and
{ps}s.
• D solves optimal default policy by H, as defined by (1.5).
• bF , bHF and {c∗s}s solve the intertemporal allocation problem in F , (1.8), given qF ,
qH and {ps}s.
•
{
cA,s, c
∗
A,s, cB,s, c
∗
B,s
}
s
solve demand for individual goods by H and F , (1.7) and
(1.10), given {cs, c∗s}s and prices {pB,s, ps}s.
30From (1.7) and (1.10), it can be seen that cA + c
∗
A =
a
1−a
cB+c
∗
B
pB
.
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• bROW , bH,ROW and
{
cROWs
}
s
solve the intertemporal allocation problem in ROW given
qROW , qH and
{
pROWs
}
s
.
{
cROWA,s , c
ROW
B,s
}
s
satisfy ROW ’s demand for individual
goods, given
{
cROWs
}
s
and prices
{
pROWB,s , p
ROW
s
}
s
.
• All markets for assets clear:
0 = bH + bHF + bH,ROW
0 = bF + bROW
• The world market for good B clears, net of resources lost to transport costs between
H,F and ROW :
yB + y
∗
B + y
ROW
B = cB,s + c
∗
B,s + c
ROW
B,s + τ
∣∣yROWB − cROWB,s ∣∣
• The market for good A clears by Walras’ law.
cA,s + c
∗
A,s + c
ROW
A,s = yA,s + y
∗
A + y
ROW
A
1.3.2 Results
Intermediation and gross capital flows. What drives intermediation of interna-
tional capital flows in this framework? When is it optimal for an economy like F to be
the main holder of risky debt issued by its partner in the economic union? Risk aversion
and the presence of a bailout promise play a crucial role in answering these questions.
In the absence of a bailout promise, risk-averse households in F are not willing to
be the marginal buyers of debt issued by H. From F ’s Euler equation, (1.9), the price
consistent with H-assets being priced by F -households is given by
qH,F = β

1− (1− π) u′
(
c∗2,D
)
/p2,D
u′ (c∗1)/p1

 ,
where qF = β follows from (1.11), as assets issued by F are risk-free. Due to risk-aversion
in preferences of F , (1.1), this price is lower than the one consistent with pricing by ROW ,
qH,ROW = βπ.
u′
(
c∗2,D
)
/p2,D
u′ (c∗1)/p1
> 1.
F would suffer from low consumption in the state of the world where H defaults, if it were
a holder of H-issued assets. F -households have to be compensated for this risk, whose
28
price is captured by the ratio of marginal utilities across initial and terminal periods.
Hence, given its risk-neutrality, ROW is the marginal buyer of assets issued by H, in the
case where households in F are not offered a bailout promise on these assets. 31
When a full bailout promise is offered, H-issued assets are perceived as risk-free by
F -households. Accordingly, they are willing to purchase these assets at a price equal to
that of risk-free liabilities:
qH,F = qF = β.
To the extent that these assets are not truly risk-free, π < 1, the price bid by H is not
sufficiently high to compensate ROW for default risk, β > βπ, and ROW will not buy any
positive amount of H-issued debt. The entire debt issued by H is then held in equilibrium
by F .
Gross asset purchases by F are partly financed with own resources, as well as by
intermediating funds borrowed from ROW . The fraction of gross asset purchases that F
finances by issuing gross liabilities lies in the interval:32
bF
bH
∈
(
β
1 + β
, 1
]
for π ∈ (0, 1] . (1.14)
Three main results emerge on intermediation of gross capital flows by F . First, if
repayment by H is certain, F entirely finances its purchase of H-debt by borrowing from
ROW , bF = bH . As debt issued by H is truly risk-free, the bailout promise has no effect
on the equilibrium allocation: F fully intermediates gross asset purchases by issuing gross
liabilities, and the allocation is equal to one where debt issued by H is held directly by
ROW . Second, in the limit where default by H is certain, π → 0, F is a net saver
and its gross liabilities are smaller in magnitude than gross assets, limπ→0 bF =
β
1+β bH .
Households in F face positive taxes with certainty in the terminal-period, to cover for
certain losses on gross assets.33 Hence, they act as net savers, in order to transfer resources
31In an equilibrium where
p2,D
p1
is sufficiently high, it would be optimal for F to hold the entire
amount of H-issued debt even in the absence of bailout promise, in order to transfer resources
across states of the world and exploit differences in good prices. This equilibrium, however, would
only arise in the presence of severe transport costs, and it is ignored here.
32This result follows from the solution to the system of optimality conditions in (1.9). I consider
here for simplicity a setup where τ = 0, so that good prices are constant across states of the world
as determined in ROW , and normalized to unity. I define total endowment in F as y∗ = y∗A+ y
∗
B .
33Note that while individual households do not internalize the effects of their choices on taxation,
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to the terminal period and mitigate the fall in consumption following default by H.
Finally, when the terminal-period repayment is uncertain, π ∈ (0, 1), households in F
face uncertainty with regard to terminal-period taxation and consumption. The larger
is the magnitude of consumption risk, the more F households will save to insure against
it. Hence, the fraction of gross asset purchases that is financed with own resources is
increasing in the relative size of gross assets to terminal-period endowment. The optimal
amount of gross liabilities issued by F is presented graphically in Figure 1.4, for values of
π ∈ (0, 1] and for two different relative values of gross assets to total endowment.
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Figure 1.4: Issuance of gross liabilities by F
Gross liabilities issued by F are presented as a function of the probability of repayment by H and
of the amount of gross assets. The blue, solid line represents the fraction of gross assets purchased
by F that is financed by borrowing from ROW , for a low amount of gross assets relative to total
income, bH/y
∗ = .25. The red, dashed line represents the same variable for a higher ratio of gross
assets to income, bH/y
∗ = 1.
Debt crisis in an economic union. Motivated by recent experience in the euro
area, we can employ the model here presented to study the transmission and amplification
of a debt crisis taking place in an economic union. A crucial role is played in this setting by
the interaction between trade integration and financial linkages characterizing countries
in the economic union.
in equilibrium, they correctly form expectations on terminal-period taxation, T = ξbHF .
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I analyze consumption by H and F in the terminal-period crisis state, where H faces
a low output realization, yA = yA,L, and it does not repay its debt. By comparing the
equilibrium allocation with bailout promise to the one with no bailout, we are able to
analyze how policy distortions in the economic union lead to cross-border transmission
and amplification of a debt crisis.34
The introduction of a bailout promise generates financial linkages between members
of the economic union, through which a crisis is transmitted from debtors to creditors.
This policy distortion induces F to take on exposure to default risk by H, issuing debt
to finance asset purchases. In the crisis state, wealth in F is lower when this country
intermediates resources towards H, as gross assets give no return and gross liabilities to
ROW are repaid. Formally, aggregate consumption by F in the terminal-period crisis
state is given by:
c∗2,D = (y
∗
A + pBy
∗
B + bF )
1
p
To the extent that F issues a positive amount of gross liabilities in order to purchase assets
issued by H, policy distortions cause consumption in this country to be lower in the crisis
state. The mismatch between risky gross assets and safe gross liabilities on F ’s external
balance sheet leads to a transmission of the crisis to this country, with detrimental effects
on consumption.
Amplification of the crisis in the debtor country arises when creditors on its external
liabilities coincide with the destination of its exports. In the crisis state, H is reduced
to financial autarky, but it is able to trade in goods A and B, according to relative
abundance of the two in its endowment basket. Aggregate consumption by H in the crisis
then crucially depends on the relative price of its exports. When transport costs imply
that good B is not traded with ROW , its relative price is function of relative abundance
within the union of H and F . In the crisis state, the relative price pB is determined
34When discussing crisis transmission and amplification, it is worth noting that endowment
realizations are not affected by features of the equilibrium of this economy, them being exogenous.
However, endowment values in terms of consumption good are endogenous, due to the possibility
of changes in goods relative prices, representing the terms of trade of countries in the economic
union.
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according to (1.13):
pB =
1− a
a
cA,2,D + c
∗
A,2,D
cB,2,D + c∗B,2,D
=
1− a
a
yA,L + y
∗
A + bF
yB + y∗B
Intermediation of gross flows by F causes the relative price of good B to be lower in the
crisis state. The bailout promise induces F to issue gross liabilities to ROW , bF < 0. In
the crisis state, the amount of good A available in the union is then lower than it would
be had H borrowed directly from ROW , and defaulted on its liabilities. In turn, in the
crisis state, relative scarcity of A causes the price pB to be lower than it would be, had
F not acted as an intermediary between H and ROW .
The effect of lower union wealth on the crisis country, H, depends on the status of this
country as a net exporter or importer of the good subject to transport costs, B. Denote
by pB,I the crisis-state relative price of good B in the equilibrium allocation where, due
to the presence of a bailout promise, external borrowing by H is intermediated by F .
Denote by pB,NI the relative price in the equilibrium where no bailout is promised, no
intermediation occurs, and H borrows directly from ROW . As gross liabilities issued by
F are higher in the equilibrium allocation with bailout, (1.13) implies pB,I < pB,NI .
Consider now two extreme cases of full specialization by H. First, when H is fully
specialized in good B, yA,L = 0, yB > 0, it can be shown that its relative consumption
across the two equilibrium allocations is proportional to the relative difference in pB:
cI
cNI
=
(
pB,I
pB,NI
)a
. (1.15)
Second, and conversely, if H is fully specialized in good A, its relative consumption is
inversely related to the difference in pB:
cI
cNI
=
(
pB,I
pB,NI
)a−1
, (1.16)
as a − 1 < 0. Finally, when relative abundance of the two goods in B equals relative
abundance in the union, the fall in pB has no effect on consumption, as no intra-temporal
trade occurs. Formally, cI = cNI if
yB
yB + y∗B
=
yA
yA,L + y∗A + bF,NI
(1.17)
with cI < cNI for values of
yB
yB+y
∗
B
above this threshold and vice versa.35 The higher
the share of good B in the endowment basket of H, the more severe is the crisis in this
35The result in (1.17) holds locally, for
pB,I
pB,NI
≈ 1. A full derivation of results in this section is
provided in Appendix 1.D.
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country. Amplification occurs as demand in export destinations deteriorates in the event
of the crisis, due to the presence of financial linkages between trade partners. If the crisis
country were instead a net exporter of good A, it would benefit from cheaper imports of
good B, while being able to export to ROW which is unaffected by the crisis.
Prior to the euro area sovereign debt crisis, Greece, Spain and Portugal were relatively
specialized in sectors characterized by lower tradability of output, as detailed in Section
1.2. To the extent that lower output tradability implied stronger trade linkages with
partners in the monetary union, this mechanism may have played a role in exacerbating
the recession observed in the periphery of the euro area during the recent crisis. I present
in Section 1.4 a quantitative evaluation of these channels, in the context of an infinite-
horizon framework.
Optimal bailout promise. In order to analyze the rationale behind the introduction
of distortions on cross-border holdings of assets, I discuss here conditions under which it is
optimal, from the point of view of a union-wide benevolent planner, to introduce a bailout
promise on risky assets. In an environment characterized by the presence of frictions that
prevent the equilibrium allocation from being Pareto optimal, it need not be the case that
the introduction of an additional distortion diminishes welfare.36 In this framework, such
frictions are represented by the inability of the fiscal authority in H to commit to repay
debt in the terminal-period crisis state. There indeed exist equilibrium allocations in this
model where aggregate welfare in the economic union with a full bailout promise is higher
than that attained absent such a distortion. The introduction of a bailout promise distorts
the allocation in F , inducing excessive risk-taking and leverage. In country H, subject
to the limited commitment friction, the same distortion determines a higher price of debt
issued, allowing for additional borrowing. When borrowing frictions are sufficiently severe,
due for example to scarce initial-period resources inH, the benefits of redistribution would
outweigh the costs of distortion, making a bailout promise desirable.
Consider welfare in the union as the sum of welfare in the two countries, as function
of the initial period income shock in H, ǫ:
V (ǫ) = VH (ǫ) + VF (ǫ)
36A canonical reference is Lipsey and Lancaster (1956).
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We are interested in studying the change in aggregate welfare when comparing an al-
location with no bailout promise, ξ = 0, to another one with bailout, e.g. ξ = 1. It is
possible to analytically compare welfare in the union across these two different allocations
by focusing on the limiting case where π, the probability of repayment by H, tends to
zero.37 Absent a bailout promise, neither H nor F would engage in financial trade, for
opposite reasons. The flat endowment profile in F ensures that this country achieves in
financial autarky the optimal allocation of consumption across periods and states, so that
no borrowing or lending takes place:
c∗1 = c
∗
2 = y
∗.
Scarcity of initial period resources, implies instead the presence of a borrowing motive in
H. It cannot borrow if default is certain, however, as debt is issued at price qH = βπ = 0.
The lower the initial period endowment, then, the higher is marginal utility of initial-
period consumption in H and the more skewed will be the consumption profile in this
country:
c1 = y − ǫ, c2,D = yL, c2,R = y
When a bailout promise is offered, default by H still occurs with certainty, as π →
0, but F is now willing to lend, financing asset purchases with own resources and by
borrowing from ROW . Lending simply amounts to a free transfer of resources to H, so
that wealth in F falls as consequence of the bailout distortion. H receives resources in the
initial period, when they are the most needed, and its welfare rises in this allocation.38
Importantly, the welfare gain in H is increasing in the initial period shock, ǫ, by concavity
of the utility function. Hence, as welfare in F is unaffected by ǫ in either the full or no-
bailout promise allocations, the following result can be established:
Proposition 2. For a sufficiently high value ǫ¯ of the initial period shock ǫ, an allocation
with bailout promise, ξ = 1 delivers aggregate welfare V (ǫ) that is equivalent to that
37As in the previous discussion on intermediation, I am considering here an allocation with no
transport costs and constant good prices determined by ROW . As prices are constant, I am also
ignoring endowments of the two different goods and focusing simply on total endowments y and
y∗.
38The amount of borrowing by H is bounded above by the amount of resources available in the
repayment state, as except in the limit π > 0 holds, and marginal utility of consumption would
otherwise be unbounded if H had to repay debt.
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attained in the allocation where no bailout is promised, ξ = 0. The bailout promise
allocation is preferable to the no-bailout one for values of ǫ above that threshold.
Proof. See appendix 1.F.
Intuitively, the bailout distortion allows resources to be transferred across members of
the union. This transfer, however, is only desirable if resources in the destination country
are sufficiently scarce.
The above result on optimality of bailout promises can help to shed light on the
rationale for the introduction of similar distortions in the euro area. At the cost of
generating critical financial linkages, implicit subsidies on cross-border asset holdings
may have contributed to a relaxation of borrowing limits faced by peripheral countries.
The relaxation of such constraints could have been seen as desirable, in turn, if relative
incomes in these countries were expected to converge.
1.4 An infinite-horizon model of gross capital flows
and debt crises
I introduce in this section a quantitative model of countries in an economic union, trading
among each other and with the rest of the world in goods and financial assets. The purpose
of the model is to quantitatively assess the ability of policy distortions on financial trade
in a union to explain the recent European experience in terms of capital flows.
In the model, the introduction of a subsidy on cross-border holdings of assets in an
economic union generates predictions for current account and gross external positions
that are in line with empirical evidence for the euro area. In addition, the model predicts
that countries with substantial external liabilities are more severely affected by a debt
crisis when their creditor countries coincide with the main destination of their exports.
The next subsection presents the infinite-horizon model. Two model economies are
considered, characterized by different treatment of risky assets within the economic union.
Thereafter, I present the calibration of the model to properties of euro area countries prior
to the inception of the EMU and I describe the steady state allocation. Finally, I present
results of the two quantitative experiments I consider. First, I consider the dynamic
transition of the model economy after the introduction of subsidies on risky assets in
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the economic union. I analyze, in particular, the implications of this change on current
account imbalances and on intermediation within the union of gross capital flows from
the rest of the world. Second, I analyze a debt crisis, describing its transmission and
amplification via financial and trade linkages among member countries of an economic
union.
1.4.1 Infinite-horizon model
Environment. The world economy is inhabited by a continuum of unit measure of
small open economies, I, and by the rest of the world, ROW . The small open economies
in I will be referred to as countries and they are indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. Each country
is inhabited by a continuum of identical households. Time is discrete and indexed by t.
There are two types of goods, A and B. Good A is freely tradable across all country
pairs, while trade in good B between ROW and countries in I is subject to an iceberg
transport cost τ .39 Each country in I receives a stream of endowments of either type of
good. F = [0, κ] denotes the subset of countries in I that receive endowments of good
A, while countries in the complementary set, H = (κ, 1], receive endowments of good
B. Good A is the numeraire in the world economy. Each country receives a stream
of endowments {yi,t}∞t=0 which is determined according to a stochastic Markov process.
The process is i.i.d. across countries and there is no aggregate uncertainty in the world
economy.
Households in each country i enjoy consumption of both types of good. Preferences
of the representative household over consumption paths are indexed according to:
Ui = E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu (ci,t), (1.18)
where E0 is the mathematical expectation operator conditional on information available
at time zero, β is the subjective discount fator and ci,t denotes aggregate consumption in
i. The period utility function takes the CRRA form u (c) = c
1−γ
1−γ , where the parameter γ
captures the degree of relative risk aversion. In each period, aggregate consumption by
39This assumption on heterogeneous transport costs is the same one made in the model of
Section 1.3.
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the representative household is defined as the CES aggregator:
ci =
[
a
1
ϑ c
ϑ−1
ϑ
A,i + (1− a)
1
ϑ c
ϑ−1
ϑ
B,i
] ϑ
ϑ−1
(1.19)
where ϑ represents the elasticity of substitution between the two types of consumption
good and a ∈ (0, 1) is the utility weight of good of type A.
ROW is represented by a large, risk-neutral agent, enjoying consumption of both
goods. ROW is relatively more patient than households in the economic union. Its
stochastic discount factor, βROW > β pins down the price of a risk-free asset in the world
economy, qROW = βROW .40 The relative price of good B in ROW is given by pROWB .
Risky sovereign debt. All countries in I can buy risk-free assets issued by ROW .
In addition, countries in the economic union issue risky debt on international financial
markets. External debt is subject to a simple non-repayment friction: For a given amount
of debt issued by i, lenders will fail to receive debt repayments with probability 1 − π.
The exogenous repayment probability π is function of current-period output yi and of the
amount of debt issued. The function determining π is increasing in yi and decreasing in
issued debt.41 I denote by bi holdings by i of risk-free assets issued by ROW . Negative
values of bi indicate that i owes debt. Adopting recursive notation, b
′
i denotes current-
period purchases of assets or, for b′i < 0, debt issuance. As assets issued by ROW are
risk-free, π = 1 if b′ > 0. All agents have full information on non-repayment probabilities.
Lenders in ROW behave competitively, and they are willing to buy debt issued by i as
long as the price of this asset compensates them for non-repayment risk. The price at
which i can issue debt to ROW is then given by the function
q
(
yi, b
′
i
)
= qROWπ
(
yi, b
′
i
)
. (1.20)
The debt price function inherits properties of π. In particular, the price of debt issued by
i is decreasing in its quantity. Borrowers always repay debt in full, even though a fraction
of debt repayments are not received by lenders.42 This assumption captures in a simple
40As in other models of external debt this assumption ensures that β/qROW < 1, ruling out
divergence of external positions in presence of a borrowing limit. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003)
review properties of alternative stationarity-inducing methods in similar frameworks.
41In addition, I assume that the function is continuously differentiable in both arguments.
42I assume that resources paid by borrowers but not received by lenders are lost.
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way sovereign risk faced by creditors on international financial markets. In addition, as
the probability of non-repayment is priced by lenders, borrowers have to take into account
how the quantity of debt they issue affects its price. These features will be crucial to our
analysis on the direction of international capital flows and intermediation in an economic
union.43
Equilibrium in no-bailout economy. Consider the case where, in all countries in
the economic union I, no distortions are imposed on households’ trade in financial assets.
In particular, no bailout is offered in the event of losses suffered on risky assets. In this
scenario, it is optimal for all countries in i to trade in financial assets solely with ROW .44
The budget constraint of the representative household in i is given in each period by:
pci + q
(
yi, b
′
i
)
b′i = piyi + bi. (1.21)
The relative price of the endowment good received by i is given by pi. This price takes
value of unity if i ∈ F and it receives an endowment of good A, and it is given by pB other-
wise. The relative price of the consumption basket c is given by p =
[
a+ (1− a) p1−ϑB
] 1
1−ϑ
.
Again, bond holdings by i are given by bi. Negative values of this variable indicate that
the economy owes debt to ROW . Note that the amount of resources that i can raise on
international financial markets is bounded, as the price at which debt is sold is decreasing
in the amount issued.
The problem solved by the representative household in i is to maximize expected
43The simplifying assumption that debt is always repaid in full allows me to study the pattern of
intermediation and current account imbalances while ignoring optimal default choice by borrowers.
In particular, I disregard strategic considerations by borrowers that would arise when issuing
defaultable debt whose price does not reflect the true default probability. While interesting, these
issues fall beyond the scope of this chapter. The reader is referred to Conesa and Kehoe (2015)
for an analysis of the strategic interaction between sovereign borrowers and lenders in a model of
self-fulfilling debt crisis.
44Risky assets issued by other economies in I could be purchased by countries in the economic
union. As these assets are priced by a risk-neutral agent, ROW , and they do not offer insurance
against own income risk, it is not optimal for the risk-averse households in I to hold positive
amounts of them.
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lifetime utility (1.18) subject to the sequence of budget constraints (1.21):
Vi (yi, bi) = max
b′i,ci
{
u (ci) + βE
[
Vk
(
y′i, b
′
i
)]}
s.t. pci + q
(
yi, b
′
i
)
b′i = piyi + bi,
(1.22)
where Vi denotes the value function of a generic country i, and it is given by either VH or
VF , depending on the type of good i is endowed with. The solution can be summarized
by the following intertemporal optimality condition,
u′ (ci)
p
(
q
(
yi, b
′
i
)
+
∂q
∂b′i
b′i
)
= βE
[
u′ (c′i)
p′
]
, (1.23)
equating the discounted marginal cost of an additional unit of debt with its marginal ben-
efit, taking into account how a marginal increase in debt issued affects its price q (yi, b
′
i).
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Households allocate consumption across the two goods according to standard CES
demand:
cA,i = a
(
1
p
)−ϑ
ci , cB,i = (1− a)
(
pB
p
)−ϑ
ci. (1.24)
Finally, the aggregate amount of good B that countries in I are endowed with is given
by
yB =
∫
i∈H
yi di.
Absent aggregate uncertainty, the aggregate endowment of goods in I is constant by
the law of large numbers,
∫
i∈I yi di = E [yi], where E [yi] is the unconditional expected
value of yi. Given intra-temporal demand, (1.24), and defining aggregate consumption as
c =
∫
i∈I ci di, aggregate consumption of good B in I is given by:
cB =
∫
i∈I
cB,i di = (1− a)
(
pB
p
)−ϑ
c. (1.25)
Due to the presence of transport costs, the relative price of B prevailing in I, pB,
may differ from the one in ROW , pROWB . If gains from trade are not sufficiently large to
outweigh transport costs, no trade in good B occurs between I and ROW .46 When no
45Differently than in standard Euler equations in Eaton-Gersovitz frameworks, repayment occurs
here in all states of the world. Hence, the expectation operator is conditional on information
available in the current period only and not on a particular realization of the following-period
exogenous state.
46Formally, no trade occurs in the range pB ∈
(
(1− τ) pROWB , 11−τ pROWB
)
. Trade in good
B between I and ROW only emerges if total demand for good B, (1.25), would imply pB /∈(
(1− τ) pROWB , 11−τ pROWB
)
when cB = yB .
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trade with ROW occurs, the aggregate endowment in I of good B is entirely consumed
within the union, and pB is determined according to (1.25), with cB = yB.
I now define a competitive equilibrium in the world economy when no bailout is
promised.
Definition 2. A recursive competitive equilibrium in the no-bailout economy is defined as
a set of functions pB, ci, cA,i, cB,i, b
′
i for i ∈ {H,F} that solve households’ optimization
problems and clear the market for good B, as well as by a transition function Γ for the
joint distribution of (y, b):
• Consumption ci (y, b) and bond holdings b′i (y, b) solve households’ maximization
problem (1.22) for countries i in either H or F
• Consumption of individual goods cA,i (y, b), cB,i (y, b) solves the intra-temporal al-
location (1.24)
• The relative price pB ensures market clearing for good B, yB =
∫
i∈I (1− a)
(
pB
p
)−ϑ
ci di
if no trade in good B between I and ROW occurs, yB = cB, and it is determined
consistently with transport costs and with the price prevailing in world markets oth-
erwise:
pB =


(1− τ) p∗B if yB > cB
1
(1−τ)p
∗
B if yB < cB
(1.26)
• The Markov transition probability of the exogenous shock process for y and the
optimal choice of bond holdings determine the transition function Γ for the joint
distribution of (y, b) in H and F .
Equilibrium in the economy with full bailout promises. Consider now the
case where, in all countries in I, the domestic government offers a bailout promise to all
households holding risky assets issued by other members of the union. The government
in each i offers to its residents a full bailout promise, if they were not to receive payments
they are owed on holdings of risky sovereign debt. Due to the full bailout promise,
households perceive assets issued by all other union members as being perfect substitutes
for each other, even though they differ in terms of repayment probabilities. The bailout
promise is only offered if the total amount of liabilities issued by each individual borrower
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j falls below a certain threshold b¯: bj ≥ b¯ (yj).47 In every period, the government in each
i finances bailout payments to asset holders in i by setting a lump-sum tax Ti that is paid
by all households in the country. Define b˜i,j as holdings by the representative household in
i of debt issued by j. The amount of resources that is lost by the representative household
in i on risky assets issued by other union members is given by
∫
j∈I
[
1− π
(
yj,−1, b˜j
)]
b˜ijdj.
As the government fully compensates asset holders for losses incurred on risky debt, the
amount of tax that is paid by the representative household in each period is exactly equal
to the aggregate amount of resources that are lost by bond holders:48
Ti =
∫
j∈I
[
1− π
(
yj,−1, b˜j
)]
b˜ijdj. (1.27)
Countries in the union only differ ex-ante in terms of the type of good they are
endowed with, which is given by A or B depending on whether i belongs to the set F
or H. Depending on their wealth and realization of the exogenous shock, economies
optimally choose to behave as gross savers, buying gross assets issued by union members
and issuing gross liabilities to ROW , or whether to be borrowers instead, simply issuing
debt to other countries in the union.
In gross saving countries, households can buy assets issued by other countries in the
union and they can issue liabilities to ROW . I define b˜i =
∫
j∈I b˜ijdj. as the aggregate
amount of union-issued assets that is held by the representative household in country i.
The price bid by union members for bonds issued by other countries in I is given by q˜.
Due to perfect substitutability implied by the full bailout promise, the price q˜ is identical
across all issuers in I. As in the no-bailout setting, bi denotes holdings by i of risk-free
bonds issued by ROW . This variable takes negative values when i owes gross liabilities to
ROW . Beginning-of-period net wealth of the representative household in a gross saving
country is defined as gross assets, net of gross liabilities owed to ROW and of taxes paid to
the domestic government: ni = b˜i+bi−Ti. Note that, even though it enjoys a full bailout
promise, the representative household still incurs in losses on holdings of gross assets, as
47As in Section 1.3, this restriction on bailout promises is required to impose a borrowing limit
and to prevent borrowers’ liability positions from growing unbounded. In an endogenous sovereign
default setting, a similar assumption is made by Ayres, Navarro, Nicolini and Teles (2015).
48By the law of large numbers, π
(
yj , b
′
j
)
both indicates the probability of repayment by a given
economy with y = yj , b
′ = b′j as well as the total fraction of resources that are received by a lender
on his holdings of assets issued by all economies with y = yj , b
′ = b′j .
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bailout transfers are financed by taxation. The budget constraint of the representative
household in a gross saving country is given by:
pci + q˜b˜
′
i + q
(
yi, b
′
i
)
b′i = piyi + ni (1.28)
describing how purchases of consumption and gross assets are financed with own resources,
ni, and by issuing liabilities to ROW .
The problem faced by the representative household in each country i includes as a
state variable aggregate wealth in the country itself, Ni. Aggregate wealth is a state
variable as it allows individual households to forecast the next-period value of gross asset
holdings in i, which determines in turn next-period taxation, according to (1.27).49 I
define Φ (yi, Ni) as the forecast for the next-period value of aggregate wealth, N
′
i , given
the current aggregate state in i, (yi, Ni). The other state variables for the household
are given by its net wealth, ni, and by the realization of the endowment shock yi. The
maximization problem solved by the representative household in a gross saving country
is the following:
V Si (yi, ni, Ni) = max
b′i, b˜
′
i>0,
{
u (ci) + βE
[
Vi
(
y′i, n
′
i, N
′
i
)]}
s.t. pci + q
(
yi, b
′
i
)
b′i + q˜b˜
′
i = piyi + ni
n′i = b˜
′
i + b
′
i − T ′i
N ′i = Φ(yi, Ni)
(1.29)
Country i is not restricted to be a gross saver in the following period, hence the continu-
ation value of households is not given by V Si (·) but rather by Vi (·), to be defined shortly.
I define ̟ as the subset of the state space where a solution to the problem in (1.29) exists
with positive holdings of gross assets, b˜′i > 0: ̟ =
{
(y, n,N) | b˜′i (y, n,N) > 0
}
. The
solution to the household problem implies a law of motion for net wealth of the repre-
sentative household, n′ (yi, ni, Ni), which, in general, differs from the perceived aggregate
one, N ′i = Φ(yi, Ni). The two must coincide in equilibrium.
49The optimization problem in Bianchi (2011) exhibits similar features, in the presence of a
pecuniary externality. Here, the household fails to internalize the effect on taxation of its choice
for gross assets. There, household choices determine relative goods prices that affect in turn the
severity of a borrowing constraint.
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The problem can be summarized by the following system of two Euler equations, for
gross liabilities and gross assets, respectively:
u′ (ci)
(
q
(
yi, b
′
i
)
+
∂q
∂b′i
b′i
)
= βE
[
u′
(
c′i
)]
(1.30)
u′ (ci) q˜ = βE
[
u′
(
c′i
)]
. (1.31)
In a gross saver country, the portfolio of gross asset and liability positions of the
representative household is set by equating the price of gross assets q˜ with the amount
of resources obtained by issuing a marginal unit of debt, q (yi, b
′
i) +
∂q
∂b′i
b′i, as gross assets
and gross liabilities are equally perceived as risk-free. In equilibrium, the amount of debt
issued to ROW is pinned down by the arbitrage condition:
q˜ = q
(
yi, b
′
i
)
+
∂q
∂b′i
b′i. (1.32)
In borrowing countries, the representative household issues debt to other union mem-
bers at the constant price q˜. Country i is a borrower if, given the vector of state variables
of the representative household (yi, Ni, ni), there exists no solution to the maximization
problem in (1.29) with positive holdings of gross assets, b˜′i > 0.
50 The budget constraint
of the representative household in a borrowing country is given by:
pci + q˜b˜
′
i = piyi + ni
The problem faced by the representative household in a borrowing country is the following:
V Bi (yi, ni, Ni) = max
b˜′i≥0
{
u (c) + βE
[
Vi
(
y′i, b˜
′
i, N
′
i
)]}
s.t. pci + q˜b˜
′
i = piyi + ni
b˜′i ≥ b¯ (yi)
n′i = b˜
′
i
N ′i = Φ(yi, Ni) .
(1.33)
Households in borrowing countries do not purchase gross assets, hence no taxes are due
in the following period, as there are no bailout transfers to be made to residents by the
50In principle, it should be possible for borrowing countries to be able to issue debt to ROW .
This restriction can be relaxed only at substantial cost, from a computational point of view. In
the numerical solution of this model, only a small subset of borrowing countries would issue debt
at a higher price if trading with ROW .
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domestic government. Next-period net wealth simply follows from the amount of debt
issued in the current period, as borrowers always repay their debt in full. The borrowing
constraint b˜′i ≥ b¯ (yi) stems from the limited bailout promise that is offered to gross savers
in the union, as they are only willing to bid q˜ on debt issued by i if the amount issued
is below b¯ (yi). The Euler equation describing the solution to borrowers’ problem is the
following:
u′ (ci) q˜ = βE
[
u′
(
c′i
)]
.
Borrowers do not take into account how marginal debt issues affect the repayment proba-
bility π. This occurs due to the presence of the bailout promise, as lenders do not require
to be compensated for non-repayment risk associated with individual assets.
For gross savers and borrowers alike, the intra-temporal allocation of consumption
across the two goods, A and B, is determined according to CES demand, (1.24), as in the
no-bailout setting.
I can now define the value function of the representative household in a generic country
i, Vi (yi, ni, Ni), as the value function of a gross saving country, V
S
k (yi, ni, Ni), in the
subset of the state space ̟ where a solution to the problem in (1.29) with positive b˜′
exists. In the complementary subset of the state space, the country i is a borrower and
its value function is given by V Bi (yi, ni, Ni):
Vi (yi, Ni, Ni) =


V Si (yi, Ni, Ni) if (y,N) ∈ ̟
V Bi (yi, Ni, Ni) otherwise.
(1.34)
I now define an equilibrium in the economy with bailout promises.
Definition 3. A recursive competitive equilibrium in the economy with bailout promises
is defined as a set of functions ci, cA,i, cB,i, b˜
′
i, b
′
i, θi for i ∈ {H,F}, pB, q˜ that solve
households’ optimization problems and clear the markets for assets traded in the union and
for good B, as well as by a perceived law of motion for wealth Φ (yi, Ni) and a transition
function Γ for the joint distribution of (y,N):
• In the state space subset ̟ where a solution to the problem in (1.29) with positive
b˜ exists, consumption ci (y, n,N), bond holdings of union-issued assets b˜
′
i (y, n,N)
and of ROW assets b′i (y, n,N) solve gross savers’ maximization problem (1.29) for
countries i in either H or F
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• In the complement subset to ̟, consumption ci (y, n,N) and bond holdings of union-
issued assets b˜′i (y, n,N) solve borrowers’ maximization problem (1.33) for countries
i in either H or F
• In gross saving countries, taxes Ti are consistent with losses incurred on gross assets
held in each country, according to (1.27).
• Consumption of individual goods cA,i (y, b), cB,i (y, b) solve intra-temporal allocation
(1.24) for all i
• The price q˜ ensures market clearing for assets traded within the union:
∫
b˜idi = 0
• The relative price pB ensures market clearing for good B, yB = (1− a)
(
pB
p
)−ϑ ∫
i∈I ci di
if no trade in good B between I and ROW occurs, yB = cB, and it is determined
consistently with transport costs and with the price prevailing in world markets oth-
erwise:
pB =


(1− τ) p∗B if yB > cB
1
(1−τ)p
∗
B if yB < cB
(1.35)
• The aggregate law of motion for wealth perceived by the representative household
in each country, N ′ = Φ(y,N), coincides with the one implied by the optimization
problems (1.29) and (1.33).
• The Markov transition probability for the exogenous shock and the optimal choice
of bond holdings determine the the transition function Γ for the joint distribution
of (y,N) in H and F .
Calibration. The model cannot be solved analytically and I obtain its numerical so-
lution via a global solution method. The algorithm is described in detail in Appendix
A.6. Choices for parameter values closely follow the literature on open-economy macroe-
conomics. Parameter values and calibration targets are reported in Table 1.1. In order to
compare simulated series from the model with empirical evidence on the current account,
the model is calibrated at quarterly frequency.
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The subjective discount factor in ROW , qROW , is set to match a world risk-free real
interest rate of 2.5%, consistently with evidence reported in King and Low (2014) for the
world real interest rate. Due to the presence of a downward secular trend in world interest
rates, this value understates the risk-free rate prevailing in the pre-EMU period, while it
can describe well the low interest rate environment observed in the world economy in the
2000s.51
The exogenous function π (y, b′), determining the probability that sovereign debt re-
payments are not received by lenders, takes value of unity for b′ ≥ 0 and it has the
following functional form otherwise:
π
(
y, b′
)
=
(η − 1) b¯η
(η − 1) b¯η + (−b′/y)η (1.36)
where b¯ and η are parameters. The price of debt issued to ROW by economies in I is then
given by q (y, b′) = qROWπ (y, b′) which is continuous, differentiable and positive for all
real values of b′. The upper bound for resources raised on international financial markets
when debt is priced by ROW is given by the solution to
max
b′
(−q (y, b′) b′) .
The value for b′ that maximizes resources raised by borrowing is given by
argmax
b′
(−q (y, b′) b′)
which, from the function in (1.36), is given by yb¯. I set the upper threshold for borrowers’
debt above which bailout promises are not offered to this value: b¯ (y) = yb¯.
The parameters b¯, and η are set to match properties of the distribution of external
positions and interest rates in euro area economies before the inception of the monetary
union. I set the parameter b¯ to calibrate the aggregate net foreign asset-to-GDP ratio for
countries in I. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) report a value of -10.3% of this variable
for the euro area in 1998. As data are not reported prior to this year, I set this variable
to a slightly higher value, -7.5%, noting that the net foreign asset position of all major
member economies was deteriorating in the years preceding 1998.
51Empirical evidence on the secular decline in interest rates is, again, presented by King and
Low (2014). Thwaites (2015) presents an explanation based on the contextual observation of a
secular decline in the price of investment goods.
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By governing the elasticity of non-repayment probability with respect to liabilities,
the parameter η can be set to target the dispersion in interest rates on debt issued by
countries in I. The spread in the real interest rate paid by borrowers between the poorest
and wealthiest decile of the stationary distribution in I is set to 50 basis points. While this
value seems low when compared to the pre-EMU spread in benchmark nominal interest
rates on European countries’ government bonds, large inflation differentials that were
present between these economies at the time need to be taken into account. For instance,
the spread between benchmark nominal interest rates on Italian and German government
debt equalled 320 basis points in 1996. This difference fell to 60 basis points when
accounting for the inflation differential between the two countries.52
In order to rule out divergence of net foreign asset positions of individual countries in
I, the subjective discount factor in I, β is set to be slightly lower that the one in ROW .
By implication, the median real interest rate in I is slightly higher than the world risk-free
rate, by 25 basis points.
Endowment streams are determined according to the autoregressive stochastic process:
log (yi,t) = (1− ρy)µy + ρy log (yi,t−1) + ǫi,t, (1.37)
where ǫi,t is a normally distributed, zero-mean, i.i.d shock with standard deviation σǫ.
To normalize the unconditional mean of yi to unity, µy, is set to equal −12 σ
2
ǫ
1−ρ2y
. The
standard deviation σǫ and the autoregressive parameter ρy are set to match standard
deviation and autocorrelation of 1.5% and 0.88, respectively, of HP-filtered GDP for euro-
area economies. In the numerical solution, the process is approximated by a discretized
process obtained via the Rouwenhorst method (Rouwenhorst, 1995, Kopecky and Suen,
2010).
Relative risk aversion of households in I, γ, is set to the standard value of 2.53 The
elasticity of intra-temporal substitution between A and B good, ϑ, is set to 0.85, following
the value adopted in Corsetti, Dedola, Leduc (2008) for the elasticity between domestic
and foreign goods. The relative mass of countries in the set H, specialized in output of
high-trade cost good B is given by 1 − κ, which I set to 0.15 to match the relative size
of Greece, Portugal and Spain to the euro area, consistently with evidence of low average
52Source: Eurostat, EMU convergence criterion bond yields and OECD, consumer price index.
53See, e.g. Backus, Kehoe, Kydland (1994), Corsetti, Dedola, Leduc (2008).
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Table 1.1: Parameter values
Calibrated Parameter Value Target / Source
Discount factor in I β .9914 Average interest rate in I
Discount factor in ROW βROW .9938 World real interest rate
Relative risk aversion in I γ 2 Standard
Bailout promise limit b¯ 1.5 Average euro area NFA
Repayment probability, debt elasticity η 4
Italy - Germany,
pre-EMU spread
Relative size of H,F κ .85
Relative size of Greece,
Portugal, Spain
Utility weight of good A a = κ Normalize pB = 1 in autarky
Intra-temporal elasticity of substitution ϑ .85 Corsetti, Dedola, Leduc (2008)
Output process, autocorrelation ρy .88 Euro area GDP
Output process, standard deviation σǫ .015 Euro area GDP
tradability of output in these countries, as presented in Section 1.2. The utility weight
a is set to equal relative abundance of the two goods, κ, in order to normalize to unity
the relative price pB, in autarky. Finally, the iceberg transport cost τ is set to the value
of 3%. This value is extremely low in comparison with estimates for typical trade costs
presented by Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004). Even for this value of τ , no trade in B
with ROW emerges in the numerical solution of this model.54
1.4.2 Imbalances, intermediation and crisis
The objective of the model introduced in this section is to perform a quantitative analysis
of the recent euro area experience, in terms of current account imbalances, expansion of
gross financial positions and crisis. In particular, this model aims to evaluate the role of
54Relative demand and supply for the two goods are set to be equal in autarky. Trade in B
with ROW would only emerge in the presence of extremely large changes in demand by countries
in I, which are not considered here. Large shocks to supply are ruled out by stationariety of the
process for yi and by the law of large numbers.
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subsidies on cross-border holdings of assets in contributing to these facts. To this purpose,
I present here the main properties of the steady state equilibrium allocation in the two
model economies I introduce, the one with no bailout and the one with a full bailout
promise. I then conduct two main quantitative experiments, both describing the dynamic
transition of the model economy after a shock. The shocks I consider allow me to analyze
the introduction of a subsidy on cross-border asset holdings and the occurrence of a debt
crisis in the economic union.
First, I define the steady state equilibrium allocation in the two economies of this
model. Properties of the equilibrium differ substantially between the economies with and
without bailout promise. I describe a key element of the steady state allocation, namely
the policy function for the current account balance in individual countries. Properties
of this policy function are crucial to determine the equilibrium distribution of wealth in
the economic union I. I then proceed to analyze differences in the distribution of wealth
that emerge in the two model economies considered, focusing in particular on differences
in terms of dispersion of net foreign asset positions. I then compare features of the
equilibrium distribution with empirical evidence for the euro area.
Second, I present results from the first of two quantitative experiments. I analyze the
initial phase of the EMU, characterized by current account imbalances and intermediation
of gross capital flows, as discussed in Section 1.2. In order to do so, I consider the
effects of a shock consisting in the introduction of a subsidy on cross-border holdings
of assets, represented by the full bailout promise. I perturb with this shock the steady
state equilibrium of the model economy with no bailout promises, which is calibrated to
replicate quantitative features of euro area countries prior to the introduction of the single
currency. No additional shocks hit the model economy, which is left to transition towards
its new steady state. To analyze current account imbalances, I describe in this context
the simulated path of net foreign assets of individual countries in I, focusing in particular
on choices by countries at the opposite ends of the wealth distribution. In addition, I
compare model predictions in terms of gross external positions with the experience of the
euro area core. To do so, I present the path of gross asset and liability positions of savers
in the model, which describes a pattern of intermediation of international capital flows.
Finally, I conduct an additional experiment to study the later phase of the EMU,
characterized by the occurrence of a sovereign debt crisis. In particular, the aim of this
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experiment is to investigate the role in a crisis of linkages that are distinctive of an
economic union. In the steady state equilibrium of the economy with bailout promise,
countries are linked by cross-border financial exposures, as well as by trade integration.
To simulate a debt crisis, I perturb this equilibrium allocation with a shock amounting
to a fall in the value of union-issued assets held by gross savers. This shock allows me to
concentrate on general equilibrium effects of a debt crisis in an economic union, arising
due to a deterioration in lenders’ net wealth.55 I analyze in this context the heterogeneous
effects of the crisis on countries in I that differ in terms of wealth and exposure to trade
with union partners, highlighting the interaction in a crisis between financial and trade
linkages among countries in a union.
Steady states. A steady state is defined as an equilibrium allocation where all aggre-
gate variables in I are constant, namely the wealth distribution, the relative price pB and,
in the economy with bailout promise, the price of union-issued assets q˜. Note that, even in
a steady state allocation, variables characterizing individual countries are not necessarily
constant. While aggregate uncertainty is not present, idiosyncratic endowment shocks
induce individual countries to accumulate and run down assets. As their external assets
fluctuate, countries move within the equilibrium wealth distribution, which is constant in
steady state.
The policy function for current account balances of individual countries in I deter-
mines the evolution of their net foreign asset position. Differences in this policy function
between the no-bailout and bailout economy stem from the key element characterizing the
allocations, namely the determination of borrowing costs. In the no-bailout allocation,
the price of debt is decreasing in the amount issued, via the function q (y, b′). This is
not the case in the bailout allocation, where individual borrowers can issue debt at the
constant price q˜. Figure 1.5 presents the current account balance policy function in the
two model economies, for a country in F with realization of the endowment process equal
to its stationary mean and for a range of values of net foreign assets.56
55A similar analysis is conducted by Arellano and Bai (2014), who focus on renegotiation after
default. Direct output costs of default in crisis countries are ignored here, as I focus on feedback
and amplification effects that are distinctive of an economic union. These have been treated
extensively in the literature, see e.g. Mendoza and Yue (2012).
56In steady state, the policy function for a similar country in H would be practically identical
50
−0.3 −0.2 −0.1 0 0.1 0.2
−0.1
−0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
Net assets/GDP
C
u
rr
en
t
a
cc
o
u
n
t
/
G
D
P
 
 
No-bailout
Bailout
Figure 1.5: Steady state policy functions for current account, N ′ −N
The current account is presented as a function of net wealth, for a country in F with realization
of the endowment process equal to its stationary mean. No-bailout (red, dashed line) and bailout
(blue, solid line) allocations.
Two key differences emerge between the policy functions arising in equilibrium in
the two model economies. First, a country with high debt chooses to optimally run a
large current account surplus in the no-bailout economy, while this is not the case in the
economy with bailout promises. This result is intuitive when we consider the difference
in borrowing costs faced by debtors in the two models. Through the function q (y, b′), a
highly indebted borrower pays a high interest rate in the no-bailout allocation, and it is
induced to rapidly reduce its external liability position. Consider the case of a country
with net liabilities equal to 35% of yearly output. In the no-bailout economy, this country
would run an extremely large current account surplus, equal to 30% of quarterly output.57
and it is not shown here. This is due to the fact that the steady state relative price pB is constant
and close to unity.
57I express stock variables as ratios of yearly output, as is commonly done when discussing
external debt ratios. As the model is calibrated at quarterly frequency, however, I express flow
variables such as current account balances as ratios to quarterly output. Mean yearly output is
simply given by mean quarterly output times four, so that debt equal to 35% of yearly output
corresponds to 140% of quarterly output.
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In the economy with bailout promise, the current account surplus of a country with the
same level of debt would only equal 1.2% of quarterly output, as the constant price of
debt q˜ induces more moderate savings.
Second, countries with low debt or positive net wealth are induced to save more in
the economy with bailout promises. A country with net external liabilities equal to 8% of
yearly output would run a balanced current account position in the no-bailout economy,
while it would run a current account surplus in the economy with bailout promises,
corresponding to 1.2% of quarterly output. In the bailout economy, current account
surpluses by wealthy countries arise due to two channels. First, the bailout promise
induces households to perceive union-issued assets as risk-free. The price of these assets
is given by q˜, which is lower than that of a truly risk-free asset, qROW . The low price of
assets perceived as risk-free constitutes an incentive to increase saving. Second, households
in gross saving economies pay in each period a tax to their domestic government to
finance bailout transfers on risky assets. The expectation of positive future taxes further
induces saving, as households do not internalize the effect on taxation of their risky assets
purchases.
Differences across the two model economies in terms of policy functions for current
account balances are reflected in the distribution of net foreign assets arising in the two
allocations. Figure 1.6 displays the steady state distribution of net foreign assets in the
no-bailout economy and in the economy with full bailout promises.
The net foreign assets distribution is substantially wider in the economy with full
bailout promises. The difference in net foreign assets between a country at the ninetieth
percentile of the wealth distribution and one at the tenth percentile amounts to 25% of
mean output in the steady state of the economy with full bailout promises. For compari-
son, the same difference amounts to just 3% of output in the economy with no bailout. As
the stochastic process driving endowment realizations is the same in the two economies,
the widening of the distribution is due to differences in agents’ optimal choices across the
two models.
The two main differences across policy functions in the two model economies are
crucial to explain differences in the equilibrium distributions of net foreign assets. First,
choices made by high-debt countries explain why we observe more mass to the left of
the distribution in the economy with bailout promises. High saving by countries with
52
high debt in the no-bailout economy implies that the mass of countries in this tail of
the distribution falls steeply as net foreign assets decrease. In the economy with bailout
promises, as high-debt countries run smaller current account surpluses, a larger mass of
countries can be found in correspondence of high negative levels of net foreign assets. In
addition, a positive mass of countries is against the borrowing constraint implied by b¯.
Second, in the economy with bailout promises, the stronger incentive to save implied by
the high perceived return on union-issued assets leads wealthy countries to run smaller
current account deficits. As economies with positive net foreign asset positions run down
their wealth to a lesser degree when a bailout promise is offered, a larger mass of countries
is found in the right tail of the wealth distribution.
The widening of net foreign assets distributions observed comparing steady state equi-
libria in the two model economies is comparable with the one observed in the euro area
between the inception of the monetary union and the global financial crisis. Figure 1.7
shows net foreign asset positions of core and periphery countries in the euro area in two
different years, in 2001, at the inception of the monetary union, and before the global
financial crisis, in 2007, as ratio to euro area GDP.58 The range of net foreign asset posi-
tions in these countries widened substantially in this period, rising from 6% of euro area
GDP in 2001 to 16% in 2007, similarly to the the prediction of this model on the effects
of of subsidies on cross-border holdings of assets.59
The inception of the EMU: Current account imbalances and intermedi-
ation. I present here results for the first of the two quantitative experiments I conduct
by means of the infinite-horizon model. Aim of this experiment is to quantitatively assess
the implications on current account balances and gross capital flows of the introduction
of a full bailout promise on assets issued within the union. First, I will describe the type
of experiment considered and the shock hitting the model economy. Second, I will present
simulations for equilibrium net foreign asset positions in two countries located at opposite
tails of the wealth distribution. Finally, I will analyze the path of gross capital flows in a
country with relatively high initial net foreign assets.
58Data are drawn from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007).
59The widening of euro area net foreign asset positions is not entirely surprising, given the
observation of current account imbalances discussed in Section 1.2 and the close relationship
between the two variables.
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Figure 1.6: Steady state wealth distributions
The two distributions are the ones emerging in the equilibrium allocations of the no-bailout and
bailout economies. Values on the y-axis represent masses of countries in intervals of the wealth
distribution spanning 0.1% of mean yearly output.
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Figure 1.7: Net foreign asset positions of core and periphery euro area economies
Data are for 2001 and 2007, expressed as ratio of euro area GDP. Source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
(2007) and own calculations.
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The experiment I conduct is the following. Consider the steady state equilibrium
allocation of the economy with no bailout promises. As discussed, parameter values
are calibrated for quantitative properties of this allocation to replicate features of euro
area economies, before the inception of the monetary union. I perturb this equilibrium
allocation by introducing a full bailout promise on assets issued within the union. The
shock is entirely unexpected by agents in the model. Thereafter, no other shocks hit the
economy, which corresponds now to the economy with full bailout promise described in
Section 1.4.1.
I consider the dynamic transition of variables chosen in equilibrium by individual
countries during the transition towards the new steady state of the economy. The effects
of the shock considered are heterogeneous across countries in the distribution.60 In order
to correctly isolate the effects of the shock on individual countries, I compare simulated
series for choices made during the transition by a generic economy i, characterized by the
pair (yi, Ni), with choices the same country would make in a counterfactual simulation
where the bailout promise is not introduced.61
To replicate the experience of peripheral countries in the euro area, characterized by
low relative GDP and negative net foreign asset positions at the inception of the monetary
union, I present in Figure 1.8 the path of net foreign assets chosen during the transition by
a country with low endowment realization and high debt. This country is characterized
by a realization of yi two standard deviations below the stationary mean and net foreign
assets corresponding to the tenth percentile of the wealth distribution.
Net foreign assets of the high debt country deteriorate substantially along the transi-
tion after the shock. In the first 24 quarters, net foreign liabilities approximately double,
rising from 9% of yearly output to 17%. The magnitude of this increase in debt is com-
parable with the one observed in the periphery of the euro area. Between 2001 and 2007
60This is due to the fact that policy functions characterizing agents’ optimal choice are not, in
general, linear in the state variables.
61In general, choices made in the counterfactual simulation will not be constant, as the country
is hit by idiosyncratic shocks and it moves within the stationary distribution. Hence, I need to
ensure that simulated series do not reflect implications of a particular draw of idiosyncratic shocks
during the transition. I address this concern by presenting median values of variables, given a
large number of simulations for the sequence of idiosyncratic shocks hitting i. The same draws
for the exogenous process are considered across transition and counterfactual simulations.
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net foreign liabilities of peripheral countries increased by 160% as a ratio to euro area
GDP, as shown already in Figure 1.7.
The deterioration of the net foreign asset position is due to the introduction of the
bailout promise, and to the ensuing reduction in borrowing costs. Consider the path of
net foreign assets chosen in the counterfactual simulation, where the bailout promise is
not introduced. We would observe there a moderate increase in net foreign assets of this
debtor country. Notwithstanding the borrowing motive implied by the low endowment
realization, this country would face high borrowing costs due to high external liabilities,
via the function q (y, b′). Hence, it would optimally choose to run current account sur-
pluses, to reduce interest payments on external debt. This saving motive is not present
when this country can issue debt to savers in the union at price q˜.
The experience of core countries in the euro area, characterized by higher than average
income and wealth, can be analyzed in the model by focusing on the path of net foreign
assets chosen by a country with high endowment realization and relatively high net foreign
assets. Simulated series for a country at the ninetieth percentile of the wealth distribution
and with a realization of the endowment shock two standard deviations above the long-run
mean are presented in Figure 1.9.
The high wealth country optimally runs large current account surpluses in response to
the introduction of the bailout promise. In the simulation, this country lets its net foreign
asset position improve by 13 percentage points of yearly output in the first 24 quarters
after the shock, rising to 8% of yearly output from a negative position of -5%. The
rise in current account surplus observed in the model is especially large when compared
to the one arising in the counterfactual simulation. There, this country would let its
assets diminish to finance consumption, running current account deficits. As discussed,
features of the allocation with bailout promise induce wealthy countries to increase their
savings. Higher returns on union-issued assets and the expectation of future taxes, as
needed to finance bailout transfers, induce households in wealthy countries to increase
their net savings. This simulated pattern is similar to the one observed in some core euro
area economies, where, for instance, a large increase in the net foreign asset position was
observed in Germany between 2001 and 2007. Positive current account surpluses also
characterized the experience of Austria, Belgium and Netherlands.
The evolution of gross external positions in the model displays a pattern of interme-
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Figure 1.8: Transition after introduction of bailout promise. High-debt, low-income
country
The blue, solid line represents the net foreign asset position chosen by a high-debt, low-income
country after the introduction of the bailout promise. The red, dashed line displays the counter-
factual simulation for the same country if no bailout promise is introduced.
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Figure 1.9: Transition after introduction of bailout promise. Low-debt, high-income
country
The blue, solid line represents the net foreign asset position chosen by a low-debt, high-income
country after the introduction of the bailout promise. The red, dashed line displays the counter-
factual simulation for the same country if no bailout promise is introduced.
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diation of international capital flows, not dissimilar to the one observed in core euro area
economies. Figure 1.10 displays gross asset and liability positions after the introduction
of the bailout promise, for the same high wealth country previously considered.62
Two main results emerge. First, we observe an expansion of gross external positions.
In the first twenty quarters after the introduction of the bailout promise, gross asset
and liability positions both widen in this country. By implication, the amount of gross
assets held on the external balance sheet is larger than net foreign assets, as the country
leverages by accumulating positive gross liabilities.
Second, gross asset and liability positions differ in terms of counterparty identity and
risk. While the former are held by the wealthy country against partners in the union, the
latter are issued to ROW . In addition, liabilities are always repaid in full, while losses
are incurred on risky assets.
Predictions of the model for gross capital flows are quantitatively and qualitatively
close to the observation of intermediation that characterized countries in the euro area.
In particular, intermediation of gross capital flows was especially prominent in France.
There, gross assets held against the rest of the euro area rose by 20 percentage points of
GDP between 2001 and 2007, as shown in Figure 1.11. By comparison, gross assets rise
by 15% of yearly output in the model experiment considered. External liabilities against
the rest of the world also rose in France, by 30 percentage point of GDP. This amount is
significantly larger than the one predicted by the model, corresponding to 8% of yearly
output. Finally, the identity of counterparties of external positions is also similar to the
one predicted in the model, with gross assets held against partners in the euro area and
gross liabilities issued to the rest of the world.
Debt crisis in the economic union. I will now consider the quantitative effects of
a debt crisis taking place in the equilibrium allocation of this model. The main purpose of
the experiment conducted here is to analyze how heterogeneous countries in a union are
differently affected by a crisis episode, depending on their wealth and on their exposure
to trade with union partners. First, I will detail the nature of the experiment considered,
62I omit here results from the counterfactual simulation. The evolution of gross financial posi-
tions would be trivial, as all trade in financial assets occurs with ROW absent a bailout promise.
I present again, however, the evolution of net foreign assets during the transition.
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Figure 1.10: Transition after introduction of bailout promise. Gross positions, low
debt, high income country
Gross foreign asset and liability positions of the low debt, high income country are represented
by the black, dashed-dotted line and by the red, dotted line, respectively. The blue, solid line
displays the transition for the net foreign asset position.
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Figure 1.11: Bilateral international investment positions of France
Net positions against counterparties located in the euro area, in the rest of the world, and global
position (World). Source: Waysand, Ross, de Guzman (2010).
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and its relationship with the recent sovereign debt crisis. Second, I will present results
on the implications of the crisis for aggregate consumption, interest rates and prices in
the union. Finally, I will analyze heterogeneous consumption dynamics for large debtors
with different export specialization.
To analyze a debt crisis in the economic union I conduct the following experiment.
Consider the steady state allocation of the economy with full bailout promise. In this
setting, countries in I are tied together by financial linkages in the form of cross-border
exposures. The debt crisis is characterized as an unanticipated fall in the value of gross
assets held by countries in I. The deterioration in asset values can be interpreted as
the consequence of a shock inducing an exceptionally large subset of borrowing countries
to default. After this shock, the economy is left to transition towards its steady state
allocation. By modelling a debt crisis in this fashion, I deliberately abstract from direct
effects of the crisis on the countries where it originates, focusing instead on transmission
and amplification within the economic union. In the simulation presented, the debt crisis
is described as a 16% fall in the aggregate value of gross assets held within the union.63
The transition of aggregate gross assets after the shock is reported in Figure 1.12. As
shown, the value of gross assets held in I reverts endogenously to its steady state value
in approximately 50 quarters.
Aggregate consumption in the union falls by 1.6% in response to the debt crisis, as
shown in Figure 1.13. The magnitude of this fall is comparable with the one observed in
the euro area, where real consumption fell by 1.6% between 2011 and 2013.64 Two main
channels generate the fall in aggregate consumption. First, countries with positive gross
assets are directly affected by the shock. As the value of gross assets deteriorates, their
wealth falls and consumption falls in response. Second, in general equilibrium, debtor
countries are also induced to consume less. As fewer resources are available to borrow
from savers within the union, debtors are forced to reduce their liabilities, which they do
by reducing consumption.
The interest rate charged on borrowers in the union rises by 280 basis points in the
63I assume that the fall in the value of gross assets simply amounts to a net loss in resources,
as it is normally the case for non-repayments on risky assets in this economy.
64Clearly, the debt crisis in the euro area developed over a longer time horizon than the simple
one-time shock considered in this experiment.
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Figure 1.12: Transition after debt crisis, aggregate gross assets
Value of aggregate gross assets held in I, in percentage deviation from steady state.
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Figure 1.13: Transition after debt crisis, consumption
Aggregate consumption in H and F , in percentage deviation from steady state value.
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event of the crisis, as shown in Figure 1.14.65 By comparison, the spread between Italian
and German benchmark bond yields rose by 320 basis points during 2011. The fall in
wealth suffered by savers in the union implies that they are willing to purchase a lower
amount of risky assets. The rise in the interest rate is the channel ensuring that the
market for risky assets clears within I, by inducing debtor countries to deleverage and by
making assets more attractive for savers.
The contraction in aggregate demand in the union determines a change in relative good
prices, causing a fall in pB. In response to lower demand in I, it is possible for countries
in F to costlessly ship their output of good A to ROW , whose demand is unaffected by
the crisis. This is not the case for economies in H producing good B: As transport costs
hinder trade with ROW , when consumption demand is depressed within the union, the
relative price of good B has to fall to clear the market within I.66 As shown in Figure
1.14, the relative price of good B, falls in this experiment by 2.2% in response to the debt
crisis shock.
The implications of a crisis episode are different across countries with high-debt in
H and F . I focus here on countries in the poorest percentile of the wealth distribution,
with income two standard deviations below the long-run mean. Figure 1.15 shows the
deviation in these countries’ consumption between the crisis episode and the counterfac-
tual simulation that would be observed in steady state.67 The high-debt country in H
suffers to a greater degree from the crisis, due to its exposure to trade with partners in
the union. Due to the crisis, consumption in this country is 2.5% lower than it would be
in steady state. The fall in pB implied by the demand deterioration in the union reduces
the value of exports by this country. Being close to the borrowing constraint b¯ due to its
high debt, this country is unable to let changes in its foreign liabilities absorb the adverse
effects of the shock, and the fall in the value of output is reflected in a large contraction
65The yearly interest rate presented here is defined as r˜ = 1
q˜4
− 1.
66Note that the supply of goods A and B remains unchanged, as it is not affected by the debt
crisis shock.
67Similarly to the first experiment considered in this section, the effects of the crisis are hetero-
geneous across countries in the wealth distribution. In order to compare the simulation arising
from the crisis episode with the steady-state counterfactual, I present here the difference between
the two series. As before, series displayed are the median from a large number of simulations,
corresponding to different draws for sequences of the exogenous process.
62
in consumption. The high debt country in F , on the other hand, experiences a milder re-
duction in consumption, smaller than the average consumption fall for countries in I. As
in H, consumption of this country is similar to that of a hand-to-mouth agent, due to the
presence of the borrowing constraint. Here, however, the fall in pB has a beneficial effect,
determining a fall in the price of the aggregate consumption basket. In this country, the
severity of a crisis episode is reduced by the availability of cheaper goods, caused by the
collapse in aggregate demand in the union.
1.5 Concluding remarks
In the past fifteen years, capital flows in the euro area have been characterized by large
current account imbalances and by a distinctive pattern of gross capital flows intermedi-
ation. In addition, a sovereign debt crisis led to severe recessions in debtor countries and
to weak economic conditions throughout the union. The magnitude of the phenomena in
question makes it important to gain a clear understanding of the causes of these facts,
especially in light of their potential implications for policy.
This chapter shows that the recent experience of capital flows in the European mon-
etary union can partly be explained by the introduction of policy distortions on trade in
financial assets. The pattern of intermediation by core countries of gross capital flows
and the widening of current account imbalances within the monetary union can be under-
stood as the result of subsidies on cross-border holdings of assets, introduced in the euro
area. The presence of such distortions in various forms has been widely documented in
the literature. In addition, removal of currency risk and regulatory harmonization have
contributed in inducing cross-border exposures for residents of the euro area.68
I contribute to the literature on capital flows in an economic union by developing a
simple theoretical framework. This model allows me to study the implications for net and
gross flows of policy distortions on financial assets trade. In addition, I introduce a rich
heterogeneous-agents, infinite-horizon model to assess the quantitative importance of the
theoretical channels identified by the simpler model.
Two important features of the euro area characterize the model introduced in this
68See, e.g. Buiter and Sibert (2005), Nouy (2012), Acharya and Steffen (2013), Coeurdacier and
Martin (2009), Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou and Peidro (2010), Hale and Obstfeld (2014).
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Figure 1.14: Transition after debt crisis, interest rate and terms of trade
Relative price of high-transport cost good, pB , and interest rate on borrowers, r˜ in percentage
deviation and difference, respectively, from steady state values.
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Consumption of the high-debt, low-income economy in F , specialized in good of type A, is given
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type B, is given by the dashed, red line. Figures are presented in percentage deviations from a
counterfactual steady-state simulation.
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chapter, the presence of extensive trade in financial assets with the rest of the world and
close integration of goods markets within the union. First, by allowing for integration
of the union with world financial markets, I am able to analyze the determinants of
member countries’ gross capital flows. In particular, I can study through the lens of this
model the pattern of intermediation observed in the euro area. Second, I analyze the
interaction between international capital flows and the pattern of imports and exports of
individual countries, by allowing for trade in goods within the union and with the rest of
the world. Specifically, I can consider in this framework how countries’ specialization and
their exposure to trade with union partners determine heterogeneous amplification of a
detrimental debt crisis.
Intermediation of international capital flows emerges in my model as agents leverage
the subsidy they enjoy on asset holdings. The presence of a subsidy leads residents of
an economic union to issue gross liabilities to the rest of the world, in order to finance
larger purchases of gross assets. The effects of policy distortions on gross capital flows
predicted by the model closely resemble the pattern of intermediation observed in the
euro area core, after the inception of the EMU. There, gross asset positions against
partners in the periphery rose significantly, funded to a large extent by the creation of gross
liability positions against the rest of the world. While the simple theoretical model here
introduced clarifies how the introduction of subsidies constitutes a possible explanation for
this observation, the infinite-horizon model presented highlights the quantitative relevance
of this channel.
The empirical observation of rising current account imbalances is also consistent with
predictions of the model for the effects of a subsidy on asset holdings. Importantly, the
model generates a rise in the current account surplus of core countries, in response to
the introduction of the policy distortion, even when these countries are fully integrated
in international financial markets. This effect does not arise mechanically due to a larger
deficit in peripheral countries, as it would if precluding trade in assets with the rest of the
world. Rather, policy distortions actively induce core countries to increase their savings,
by making assets issued by union partners more attractive.
A perverse feedback effect arises in the event of a sovereign debt crisis, when members
of an economic union are tied together by financial as well as by trade linkages. When
a debtor defaults on creditor countries that coincide with the main destination of its ex-
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ports, a fall in the debtor’s terms of trade ensues, amplifying the severity of the recession
associated with the crisis. This mechanism is likely to have exacerbated the recent reces-
sion in peripheral countries of the euro area, as these were significantly exposed to trade
with union partners that also constituted important creditors on external liabilities.
In future research, I plan to employ the flexible framework here introduced to consider
two closely related issues, the introduction of common monetary policy in the euro area
and the different treatment of sovereign and private-sector assets prescribed by financial
regulation.
The introduction of common monetary policy has been a distinctive feature of the
integration process represented by the EMU. In light of the diverse economic performance
observed in countries of the euro area, and the of heterogeneous implications of policy
distortions highlighted in this chapter, it is interesting to assess whether the presence
of common monetary policy has magnified these effects. Fluctuations in demand in the
event of a crisis are also heterogeneous in magnitude across union members, and this
framework can contribute to our understanding of the stabilizing role of monetary policy
in this setting. For instance, changes in the nominal exchange rate of the union against
the rest of the world are likely to display a rich pattern of heterogeneous effects across
union-member countries, as they differ in terms of gross external positions and trade
specialization.
Prescriptions of financial regulation typically allow for different treatment of assets
on banks’ balance sheets, depending on the identity of their issuers. The prescription
of a “zero-risk weight” on sovereign exposures in the Basel II regulatory framework is a
notable example of this fact. Regulatory provisions of this type are likely to have had a
significant impact on the nature of capital flows received by countries in the euro area
periphery, by distorting the composition of flows towards specific counterparties. Recent
research has highlighted how the misallocation of resources in the presence of large capital
inflows is likely to have led to slow productivity growth in the euro area periphery.69 By
extending this framework to explicitly consider private sector agents and endogenous
allocation across industrial sectors, it would be possible to further investigate the role of
policy distortions and financial regulation in the euro area, analyzing their implications
for productivity dynamics.
69See Aoki, Benigno, Kiyotaki (2009), Reis (2013), Gopinath et al. (2015).
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1.A Description of data and statistics in section
1.2
The data used to construct the measures of tradability of output presented in section
1.2 are drawn from the STructural ANalysis (STAN) and Trade in Value Added (TiVA)
databases released by OECD and WTO (OECD 2011b and OECD/WTO, 2015).
I consider data for the year 2005, as that is the last year for which data from both
datasets are available for a sufficiently wide sample of countries. The sample consists of all
34 OECD countries with the exclusion of Turkey and Chile, for which STAN data are not
fully available. This sample does not include all EU economies: Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus,
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and Romania are EU-28 members but not OECD members,
hence they are excluded from this sample.
Industrial sectors in my sample correspond to groupings of 2-digit industries from
the ISIC Rev.3 Classification. Specifically, these are: Agriculture, hunting, forestry and
fishing (01-05), Mining and quarrying (10 - 14), Food products, beverages and tobacco
(15 - 16), Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear (17 - 19), Wood, paper, paper
products, printing and publishing (20 - 22), Chemicals and non-metallic mineral products
(23 - 26), Basic metals and fabricated metal products (27 - 28), Machinery and equip-
ment, not elsewhere classified (29), Electrical and optical equipment (30 - 33), Transport
equipment (34 - 35), Manufacturing not elsewhere classified; recycling (36 - 37), Electric-
ity, gas and water supply (40 - 41), Construction (45), Wholesale and retail trade; Hotels
and restaurants (50 - 55), Transport and storage, post and telecommunication (60 - 64),
Financial intermediation (65 - 67), Business services (70 - 74), Other services (75 - 95).
In order to clarify the results described in section 1.2, I present in Figure 1.16 data
for tradability of output disaggregated at the industrial sector level. Intuitively, services
are characterized by low tradability of output, while subsectors of manufacturing, mining
and agriculture are characterized by higher than average tradability.
Figure 1.17 decribes the industrial specialization of the EU economies in the sample,
displaying the shares of GVA attributed to groups of industrial sectors ordered accord-
ing to their tradability. Manufacturing is divided into two groups, with high tradability
manufacturing including Textile, Transport equipment, Electrical equipment, Machinery
and Chemical products and low tradability manufacturing including Metallic products,
68
Manufacturing not elsewhere classifed, Food and Wood and paper products. Transport
services are treated separately from other services due to their higher tradability. Consis-
tently with the evidence presented on tradability of individual sectors, countries displaying
higher average tradability are typically characterized by a larger share of the manufac-
turing sector.
1.B Proof of Proposition 1
Consider the case where a risk-neutral agent is the marginal buyer of debt issued by H.
Given the terminal-period default policy by H, the price that the risk-neutral agent is
willing to bid for bH is given by
qH =


β if bH ∈ [0,∞)
πβ if bH ∈
[
−ζˆ , 0
)
0 if bH ∈
(
−∞,−ζˆ
) (1.38)
The interior solution for bH in
[
−ζˆ, 0
)
to the problem in (1.5) is given by the solution
to the following first-order condition:
πβ
1
p1
u′
(
yA − ǫ+ pB,1yB − πβbH
p1
)
= πβ
1
p2,R
u′
(
yA + pB,2,RyB + bH
p2,R
)
.
where pB,2,R and p2,R denote prices in the terminal-period state of the world with high
output realization, where repayment by H is optimal.
Imposing logarithmic utility, the optimal amount of debt issued by H is given by
bH = −ǫ+ yB (pB,2 − pB,1)
1 + πβ
.
I will restrict attention to cases where ǫ > yB (pB,1 − pB,2,R), where H optimally chooses
to issue debt, bH < 0. This interior solution for bH is optimal if it is preferred by H to
all values of bH in
(
−∞,−ζˆ
)
∪ [0,∞).
Consider now the interior solution with bH < 0 and qH = β. Such a solution is
characterized by the following first-order condition:
β
1
p1
u′
(
yA − ǫ+ pB,1yB − βbH
p1
)
= πβ
1
p2,R
u′
(
yA + pB,2,RyB + bH
p2,R
)
+
(1− π)β 1
p2,D
u′
(
yA,L + pB,2,DyB + bH
p2,D
)
.
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where pB,2,D and p2,D denote prices in the terminal-period state of the world with low
output realization. Note that, for bH ≥ 0, default never occurs. Imposing logarithmic
utility, the first-order condition becomes:
1
yA − ǫ+ pB,1yB − βbH = π
1
yA + pB,2,RyB + bH
+
(1− π) 1
yA,L + pB,2,DyB + bH
.
Such a condition cannot be satisfied by a value of bH > 0 whenever the initial-period
output realization is sufficiently low:
ǫ > yA + pB,1yB −
[
π
1
yA + pB,2,RyB
+ (1− π) 1
yA,L + pB,2,DyB
]−1
. (1.39)
Let us now consider the corner solution bH = 0. Welfare of the representative house-
hold is given in this case by :
VH,corner = log (yA − ǫ+ yBpB,1)− log (p1)
+ πβ [log (yA + yBpB,2,R)− log (p2,R)] + (1− π)β log
(
yA,L + yBpB,2,D
p2,D
)
Compare this with welfare under the interior solution for bH in
[
−ζˆ , 0
)
, imposing log
utility:
VH,risky-debt =− log (p1)− πβ log (p2,R)
+ (1 + πβ)
[
log
(
yA − ǫ
1 + πβ
+
1
1 + πβ
yBpB,1 +
πβ
1 + πβ
yBpB,2,R
)]
+ (1− π)β log
(
yA,L + yBpB,2,D
p2,D
)
.
Removing identical terms, and ignoring differences in good prices across the two solutions,
due to price-taking behaviour, the risky-debt choice is preferred to the corner solution if
and only if
(1 + πβ) log
(
yA − ǫ
1 + πβ
+
1
1 + πβ
yBpB,1 +
πβ
1 + πβ
yBpB,2,R
)
>
log (yA − ǫ+ yBpB,1) + πβ log (yA + yBpB,2,R)
noting that
yA − ǫ
1 + πβ
+
1
1 + πβ
yBpB,1 +
πβ
1 + πβ
yBpB,2,R =
1
1 + πβ
(yA − ǫ+ yBpB,1) + πβ
1 + πβ
(yA + yBpB,2,R) .
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this condition is satisfied due to concavity of the logarithm function and Jensen’s inequal-
ity.
It is trivial to rule out choices for bH in
(
−∞,−ζˆ
)
. Given qH = 0, such choices are
dominated by setting bH = 0. While the same amount of resources is obtained in the
initial period, i.e. zero, by choosing bH < −ζˆ a positive output cost of default is suffered
with positive probability in the terminal period.
Suppose an agent were willing to bid qH > πβ for bH ∈
(
−ζˆ , 0
)
, qH = 0 for bH < −ζˆ
and qH = β for bH ≥ 0. A fortiori, it will still be optimal for H to issue bH in the(
−ζˆ, 0
)
interval, as the value of this choice improves, while the value of the alternatives
is unchanged.
The above proves that a risky borrowing choice is preferred to all other choices when
ǫ > min
{
yBH (pB,1 − pB,2) , yA + pB,1yB −
[
π
1
yA + pB,2,RyB
+ (1− π) 1
yA,L + pB,2,DyB
]−1}
.
This condition is function of good prices that are determined in general equilibrium and,
in general, it must be verified on a case-by-case basis. In the special case where pB is
constant across periods and states of the world, for example being determined in ROW
due to the absence of transport costs, τ = 0, the condition simplifies to
ǫ > (1− π) (yA − yA,L) yA + pByB
πyA,L + (1− π) yA + pByB .
1.C Optimization problem in ROW
The ROW is inhabited by a risk-neutral representative household enjoying utility from
consumption of goods of type A and B.
The problem faced by the representative household in ROW is the following:
max
cROW
1
, cROWA,1 , c
ROW
B,1 ,
cROW
2
, cROWA,2 , c
ROW
B,2 ,
bROW ,bH,ROW≥0
cROW1 + βEc
ROW
2
s.t. cROWt =
(
cROWA,t
)a (
cROWB,t
)1−a
,
pROW1 c
ROW
1 = y
ROW
A + p
ROW
B,1 y
ROW
B + qROW bROW − qHbH,ROW ,
pROW2 c
ROW
2 = y
ROW
A + p
ROW
B,2 y
ROW
B − bROW + (1−D) bH,ROW ,
(1.40)
where I allow relative prices and price indices in ROW , to differ from those prevailing in
H and F . All other variables have their intuitive meaning, in particular, bH,ROW denotes
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the amount of assets issued by H and purchased by ROW and bROW denotes the amount
of risk-free assets that are issued by ROW .
1.D Crisis amplification in H
Consider terminal-period consumption in H in the crisis state where it receives a low
amount of good A endowment. This is given by
c =
yA,L + pByB
p
.
Denoting with subscripts I andNI allocations in the intermediation and non-intermediation
scenarios, respectively, the crisis is amplified in H in presence of intermediation when
cI
cNI
=
pNI
pI
yA,L + pB,IyB
yA,L + pB,NIyB
< 1
It is easy to see that this condition holds when specialization in B good in H is extreme,
namely when yA,L = 0, yB > 0. In this case,
cI
cNI
=
pNI
pI
pB,I
pB,NI
=
pB,I
pB,NI
a
.
Default by H liabilities owed to F rather than to ROW causes lower wealth in the union
in the intermediation scenario. The ensuing lower price of the high-transport cost good B
is unambiguously detrimental to consumption in H, when this economy displays extreme
specialization in this type of good, as stated in (1.15). Consider now the opposite case
where H is extremely specialized in good A, yA,L > 0, yB = 0. Now,
cI
cNI
=
pNI
pI
=
pB,I
pB,NI
a−1
.
In this event, a fall in the relative price of good B implies an appreciation of the terms
of trade and, thanks to cheaper imports of good B, intermediation dampens the severity
of the crisis in H. Finally, consider the general case where both yA,L > 0 and yB > 0:
cI
cNI
< 1↔ yA,L + pB,IyB
yA,L + pB,NIyB
<
pI
pNI
Noting that pIpNI =
(
pB,I
pB,NI
)1−a
, taking logs and making use of the fact that log (1 + x) ≈ x,
at first order, the condition above reduces to
(pB,I − pB,NI) yB
yA,L + pB,NIyB
< (1− a) pB,I − pB,NI
pB,NI
.
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Imposing pB,NI =
yA,L+y
∗
A+bF,NI
yB+y
∗
B
, this reduces to the condition on relative abundance of
good B stated in (1.17):
yB
yB + y∗B
>
yA,L
yB + y∗B
yA,L + y
∗
A + bF,NI .
1.E Model with homogeneous consumption good
This appendix presents a simplified version of the model in Section 1.3. In this version,
all countries consume and are endowed with only one type of consumption good, freely
tradable across all country pairs. This version of the model allows for a simpler analysis
of the effects of policy distortions on intermediation of gross flows and current account
imbalances. In addition, it can serve as a useful benchmark against which to compare
the two-good model. This is especially true with regard to results on the amplification
of a crisis due to the interaction between financial and trade linkages among members of
a union of countries. The reader is referred to Section 1.3 for a full presentation of the
model, as only major departures from the two-good version of the model will be described
here.
Lifetime utility of households inH and F is given by (1.1), where ct now simply denotes
consumption of a homogeneous consumption good. The homogeneous consumption good
is the numeraire of this simplified model economy.
H receives in the initial period an endowment of good given by
y1 = y − ǫ
where ǫ denotes the amount by which the initial-period endowment falls short of a long-
run value, which is now given by y. In the terminal period, the endowment received by
H is subject to uncertainty, as in the two-good case:
y2 =


y w.p. π
yL w.p. 1− π.
.
Again, the fiscal authority in H cannot commit to repay debt in the terminal period, and
default costs are defined as in the two-good case, (1.4).
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The problem faced by the fiscal authority in H is now the following:
VH (ǫ) = max
bH ,c1,c2,
D∈{0,1}
u (c1) + βE [u (c2)]
s.t. c1 + qHbH = y − ǫ,
c2 = y2 +− [Dζ − (1−D) bH ] ,
(1.41)
The solution to this problem can be described by the optimality condition:70
qHu
′ (c1) = βπu
′ (c2,R) . (1.42)
The problem solved in F is the following:
VF (ǫ) = max
c∗
1
,c∗
2
,
bF ,bHF≥0
u (c∗1) + βE [u (c
∗
2)]
s.t. c∗1 + qF bF + qHbHF = y
∗,
c∗2 = y
∗ + bF + [D (ξbHF − T ) + (1−D) bHF ] ,
(1.43)
and it can be summarized by the following system of first-order conditions71:
qFu
′ (c∗1) = βE
[
u′ (c∗2)
]
qH = qF − β (1− π) (1− ξ)
u′
(
c∗2,D
)
u′ (c∗1)
.
(1.44)
The ROW is again a large, risk-neutral agent, with subjective discount factor β.
Intermediation of gross capital flows and current account imbalances.
The one-good framework allows for a simple description of trade in financial assets in this
model. Consider first the case where no bailout promise is offered to households in F ,
ξ = 0. F issues risk-free debt to ROW at price given by qF = β. The price of H-issued
assets consistent with pricing by households in F has to satisfy the system in (1.44).
Imposing log-utility, the period budget constraints and qF = β, this is given by:
1
y − βbF − qHbHF = π
1
y + bF + bHF
+ (1− π) 1
y + bF
qH,F = β − β (1− π) y + βbF + qHbHF
y + bF
.
(1.45)
70As in the two-good case, this optimality condition only holds in the interior solution, when it
is optimal for H to issue debt carrying positive but not certain default probability, see Proposition
1.
71Again, as in the two-good case, this is only true in cases where H issues risky debt and gross
assets purchased by F are positive, bH ∈
(
−ζˆ, 0
)
and bHF > 0.
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The price of H-assets consistent with the solution to the problem in F is higher than
the price at which ROW is willing to buy these assets, qH,F > βπ, if and only if
y + βbF + qHbHF
y + bF
< 1.
The solution to 1.45 implies that this inequality cannot be satisfied for bHF > 0. Hence,
F is not willing to purchase any positive amount of assets issued by H at price qH,F ≥ βπ.
From the above, it follows that the marginal buyer of debt issued by H is ROW if no
bailout promise is offered to households in F , and that no amount of H-issued assets is
purchased by F . In addition, no liabilities are issued by F , as bF = 0, bHF = 0 constitutes
a solution to (1.44) when ξ = 0.
I have established that in the absence of a bailout promise, ξ = 0, the price of H-issued
assets has to be consistent with pricing by ROW and it is therefore given by qH = βπ.
From the optimality condition in H, it follows that assets issued satisfy
bH = − ǫ
1 + βπ
.
Intuitively, issuance of debt delivers insurance against the initial-period endowment shock,
ǫ.
Consider now the case where a full bailout promise is offered to households in F , ξ = 1.
It is trivial to show that the price of H-issued assets that is consistent with optimality
in F , (1.44), is given by qH = β, making F the marginal and sole buyer of these assets.
Given this price, the amount of assets issued by H is given by
bH = −πǫ+ (1− π) y
1 + βπ
,
showing that H benefits from the higher price of its own debt by running a wider current
account deficit.72
F finances purchases of H-issued assets with own resources and by borrowing from
ROW . The amount of liabilities issued by F to ROW follows from the solution to (1.44),
given qH = β and bH = −bHF . It can be shown that bFbH ranges between
−β
1+β for π = 0
and −1, for π = 1. Finally, to the extent that
∣∣∣ bFbH
∣∣∣ < 1, F acts as a net saver, financing
part of its gross asset purchases with own resources. The presence of a bailout promise,
then, induces F to run a current account surplus, contributing to wider current account
imbalances in the union of H and F .
72This is clearly true to the extent that ǫ < y.
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Crisis transmission and amplification. The analysis of a crisis event is extremely
simple in this one-good framework. In the terminal-period crisis state, consumption in F
is given by
c∗2,D = y
∗ + bF .
The analysis above showed that bF 6= 0 if and only if ξ > 0: A bailout promise induces the
creation of gross external positions in F . In the absence of the bailout promise, the crisis
would not be transmitted to F , as bF = 0 in that case. When F issues gross external
liabilities to purchase risky gross assets issued by H, its consumption in the crisis state
is adversely affected due to default by H.
In the absence of fluctuations in goods relative prices, financial linkages between H
and F are not sufficient to deliver amplification of the crisis in H. In H, terminal-period
consumption in the crisis state is simply given by
c2,D = yL.
In the absence of intra-temporal trade and unlike in the two-good framework, consumption
in H in a crisis is independent of the identity of its external creditors.
1.F Proof of Proposition 2
Consider the allocation with ξ = 0, π → 0. Consumption by H in financial autarky is
given by c1 = y − ǫ, c2,D = yL, c2,R = y, noting that the repayment state is realized with
zero probability in the limit. In the limit, welfare in H is given by
V ξ=0H (ǫ) = log (y − ǫ) + β log (yL) .
Consumption by F is given by c∗s = y
∗ in all periods and states s. Welfare in F is
V ξ=0F (ǫ) = (1 + β) log (y
∗) .
Under the bailout allocation, borrowing by H is bounded in the limit by the amount of
resources available in the repayment state, bH = −y. Consumption is given by c1 = 2y−ǫ,
c2,D = yL and c2,R → 0. Using the fact that limx→0 x log (x) = 0, welfare in H tends to
V ξ=1H (ǫ) = log (2y − ǫ) + β log (yL) .
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As established in (1.14) borrows bF =
β
1+β bH = − β1+β y to finance asset purchases when
π = 0. In the limit for π = 0, consumption is equalized across the initial period and
terminal period default state: c∗1 = c
∗
2,D = y
∗ − β1+β y. Welfare in F in the bailout
allocation is then given by
V ξ=1F (ǫ) = (1 + β) log
(
y∗ − β
1 + β
y
)
.
Note that the change in F welfare induced by the bailout promise is independent of ǫ:
V ξ=1F (ǫ)− V ξ=0F (ǫ) = (1 + β) log
(
1− β
1 + β
y
y∗
)
.
The change in welfare in H is instead increasing in ǫ:
V ξ=1H (ǫ)− V ξ=0H (ǫ) = log
(
2− ǫ/y
1− ǫ/y
)
Hence, the change in union welfare induced by the bailout promise, V ξ=1 (ǫ) − V ξ=0 (ǫ),
is increasing in ǫ. Note that this change tends to infinity for ǫ→ y. For ǫ = 0, V ξ=1 (ǫ)−
V ξ=0 (ǫ) < 0 under the following condition for y/y∗ and β:
(
1− β
1 + β
y
y∗
)1+β
<
1
2
.
By continuity of V ξ=1H (ǫ) − V ξ=0H (ǫ) and the intermediate value theorem, it can be
shown that there exist a value ǫ¯ ∈ (0,∞) such that V ξ=1 (ǫ¯)−V ξ=0 (ǫ¯) = 0 and V ξ=1 (ǫ)−
V ξ=0 (ǫ) > 0 for ǫ > ǫ¯.
1.G Infinite-horizon model, solution method
The solution of this model is obtained by a numerical algorithm related to the one pro-
posed by Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2011), also employed by Fornaro (2014) in a model of
external debt.
Solution for the equilibrium of the economy with no bailout promises is relatively sim-
ple. The risk-free real interest rate is exogenous in this model, as determined in ROW .
I need to solve for the endogenous price of good B, pB, which is determined in general
equilibrium within the union I. To solve for the steady state of this model economy, I
first need to obtain optimal policy functions of individual countries for net foreign assets,
b′ (y, n). I discretize the state space on a grid for y and n, and I solve for the policy
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functions by iterating on the Euler equation that follows from the problem of individual
countries, (1.33), given an initial guess for pB, p. The price at which individual countries
issue debt follows from qROW and from the function determining π, (1.36). Having ob-
tained policy functions for net foreign asset accumulation, I update the distribution of net
foreign assets in the economic union, until its convergence. Given distribution and policy
functions, I solve for aggregate consumption in I and I check whether the market for good
B clears within the union. If not, I update the for pB and p I repeat this procedure until
market clearing. The distribution obtained upon convergence of pB is the steady state
distribution of this model economy.
The algorithm I implement to solve for the steady state equilibrium of the economy
with a full bailout promise is an extension of the one above presented. In addition to
the distribution of net foreign asset and to the relative price pB, I need to solve for the
equilibrium price of union issued assets, q˜, and for the function determining the amount
of tax paid by the representative household in gross saving countries. Again, I discretize
the state space and I introduce an initial guess for aggregate variables, q˜, pB and taxes.
Given the initial guesses, I iterate on the Euler equation of gross savers and borrowers
to determine their policy functions for external positions, b˜′ (y, n,N), b′ (y, n,N) and for
the rule determining whether each country is a borrower or a gross saver, ̟. Again, I
use the policy functions to obtain a stationary distribution of net foreign assets. I now
need to ensure that the market for good B and the market for assets issued within the
union clear. In addition, the function determining taxes in gross saver economies has to
be consistent with the amount of bailout transfers paid by in each period to holders of
gross assets. To this purpose, I make use of the result that all assets issued within the
union are perfect substitutes, thanks to the full bailout promise. I can impose that the
portfolio of assets held by all gross saver countries is the market portfolio. By implication,
losses on gross assets due to default are equal in each country to the aggregate fraction of
non-repayments on liabilities, determined by the function π. Taxes paid in each period
by the representative household in gross saver economies are then a constant fraction of
holdings of gross assets. I iterate the above procedure until convergence of the net foreign
asset distribution, pB, q˜ and of the tax rate paid on gross assets.
Finally, I employ a standard algorithm to compute dynamic transitions after shocks
in the two quantitative exercises. I introduce an initial guess for the path of aggregate
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variables for a large number of periods. Assuming that the economy will be in steady
state in the final period, I solve the problem of individual countries backwards, given the
guess for aggregate variables. In the initial period, the net foreign asset distribution of
the economy is either the one of the steady state with no bailout promises, in the first
exercise considered, or in the that arises after the shock to gross assets caused by the
debt crisis. Starting from the initial period, I update the distribution forwards, given the
policy functions obtained. In general, markets will not clear along the transition, and
I update guesses for prices accordingly. Given the new guess, I repeat the procedure,
until convergence of prices. Importantly, I need to check that in the final period of the
transition the equilibrium of the economy is indeed given by the steady state one.
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Chapter 2
Sovereign Debt Crises, Fiscal
Austerity and Corporate Default
No Greece will not default. Please. In the euro area, the default
does not exist.
Joaqu´ın Almunia
European Commissioner for Economic and Financial Affairs
29 January 2010
2.1 Introduction
What is the impact of a sovereign debt crisis on credit to the private sector? What is the
role of fiscal policy in transmitting the adverse effects of a crisis from the government to
firms? The recent euro area sovereign debt crisis was accompanied by a severe recession.
In Italy, the rise in government borrowing costs was followed by a sharp tightening in the
stance of fiscal policy and by an increase in the cost of funding for firms. Moreover, during
the crisis, the performance of Italian firms was impaired to a heterogeneous degree. In
particular, the downturn had very severe effects for domestically-oriented firms who only
exported a small fraction of their output.
I introduce in this chapter a model to analyze jointly sovereign default risk, fiscal policy
and corporate default risk. I propose a transmission channel of a sovereign debt crisis to
firms. Through the action of fiscal policy, a sovereign debt crisis causes a tightening in the
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severity of financial frictions faced by firms. An increase in sovereign default risk leads
to a rise in the cost of government borrowing. In turn, higher borrowing costs induce
the fiscal planner to reduce its exposure to international financial markets and to raise
revenues domestically, instead. The contraction in fiscal policy leads to a reduction in
output in the domestic economy. Firms’ profits deteriorate due to the fiscal tightening
and the risk of corporate default rises. Sovereign risk is thus transferred to firms. Firms’
borrowing costs rise along with the increase in firms’ default risk, leading to a contraction
of firm-level financial frictions.
The model introduced here allows for a quantitative study of the three key elements
of this analysis, sovereign default risk, fiscal policy, and firm-level financial frictions. The
fundamental structure of this framework is that of an endogenous sovereign default model
a la Eaton and Gersovitz (1981). Sovereign default emerges as the optimal choice of a
benevolent planner weighting the benefits of integration in international financial markets
against the cost of debt repayment. I augment the quantitative model of Arellano (2008)
along three main directions. First, I introduce the presence of a meaningful corporate sec-
tor, composed of firms who hire labor supplied by households to produce output. Second,
I calibrate parameter values of the model to replicate quantitative features of the Italian
economy. In particular, I obtain empirically plausible levels of external debt, taxation
and government expenditure. Finally, the model features the presence of distortionary
taxation, so that government choices have implications for endogenous variables such as
output.1
In the model economy, there is no direct linkage between the severity of financial
frictions faced by firms and those faced by the government. Both firms and the govern-
ment can borrow from risk-neutral lenders on international financial markets. Default
by both types of agents can emerge in equilibrium, but default by the government does
not necessarily trigger default by firms, nor it causes their exclusion from international
financial markets. As firms can borrow from from foreign lenders, there is no meaningful
role in this model for financial intermediation by domestic banks. In particular, firms
in the model economy are insulated from the effects of a sovereign crisis on holders of
1Cuadra, Sanchez and Sapriza (2010) introduce a model of endogenous sovereign default where
the government raises revenue domestically via distortionary taxation and it sets the level of
government expenditure.
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government debt. Credit supply conditions in the domestic markets are irrelevant for
firms in this model, as they are able to raise funds from the rest of the world.
Two different types of firms are considered in the model. The two types of firms
differ in their degree of exposure to the domestic economy. All firms equally rely on labor
supplied by domestic households as their sole input in production. Firms producing a
non-tradable type of good, however, are constrained by a lack of access to international
goods markets. Firms in this sector are more reliant on the domestic economy, which is the
sole destination market for their output. On the other hand, firms that produce tradable
goods are less exposed to domestic considerations, as they can export their production to
foreign residents.
Interest rates on government and firms’ debt display positive comovement in the
equilibrium of the model economy. The interest rate is high for both the government
and firms in bad times, when aggregate productivity is low and government debt is high.
First, in times of low productivity the government faces a strong incentive to default.
Foreign lenders require compensation for the high default risk and charge a high interest
rate on government debt. Low productivity is also detrimental to firms’ profits. Low
profits imply a high risk of default by firms, which leads in turn to a high interest rate
on firms’ debt. Second, a high level of government debt also strengthens the incentive for
the government to default, thus implying a high interest rate on government debt. At the
same time, high borrowing costs induce the government to run a surplus when government
debt is high. The government thus sets higher taxes to raise revenue domestically. In
turn, higher taxes lead to a contraction in firms’ profits. As firms’ profits fall, their
default probability rises. Firms’ borrowing costs rise along with their default probability,
as lenders are compensated for higher default risk.
I consider in this framework the implications of a sovereign debt crisis that hits the
small open economy of the model. A sovereign debt crisis is a shock leading to a sharp
increase in the cost of borrowing for the government of the small open economy. The
sovereign debt crisis causes a fiscal contraction, a tightening in financial frictions faced by
firms, a reduction in output, and a more severe deterioration in the performance of non-
exporting firms. The effects of the crisis in the model are similar to those observed in Italy
during the recent recession. First, the higher cost of borrowing induces the government
to reduce its stock of debt, leading to an increase in taxation. Second, higher taxes lead
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to a fall in output and to a reduction in firms’ profits. Third, lower profits of firms lead
to a rise in their default risk, and to a higher cost of firms’ borrowing. Finally, the crisis
leads to a contraction in domestic demand, making its effects particularly severe for firms
in the non-tradable sector.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the contribution
of this chapter to the literature on sovereign debt. Section 2.3 presents the key facts about
the recent crisis in Italy that motivate this research. Section 2.4 introduces the model.
Section 2.5 describes the calibration of the model economy and quantitative properties of
the eqilibrium. Section 2.6 discusses a sovereign debt crisis episode. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Related literature
This chapter is related to several strands of the literature on on sovereign debt. First, I
contribute to the literature on endogenous sovereign default initiated by the seminal work
of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981). The model in this chapter builds on the quantitative
framework developed by Arellano (2008) and Aguiar and Gopinath (2006). I depart
from the baseline model by introducing endogenous production of goods by firms facing
idiosyncratic default risk. As in Cuadra, Sanchez and Sapriza (2010), I allow for the
presence of distortionary taxation, government expenditure and endogenous labor supply
by households. In addition, differently than in most papers in this literature, I calibrate
the model economy to replicate quantitative features of an advanced economy like Italy,
rather than those of emerging market economies.
Second, this chapter contributes to the literature on the interaction between sovereign
debt and credit to the private sector. Mendoza and Yue (2012) study the endogenous
determination of the costs of sovereign default. To this purpose, they assume the presence
of a direct link between government and firms in their borrowing costs and in their access
to international financial markets. I abstract here from assuming the presence of such
direct linkages. I study instead how the correlation of borrowing costs and market access
between the two agents emerges endogenously, as sovereign risk is transmitted to the
private sector through fiscal policy.2
2In a New-Keynesian framework, Corsetti, Kuester, Meier and Mu¨ller (2014) also assume the
presence of a direct linkage in borrowing costs of government and firms, to study the effects of
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The endogenous determinants of linkages between sovereign debt markets and credit
to the private sector have been analyzed extensively. Many authors have studied how
a sovereign crisis is transmitted to firms because of its adverse effects on the balance
sheet of domestic lenders. Gennaioli, Martin and Rossi (2014) is a notable example of a
paper analyzing this transmission channel. Similarly, the adverse implications of sovereign
debt for credit to the private sector stem from the exposure of domestic creditors to the
government in Guerrieri, Iacoviello and Minetti (2013), Acharya, Drechsler and Schnabl
(2014), Broner, Erce, Martin and Ventura (2014), Mallucci (2015), Perez (2015), Sosa-
Padilla (2015) and Bocola (2016).3 I contribute to this field of research by studying
the transmission of shocks between sovereign and firms in a framework where debt of
government and firms is held externally of the domestic economy. Here, fiscal policy set
by the government affects fundamentals of the economy and the severity of firms’ default
risk, independently of the identity of holders of government debt. Similarly, Arellano
and Kocherlakota (2014) introduce a model where a crisis is transmitted from the private
sector to the government, as tax revenues fall in times of financial distress.
The correlation between credit conditions of government and firms has been empiri-
cally documented in the literature. I introduce here a theoretical framework that I employ
to quantitatively analyze the importance of the fiscal channel of crisis transmission. Ag˘ca
and Igan (2015) show that policies aimed at reducing the stock of government debt have
significant adverse affects on credit to the private sector. Effects are shown to be hetero-
geneous across firms, depending in particular on their degree of exposure to the domestic
economy. Arteta and Hale (2008) document that sovereign default crises are associated
with contractions in credit to the private sector in emerging market economies. Bofondi,
Carpinelli and Sette (2013) and Baskaya and Kalemli-Ozcan (2016) empirically docu-
ment the impact of sovereign risk on private sector credit, via the channel of domestic
intermediaries.
Finally, this chapter is related to the growing area of research that has studied the
recent euro area sovereign debt crisis. Lane (2012) and Shambaugh (2012) provide a
fiscal policy in a union of countries subject to sovereign debt crises.
3Chari, Dovis and Kehoe (2016) show that financial repression, in the form of incentives to
domestic agents to hold domestic government debt can be welfare-improving, by improving the
ability of the government to commit to repay debt.
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detailed discussion of the economic and sovereign debt crises. Ardagna and Caselli (2014)
discuss the conditions attached to the Greek government bailouts of 2010 and 2011. De
Santis (2012) studies the spillover of the crisis from Greece to the rest of the euro area.
2.3 Empirical evidence
This section introduces three key sets of facts that motivate the analysis in this chapter.
First, I present evidence on the adverse impact of the euro area sovereign debt crisis
on borrowing costs of the Italian government and of Italian firms. Second, I show that
fiscal policy in Italy reacted to the crisis with an increase in government saving, as the
government primary balance rose along with the increase in government borrowing costs.
Finally, I show that the performance of non-exporting firms was especially weak during
the sovereign crisis and the subsequent contraction of fiscal policy.
Government and firms’ interest rates Interest rates on liabilities of the Italian
government and of Italian firms rose sharply during the euro area sovereign debt crisis of
2011-2013. A measure of borrowing costs for both is presented in Figure 2.1, displaying
the spread of the interest rate paid by government and firms over a risk-free nominal
benchmark, for the period from 1999 onwards.
The interest rate spread on Italian government debt rose to 485 basis points at its peak
during the crisis in December 2011. I measure the interest rate spread as the difference
between the interest rate on 12-month government debt and the interest rate on a nominal,
risk-free security. I use the interest rate on main refinancing operations of the European
Central Bank as a measure of the nominal, risk-free rate.4 The increase in government
borrowing costs was sharp, but relatively short-lived. While the spread on interest rates
for government debt remained high and volatile until the second half of 2012, it quickly
returned thereafter to a level close to its pre-crisis mean of just 20 basis points.5
4Both series are accessed via the Bank of Italy Statistical Database. For the government
interest rate, I use the the interest rate on 12-month Buoni ordinari del Tesoro.
5In July 2012, Mario Draghi, President of the European Central Bank, expressed a commitment
to do “whatever it takes to preserve the euro.” This commitment was accompanied by the launch of
non-standard monetary policy measures allowing the ECB to purchase government debt securities
(Outright Monetary Transactions, OMT). The impact of non-standard monetary policy operations
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The interest rate paid by Italian firms on their debt rose in coincidence with the rise
in government borrowing costs.6 The interest rate spread on firms’ borrowing rose above
300 basis points, around the peak for the corresponding government variable. The interest
rate on firms’ debt persisted at a high level for longer than the government interest rate.
Spreads remained high through 2012 and 2013, equal on average to 287 basis points. By
comparison, the mean level of this spread equaled 130 basis points in the pre-crisis period
between 2000 and 2007. Firms’ borrowing costs started to fall considerably later than
government borrowing costs, reaching a peak of 322 basis points in February 2014 and
diminishing thereafter. As of December 2015, firms’ interest rate spread was equal to 186
basis points, still above its pre-crisis peak.
Fiscal policy in the sovereign debt crisis A positive and rising government
primary balance characterized the conduct of fiscal policy in Italy during the euro area
sovereign debt crisis. Italy’s primary balance rose in 2012 to 2.2% of GDP, in the context of
a severe recession. During the same period, GDP fell by 5.2% between the second quarter
of 2011 and the second quarter of 2013. Data for Italy’s primary balance, government
revenue and expenditure are presented in Figure 2.2.
A number of measures were enacted by the Italian government to achieve an increase
in tax revenue. The ratio of government revenues to GDP rose by two percentage points
between 2011 and 2012, to 47.8%. Implicit tax rates on consumption, labor employed
and capital all rose in 2012.7 Taxation on capital rose particularly substantially, with the
implicit tax rate rising from 32.4% to 37%. Taxes on residential property also rose in this
period, as did VAT and excise duties.8 Finally, as government borrowing costs subsided
on government borrowing costs falls beyond the scope of this chapter. For an analysis of monetary
policy in the euro area during the global financial crisis and during the euro area sovereign debt
crisis, see Reichlin and Pill (2016).
6As a measure of the interest rate on firms’ liabilities, I use the series for the harmonized interest
rate on loans other than overdraft to non-financial corporations, average maturity, provided by
the Bank of Italy. Again, I use the ECM main refinancing operations interest rate as a nominal
risk-free benchmark.
7Data on implicit tax rates are compiled and published in Eurostat (2014). They are computed
as the ratio of total tax revenues, by category of taxes, to an estimate of the tax base.
8Eurostat (2014) and Eurostat (2015) provide a detailed account of yearly changes in the tax
policy of EU countries, including Italy. For an analysis of the impact on domestic demand of the
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Figure 2.1: Interest rate spreads on liabilities of Italian government and firms
The series for the government is the difference between the interest rate over 12-month Italian
government bonds (Buoni ordinari del Tesoro) and the risk-free rate. The series for firms is given
by the spread over the risk-free rate of the interest rate for Italian non-financial corporations on
non-overdraft loans, average across maturities. The nominal risk-free rate is given by the ECB
main refinancing operations interest rate. All series are accessed via the Bank of Italy Statistical
Database.
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Figure 2.2: Italian government primary balance, revenue, and expenditure net of
interest payments
All series are displayed as a share of GDP. The primary balance is simply defined as the difference
between government revenue and government expenditure net of interest payments.
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in 2013 and 2014, the primary balance fell as a share of GDP, reaching 1.6% in 2014 and
2015.
The increase in primary balance during the 2012 recession was in contrast with the
fall in this variable observed during the global financial crisis, when the primary balance
turned negative to -0.9% of GDP in 2009. In the period between the inception of the
monetary union and the crisis, Italy had run a positive but diminishing primary balance,
with this figure falling from 4.8% of GDP in 2000 to 0.4% in 2005. The increase in
primary balance observed in 2007 and 2008 was abruptly interrupted by the emergence
of the global financial crisis.
Heterogeneous impact of the crisis on firms The performance of non-exporting
firms weakened substantially in Italy during the sovereign debt crisis. Firms for which a
smaller share of sales is accounted for by exports observed the largest contraction, while
the performance of all firms was, in general, adversely affected by the crisis. This pattern
of heterogeneous performance is not common to all recessions and, for example, is not
observed during the recession associated with the global financial crisis in 2009. I discuss
here evidence on operating result, labor employed, sales and investment from the survey
on industrial firms conducted by the Bank of Italy. Data are presented in Figure 2.3.
This survey allows for an analysis of the heterogeneous effects of the crisis by presenting
data on the performance of firms disaggregated by the share of their sales accounted for
by exports.
First, the percentage of firms reporting an operating loss rose substantially for domestically-
oriented firms in the year 2012, from 25% to 32%. This increase was the largest among
firms exporting less than one third of their sales. As the number firms reporting a neg-
ative profit rose, it is likely that the risk of corporate default also rose substantially in
this group. During 2012, the percentage of firms reporting an operating loss also rose
in the group of firms exporting between one third and two thirds of their sales, while it
remained constant for firms exporting more than two thirds of sales.
Second, hours employed fell the most for the group of firms exporting the smallest
share of their output, between 2011 and 2013. Hours employed fell by 4% for firms
exporting less than one third of output, and only by 1.5% for those exporting more than
increase in residential property tax rates, see Surico and Trezzi (2016).
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Figure 2.3: Heterogeneous impact of the crisis on firms
The four panels show data on the percentage of Italian firms reporting an operating result of
“Loss”, the amount of hours of labor employed, sales as measured by turnover, and investment.
Figures are disaggregated by dividing firms according to the share of exports in their sales. Firms
exporting less than one third of their output are classified as “Low exporters” (blue, solid line).
Firms exporting between one third and two thirds of output are classified as “Middle exporters”
(green line with cross markers) and the remainder of firms, exporting more than two thirds of
output, are classified as high exporters (red line with diamond markers). All data, except those
for operating result, are normalized to 100 for the year 2011. Data are drawn from Bank of Italy
(2016).
two thirds. This pattern is in sharp contrast with the one observed for hours employed
during the 2009 recession: Then, hours fell by 12% for high exporters, and by a more
moderate 6.7% for low exporters.
Finally, data for sales and investment also corroborate the observation that the 2012
recession was characterized by a stronger contraction in the performance of domestically-
oriented firms. While the turnover of high exporters fell by less than 1% in 2012 and
rose in 2013, turnover fell by 2% and 4% for firms exporting less than one third, and
between one third and two thirds of their output, respectively. Investment fell for all
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firms between 2011 and 2013, but while it fell by 6% for high exporters, the contraction
amounted to 16% for low exporters. For both sales and investment, the 2009 recession
was characterized instead by a sharper contraction in export-oriented firms.
2.4 Model
I consider an infinite-horizon small open economy trading in goods and assets with the
rest of the world. Time is discrete and it is indexed by t. The small open economy is
populated by three types of agents, a representative household, firms and a government.
The household derives utility from leisure and from consumption of two different goods,
a tradable and a non-tradable consumption good. The representative household owns the
firms that operate in the economy. Firms hire labor to produce output of tradable or
non-tradable good. The government purchases in each period an exogenous amount of
goods. To fund this expenditure, the government can raise taxes on domestic households.
In addition, the government is able to borrow from foreign lenders. The government
borrows by issuing one-period, non-contingent debt. The government cares about welfare
of the representative households and its objective is to maximize its utility.
2.4.1 Households
Expected lifetime utility of the representative household is given by
E0

 ∞∑
t=1
βt
1
1− γ
(
ct − χ l
1+ψ
t
1 + ψ
)1−γ (2.1)
where ct is a composite consumption good and lt denotes hours of labor supplied by the
household. E0 is the expectation operator conditional on information available at time
0. The subjective discount factor is denoted by β < 1, the coefficient of relative risk
aversion by γ > 0, ψ > 0 denotes the inverse of the elasticity of labor supply, and χ is
a scaling parameter determining the relative marginal utility of consumption and leisure.
Consumption ct is defined as a CES aggregator of tradable and non-tradable consumption
goods, cT,t and cN,t:
ct =
[
a
1
θ c
θ−1
θ
T,t + (1− a)
1
θ c
θ−1
θ
N,t
]
(2.2)
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where θ represents the elasticity of substitution across the two goods and a denotes the
utility weight assigned in the aggregator to the tradable good.
In each period, the household faces a flow budget constraint given by
cT,t + pN,tcN,t = wt (1− τt) lt + dt − ht (2.3)
The budget constraint is expressed in units of tradable good, which is the numeraire in
this economy. The relative price of the non-tradable good in units of numeraire is given
by pN,t. The left-hand side of this expression describes expenditure of the household for
purchases of consumption goods. The right-hand side of the budget constraint describes
income of the representative household. The wage rate per unit of labor supplied by
the household is denoted by wt. The household pays taxes on its labor income to the
government, and τt is the proportional labor income tax rate. The household receives
dividends from the firms it owns, and dt is the aggregate amount of such dividends. ht is
a lump-sum social security contribution that is paid by the household.9 Total consumption
expenditure of the household can be expressed as ptct, where pt is the price index of the
CES aggregator ct:
pt =
[
a+ (1− a) p1−θN,t
] 1
1−θ
. (2.4)
The household cannot directly interact with foreign residents. However, the household
indirectly borrows or lends from international financial markets through the actions of
the domestic government.
Each period the household chooses cT,t, cN,t and lt to maximize its utility (2.1) subject
to the flow budget constraint in period t, (2.3). The first-order conditions of this problem
are given by
a
1
θ
(
ct − χ l
1+ψ
t
1 + ψ
)−γ (
ct
cT,t
) 1
θ
= λt (2.5)
(1− a) 1θ
(
ct − χ l
1+ψ
t
1 + ψ
)−γ (
ct
cN,t
) 1
θ
= λtpN,t (2.6)
χlψt =
wt (1− τt)
pt
, (2.7)
where λt is the marginal utility of wealth, or the Lagrange multiplier on the budget
constraint. Neither this multiplier, nor consumption appear explicitly in the first-order
9In equilibrium, social security contributions serve to insure workers against losses due to
default by firms on wage payments they are owed.
92
condition for hours, (2.7), due to the fact that the marginal utility of leisure is proportional
to that of consumption, given the functional form for preferences here assumed.10 Finally,
(2.5) and (2.6) can be combined to obtain the intratemporal equilibrium condition linking
the relative consumption of tradable and non-tradable goods to their relative price:
pN,t =
(
1− a
a
) 1
θ
(
cT,t
cN,t
) 1
θ
. (2.8)
2.4.2 Firms
The small open economy is inhabited by a continuum of unit mass of firms. Firms are
indexed by i ∈ (0, 1). A subset of firms with mass mT has access to a technology to
produce tradable good. The complementary set of firms, with mass 1 −mT , has access
to a similar technology to produce non-tradable good. In both sectors, the only input
required to produce output is labor supplied by the representative household. The amount
of good produced by a generic firm i in each period t, yi,t, is given by
yi,t = ztsi,tl
1−α
i,t − ϕ, (2.9)
where li,t is the amount of labor used in production by firm i, si,t is an idiosyncratic
productivity shock affecting output of firm i and zt denotes an aggregate productivity
shock. Output of all firms is net of a fixed cost, ϕ, which is denominated in units of the
type of good produced by either firm. The elasticity of output, gross of fixed costs, to
labor input is given by 1− α.
Aggregate variables are known to all firms at the beginning of each period, before their
production is realized. Such variables include aggregate productivity zt and variables re-
lated to fiscal policy, the tax rate τt and assets held by the government bG,t. Idiosyncratic
productivity si,t is not revealed to firms until after their choices are made and produc-
tion is realized, at the end of each period. The stochastic process driving idiosyncratic
productivity is i.i.d. across periods and firms.11
10Specifically, the results follows from λt =
1
pt
(
ct − χ l
1+ψ
t
1+ψ
)−γ
. These preferences are also
known as GHH, following Greenwood, Hercowitz and Huffman (1988). Note that in models with
non-tradable goods, wealth can affect the choice of labor supply in general equilibrium, through
its impact on the price level, pt (Benigno, Chen, Otrok, Rebucci and Young, 2013).
11Aggregate and idiosyncratic productivity both take values in the support [0,∞).
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Firms are subject to a working capital constraint. Due to the constraint, each firm
must pay a fraction of its wage bill before production is realized. Firms cannot obtain
equity from their shareholders, nor they can retain earnings to store resources internally.
However, firms can borrow by issuing intraperiod, non-contingent and defaultable debt
to foreign lenders, in order to obtain resources to pay workers. The working capital
constraint is given by:
ζwtli,t ≤ qF,i,tbF,i,t, (2.10)
where ζ denotes the fraction of the wage bill that the firm has to finance, bF,i,t is the
amount of debt issued by the firm and qF,i,t is the unit price of such debt. The amount of
resources that is raised by each firm on international financial markets at the beginning
of each period is given by qF,i,tbF,i,t. The price of debt issued by each firm is affected by
variables that are specific to the firm. In particular, it is a function of the amount of debt
issued and of labor hired by the firm itself, as well as of the relative price of the good the
firm produces. Such variables determine in equilibrium the expected return to lenders on
firm-issued debt, hence they are necessary to determine the price at which such debt is
traded.
At the end of each period, after idiosyncratic shocks are realized, all firms pay all
resources left in the firm as dividends to the domestic household.12 The dividend paid by
each firm is given by
di,t = max {pi,tyi,t − (1− ζ)wtli,t − bF,i,t, 0} , (2.11)
where pi,t is the relative price of output produced by each firm, given by pN,t if the
firm produces non-tradable good, and by unity otherwise. The dividend that each firm
pays amounts to the value of its output net of payments due to workers and lenders.
In the event where the value of output is not sufficient to repay workers and lenders,
pi,tyi,t < (1− ζ)wli,t+ bF,i,t, the firm defaults on external lenders and it does not pay any
dividend.13 Upon default, a firm exits and it is replaced in the following period by a new
and identical one.
12As firms do not have access to a storage technology, resources would be wasted if not trans-
ferred as dividends to the household.
13Workers’ claims on firm resources are senior with respect to those of lenders. However, if
output were insufficient to fully compensate workers, pi,tyi,t < (1− ζ)wli,t, the firm would default
on its obligations towards workers, too.
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In each period, all firms hire labor and issue debt to maximize the expected value of
dividend realized at the end of the period, subject to the working capital constraint (2.10)
and taking into account how choices for labor and debt affect the price of debt. Dropping
time subscripts, the problem of an individual firm is given by
max
li,bi
Es (di) =
∫ ∞
0
max
{
pi
(
zsl1−αi − ϕ
)− (1− ζ)wli − bi, 0} fs (s) ds
s.t. ζwli ≤ qF,ibF,i,
(2.12)
where Es denotes the mathematical expectation operator over the distribution of firm-
level idiosyncratic productivity shocks, which is denoted by fs (s).
14 All firms have access
to identical information sets and all enter each period with no resources inherited from the
past. Hence, all firms in a given sector optimally make identical choices. In equilibrium,
the working capital constraint is binding with equality. Each firm optimally equates the
expected marginal product of an additional unit of labor with its marginal cost. Formally,
the first-order condition associated with the firm’s problem is given by
(1− α)Es [s| s ≥ sˆi] pizl−αi = w
(
1− ζ + ζ
qFb,ibi + qF,i
)
− qFl,ibi
qFb,ibi + qF,i
(2.13)
where qFb,i and qFl,i denote the partial derivatives of the price of debt issued by the
firm, qF,i, with respect to debt issued and labor hired, respectively. The threshold for
idiosyncratic productivity below which a firm defaults on external lenders is given by sˆi,
which follows from the definition of firm dividends in (2.11). Given choices li and bF,i and
aggregate variables z, w, and pi, such threshold is given by
sˆi =
(1− ζ)wli + bF,i + piϕ
pizl
1−α
i
. (2.14)
The policy function for default of individual firms is given by DF,i, which is defined as
the indicator variable for idiosyncratic productivity falling below the default threshold
DF,i = 1 (sˆi < si) . (2.15)
A firm defaults on wage payments due to workers if output is insufficient to fully
cover for them, even after defaulting on external lenders. Default on workers occurs when
idiosyncratic productivity falls below the threshold given by
ˆˆsi =
(1− ζ)wli + piϕ
pizl
1−α
i
. (2.16)
14Note that the choices of the firm only concern current-period variables, namely li,t, bi,t, di,t,
qF,i,t. It is possible, then, to ignore time subscripts to simplify notation.
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2.4.3 Government
The government is a benevolent agent who can trade bonds in international financial
markets and sets taxes in the domestic economy, in order to maximize utility of the repre-
sentative household. The only type of asset the government can trade in is a one-period,
non-contingent and defaultable bond. The government can raise revenue domestically by
charging a proportional labor income tax on the household. Revenues from taxation and
external borrowing are used to finance a constant and exogenous stream of government
expenditure. Government expenditure takes the form of a composite good, g, which is
defined in analogous way to consumption
g =
[
a
1
θ g
θ−1
θ
T,t + (1− a)
1
θ g
θ−1
θ
N,t
]
. (2.17)
Government purchases of tradable and non-tradable good are denoted by gT,t and gN,t,
respectively. The price index associated with g is the same one associated with private
consumption, pt.
15
If the government has access to international financial markets, its budget constraint
is given by
ptg = τtwtlt + bG,t − qG (zt, bG,t+1) bG,t+1, (2.18)
where bG,t denotes the amount of foreign assets held by the government and bG,t+1 is the
amount of bonds purchased by the government in the current period. Both are denomi-
nated in units of tradable good. A negative value for bG,t+1 implies that the government
is issuing debt in the current period, promising to repay one unit of consumption good
in the following period for each unit of bond issued. The price at which bonds are issued
or bought by the government is given by qG (zt, bG,t+1) which is a function of current
aggregate productivity and of the amount of bond traded.
If the government does not have access to international financial markets, it can-
not issue bonds and government expenditure is entirely financed by tax revenue. The
government budget constraint is then given by
pG,tg = τtwtlt. (2.19)
15Note that while aggregate government expenditure, g, is constant, the government can choose
gT,t and gN,t in each period to minimize expenditure, gT,t + pN,tgN,t.
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Each period, if it has access to international financial markets, the government can
choose whether to repay or to default on debt it owes to foreign lenders. The default
choice is taken by the government comparing its benefits with the costs it would entail,
in terms of utility of the domestic representative household. The benefit of default lies
in the fact that debt is not repaid, so that a lower tax rate needs to be set to balance
the government budget. On the other hand, default implies two different costs that are
imposed onto the domestic economy. First, upon default, the government temporarily
loses access to international financial markets, so that debt can no longer be used as a
buffer against domestic shocks. Second, the representative household suffers from a direct
welfare loss in the periods during which the government is excluded from international
financial markets. Such a welfare loss is meant to capture disruptions that befall the
economy in the aftermath of a default episode.16
The intertemporal choice problem of the government can be expressed recursively.
When not excluded from international financial markets, the government chooses whether
or not to default. Upon choosing repayment, it chooses how much debt to issue and it sets
the labor income tax rate in order to satisfy the government budget constraint (2.18). The
state variables for the government choice problem are the aggregate productivity shock,
z, and the amount of foreign assets held by the government, bG, where time subscripts
have been removed making use of recursive notation.
The government value function, conditional on having access to international financial
markets, is given by V (z, bG). The government chooses to repay or to default on debt
by comparing the value function associated with default, VD (z), with the one associated
with repaying debt and maintaining access to international financial markets, VR (z, bG).
The discrete choice default problem is given by
V (z, bG) = max
D∈{0,1}
DVD (z) + (1−D)VR (z, bG) , (2.20)
where D denotes an indicator taking the value of unity in the event of default. The
problem above defines the discrete policy function for default:
D (z, bG) = 1 (VR (z, bG) > VD (z)) . (2.21)
16Cole and Kehoe (2000) and Arellano (2008) both introduce direct output costs of default in
their models. A strand of the literature has more recently analyzed the endogenous determinants
of sovereign default costs. Mendoza and Yue (2012) is a notable example.
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If the government chooses to default, it sets the tax rate in order to satisfy the autarky
budget constraint (2.19). While default causes the government to be excluded from fi-
nancial markets, readmission occurs in the following period with exogenous probability λ.
In the event of readmission, the value function of the government is given by V (z, 0), as
the government regains access to markets with zero assets. If the government is not read-
mitted, it remains in financial autarky and it may again be readmitted in the following
period with probability λ. During periods of exclusion from financial markets the welfare
loss suffered by the representative household is increasing in aggregate productivity and
it is given by δ (z). The value function in the event of exclusion is given by
VD (z) =max
τ
{
u (c∗, l∗)− δ (z) + βE [λV (z′, 0)+ (1− λ)VD (z′)∣∣ z]}
s.t. p∗g = τw∗l∗
(2.22)
where u (c, l) denotes the period utility function defined in (2.1) and c∗ and l∗ denote the
equilibrium values of consumption and hours, respectively, that are consistent with the
government choice for τ and with aggregate productivity z.17 Similarly, w∗ and p∗ denote
equilibrium values of the wage rate and of the price index. Prime superscripts denote next-
period variable values. The expectation operator on next-period variables, conditional on
information summarized by current-period productivity, is denoted by E [ ·| z].
When the government has access to international financial markets, it can choose the
amount of foreign assets to carry into the following period, b′G, as well as the labor income
tax rate that is charged to domestic households. When issuing debt to foreign lenders,
the government internalizes how changes in the amount of debt affect its price, through
the function qG (z, b
′
G). The maximization problem is given by
VR (z, bG) =max
τ,b′G
{
u (c∗, l∗) + βE
[
V
(
z′, b′G
)∣∣ z]}
s.t. p∗g = τ∗w∗l∗ + bG − qG
(
z, b′G
)
b′G.
(2.23)
The problem above defines policy functions for the tax rate and for the amount of assets
traded by the government, as a function of the aggregate state variables. Note that while
star superscripts still denote equilibrium values of variables, such values differ, in general,
from the ones in (2.22). This follows from the fact that the policy function for τ when the
17A complete description of the competitive equilibrium of this economy is presented in Section
2.4.6.
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government has access to international financial markets differs from the one emerging
under financial autarky.
2.4.4 Foreign lenders
The rest of the world is inhabited by a continuum of infinitely lived, identical and risk-
neutral foreign lenders. Foreign lenders can trade one-period debt with the government
of the small open economy and they can buy intraperiod bonds issued by firms. Foreign
lenders are profit maximizers and they behave competitively.
The price of a unit of government debt that compensates lenders for sovereign default
risk is given by
qG
(
z, b′G
)
= βROWE
[
1−D (z′, b′G)∣∣ z] (2.24)
where βROW denotes the subjective discount factor of foreign lenders. Lenders understand
how the policy function for default depends on the state variables z and bG and they
correctly evaluate the risk of sovereign default by forming expectations over this policy
function. Given the binary nature of the variable D, this expression can be rewritten as
qG
(
z, b′G
)
= βROW
[
1− Pr (D (z′, b′G) = 1∣∣ z)] ,
showing how the price of sovereign debt is decreasing in the probability of next-period
default.
The price at which firm-issued debt is traded must also compensate lenders for firms’
default risk. However, when purchasing intra-period debt issued by firms, foreign lenders
don’t need to be compensated for their rate of time preference, as all transactions take
place within each period. In the event of default, all output left in the firm, net of wage
payments to workers and liquidation costs, is shared among lenders, proportionally to the
amount of debt held by each. The amount of resources shared by lenders is given by
max {ξ (piyi − (1− ζ)wli) , 0} (2.25)
where ξ is a parameter capturing the fraction of output left in the firm after losses due to
liquidation costs. The price of debt issued by firm i that is consistent with optimization
by foreign lenders is then given by
qF,i = Es
[
(1−DF,i) +DF,i ξmax {(piyi − (1− ζ)wli) , 0}
bF,i
]
. (2.26)
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2.4.5 Market clearing
Market clearing for labor requires that the amount of labor demanded by firms equals
labor supply by the representative household
l =
∫
i∈(0,1)
lidi (2.27)
For the non-tradable goods market to clear, the amount produced must equal the
amount consumed by the representative household and by the government
cN + gN = yN (1−mT ) (2.28)
where yN is the amount of good produced by an average firm in the non-tradable sector
and it is defined in Appendix 2.A.
By combining the household budget constraint (2.3), the budget constraint of the gov-
ernment (2.18), the definition of firm dividends (2.11), and the market clearing condition
for non-tradable goods (2.28), we obtain the market clearing condition for tradable goods
cT + gT = mT yT + bG − qGb′G. (2.29)
Note that the condition above is satisfied by Walras’ law.
Finally, social security contributions paid by the representative household must cover
for losses on wage payments suffered by workers due to firms’ default. This is established
by (2.33) in Appendix 2.A.
2.4.6 Equilibrium
In equilibrium, firms choose the optimal amount of labor to hire and debt to issue. House-
holds choose labor supply and consumption of tradable and non-tradable good. Both
household and firms make their choices given government policy for taxation, debt is-
suance and default. In turn, the government sets policy taking into account optimal
behavior of domestic households and firms and of foreign lenders. I define below the
competitive equilibrium in the small open economy.
Definition 4. A recursive equilibrium in the small open economy is characterized by
• A set of value functions for the government V , VR, and VD,
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• Household policy functions for consumption c, cT , and cN , and labor supply l,
• Policy functions for firms in the tradable and non-tradable sector for labor, lT , lN
and debt issued bF,T , bF,N ,
• Government policy for taxation τ , asset holdings b′G, default D and allocation of
government expenditure gN , gT ,
• Government debt price function qG,
• Equilibrium good prices pN , p, wage w, firm debt prices qF,T , qF,N , dividends dT ,
dN , default thresholds sˆT , sˆN , ˆˆsT , ˆˆsN , and social security contribution h,
such that:
• Given government policy, the policy functions of household and firms solve their
maximization problems and they are consistent with the first-order conditions (2.5)
- (2.7) and (2.13),
• Given the debt price function qG and the policy functions of households and firms,
the government value and policy functions solve its maximization problem (2.20),
(2.22), (2.23),
• Government and firms’ debt prices are consistent with optimization by foreign
lenders, (2.24) and (2.26),
• Markets for labor and non-tradable good clear domestically, (2.27) and (2.28), and
firm dividends and default thresholds are consistent with firm choices and given by
(2.11), (2.14) and (2.16).
2.5 Quantitative analysis
2.5.1 Calibration
The model is solved numerically. I analyze quantitative properties of the solution, focusing
in particular on the nature of government policy and on its implications for firm-level
variables. Empirical targets for the calibration will largely be drawn from data for Italy.
The aim of this chapter is to study the experience in this country of a sovereign debt crisis
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followed by a fiscal policy tightening and by a contraction in credit to the private sector,
motivated by the empirical evidence presented in Section 2.3. Table 2.1 shows calibrated
parameter values and corresponding empirical targets. Parameters of the model economy
are set to match means of variables from the ergodic distribution of the model-generated
data with their empirical counterparts.
Parameters related to preferences of the domestic household are largely standard and
drawn from the literature on international macroeconomics. One period corresponds to
one quarter, for ease of comparison with data from national accounts. The subjective
discount factor of the representative household, β, is set to 0.97, implying a standard
deviation of the current account of 0.6%. The subjective discount factor of foreign lenders,
βROW , is set to target an average world risk-free real interest rate of 2.5%. I set the
intratemporal elasticity of substitution between tradable and non-tradable consumption
θ and the relative share of tradable goods in consumption a to 0.5, following Stockman
and Tesar (1995).
Parameters governing the technology of firms in the model are set to target key em-
pirical moments of data on the Italian economy. The elasticity of gross output to labor
input, 1−α, is consistent with the average share of labor income in GDP in this country,
equal to 62.5%.18 Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta (2013) show that the standard
deviation of labor productivity is consistently higher than that of total factor productiv-
ity, across industries and countries. This result is delivered in the model by considering a
positive value for the fixed cost of production, ϕ. I set ϕ to target a standard deviation of
log labor productivity that is 50% higher than the one of log total factor productivity, as
observed in the United States.19 The recovery rate on payments received by lenders after
default by firms, ξ, determines the price at which firms are able to issue debt, given pa-
rameters affecting the firms’ default threshold and the standard deviation of idiosyncratic
productivity. I set this parameter to be consistent with an average yearly interest rate
of 1.3%, in line with evidence on the interest rate charged to firms by Italian banks.20
The implied quarterly probability of default by a firm is equal to 0.5%. The parame-
18This figure is reported in European Commission (2007) for the period 1960-2006.
19Data are not available for Italy. The same ratio of standard deviations is also found for the
United Kingdom, while the ratio is higher in France and the Netherlands.
20I make use of the same series for interest rates on loans to non-financial corporations used in
Section 2.3, net of the nominal risk-free rate.
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ter governing the tightness of the working capital constraint, ζ, is set to unity, implying
that the entire wage bill has to be financed by firms. A similar assumption is made in
Neumeyer and Perri (2005). This assumption is consistent with the observation that the
stock of credit to non-financial corporations in the Italian economy is of the same order
of magnitude as the share of GDP accruing to labor income.
The stochastic process driving aggregate productivity z is log-normal with autocorre-
lation of 0.98 and standard deviation of the innovations equal to 0.6%. These values are
standard in the real business cycles literature. The mean of this process is set to normal-
ize to unity the average output of firms. The process is discretized with the method of
Tauchen (1986) on a very fine grid. On average, each grid point spans 0.036 unconditional
standard deviations of the process. The very fine grid is needed to ensure that the func-
tion qG (z, b
′
G) is sufficiently smooth. The presence of jumps in this function would cause
the government to choose values of borrowing which correspond to the jumps, leading to
an underestimation of the amount of sovereign debt issued and of the interest rate paid
on such debt.
Idiosyncratic productivity of firms is driven by a log-normal process that is i.i.d.
across periods and firms. The standard deviation of the shocks is set to 9%. This value
is low in comparison to the ones reported by Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta
(2013). In this model, however, transitory shocks account for the entirety of firm-level
dispersion in productivity. As persistent shocks are likely to capture a sizable fraction of
such dispersion, it appears conservative to use a lower value for such standard deviation.
The mean of the log-normal process is set to normalize average idiosyncratic productivity
to unity.
Government expenditure is equal to the average ratio of government consumption to
GDP in Italy between 1999 to 2007, 18.5%.
The function that determines the welfare cost of default is akin to the one introduced
by Arellano (2008). Differently than in that paper, the default cost is specified here as a
lump-sum loss in welfare for the representative household. Thanks to this specification,
the default cost has no implication for any of the variables determined in the competitive
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equilibrium. The default cost is defined as follows:
δ (z) =


0 if z < δE (z)
uaut (z)− uaut (δE (z)) otherwise
(2.30)
where uaut (z) denotes period utility of the representative household in autarky, when
the tax rate is set so that tax revenue solely covers for government expenditure, for a
given value of aggregate productivity. The above definition of welfare costs of defaults
implies that, in case of exclusion from international financial markets, period utility of
the representative household is increasing in z only for z < δE (z), and it is flat otherwise.
This implies that the welfare cost of default is increasing in z. The parameter δ is set to
match the average ratio of sovereign debt to GDP for Italy in 1999 - 2007. Given that
sovereign debt is entirely held outside of the small open economy in this model, I correct
the empirical target of 105% for the debt-to-GDP ratio by subtracting the fraction of
sovereign debt that is held domestically, which equals to a half in the period preceding the
global financial crisis, according to Brutti and Saure` (2014). The parameter λ, governing
the probability of readmission into international financial markets is set to 0.1, a standard
value in the endogenous sovereign default literature (e.g. Cuadra, Sanchez, Sapriza 2010).
2.5.2 Sovereign default, fiscal policy and firms in the model
economy
I illustrate here key properties of fiscal policy and its implications for firms in the equi-
librium of the calibrated model economy. First, I discuss the planner’s optimal default
decision, by presenting the equilibrium policy function for sovereign default and the im-
plied function describing the price at which sovereign debt is issued. Second, I analyze
optimal fiscal policy chosen by the planner, by presenting the policy functions for govern-
ment net lending and for the tax rate on labor income. Finally, I discuss the implications
of government policy for variables determined in the private sector. In particular, I show
how a positive correlation emerges between interest rates on sovereign and corporate debt,
and I discuss how fiscal policy differently affects the performance of firms in the tradable
and in the non-tradable sector.
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Table 2.1: Parameter values
Calibrated Parameter Value Target / Source
Discount factor β 0.97 St. deviation of current account, 0.6%
Foreign lenders’ discount factor βROW 0.994 World risk-free rate, 2.5%
Relative risk aversion γ 2 Standard
Frisch elasticity 1
ψ
2 Standard
Labor disutility χ 2.49 Normalize l = 1/3
Share of tradable good a 0.5 Stockman and Tesar (1995)
Intra-temporal elasticity of substitution θ 0.5 Stockman and Tesar (1995)
Elasticity to labor input of gross output α 0.46 Labor income share, 62.5%
Fixed cost in production ϕ 0.5 Relative volatility of labor productivity
Recovery rate ξ 0.24 Average real interest rate on firm debt
Working capital constraint ζ 1 Ratio of total credit to labor income
Aggregate TFP standard deviation σz 0.006 Standard
Aggregate TFP autocorrelation ρz 0.98 Standard
Idiosyncratic TFP standard deviation σs 0.09 Bartelsman et al. (2013)
Government expenditure g 0.185 Government consumption to GDP ratio
Welfare cost of sovereign default δ 0.9 Sovereign debt to GDP ratio
Readmission probability λ 0.1 Average length of exclusion period
105
Sovereign default The policy function for sovereign default, as determined by the
solution to (2.20), is presented in Figure 2.4. The pink, shaded area represents the
subset of the state space where it is optimal to default, given aggregate productivity and
sovereign debt. Assets held by the government are displayed on the horizontal axis, with
negative values denoting sovereign debt.21 Aggregate productivity is displayed on the
vertical axis. The ratio of aggregate productivity to its ergodic mean is denoted by zˆ,
so that e.g. zˆ = 1.02 implies that aggregate productivity is 2% above its unconditional
mean.
Two main features of the default policy function are worth noting. First, the level
of debt for which it is optimal to default is substantially higher than in most models of
endogenous sovereign default. Default is optimal in this model for sovereign debt equal
to 38.5% of yearly output, when aggregate productivity is at its ergodic mean. By way
of comparison, mean debt is 6% of output in the seminal paper of Arellano (2008). As
emphasized by Aguiar and Gopinath (2006), a high penalty for default is necessary to
generate a high equilibrium level of debt. That is indeed the strategy adopted when
setting δ (z) in calibrating this model.
Second, the highest sustainable level of debt is increasing in aggregate productivity.
This result follows from the assumption that default costs are increasing in aggregate
productivity, as in Arellano (2008). Here, default costs arise due to a lump-sum reduction
in welfare, rather than from a reduction in productivity. This particular modeling choice,
however, has no implications for this result on the slope of the default threshold.
Sovereign debt price function The sovereign debt price function qG (z, b
′
G) de-
scribes the price at which the government can issue debt on international financial mar-
kets, given the amount issued b′G and current productivity z, following (2.24). It is
displayed in Figure 2.5 for three values of aggregate productivity, corresponding to its
ergodic mean and to a high and a low value, 0.7 standard deviations above and below the
mean, respectively.
First, changes in the value of current productivity cause the function to shift. For a
21Sovereign assets are a stock variable. I thus divide their value by four, for ease of comparison
with empirical targets such as the debt-to-(yearly) GDP ratio. Note that quarterly output of an
average firm is here normalized to unity.
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Figure 2.4: Policy function for sovereign default
The shaded area represents the region of the state space where it is optimal for the planner to
default. zˆ denotes aggregate productivity, expressed as the ratio to its ergodic mean, bG denotes
assets held by the government, with negative values denoting sovereign debt.
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Figure 2.5: Sovereign debt price function
The function qG (z, b
′
G) describes the price at which the government can issue debt on international
financial markets, given the amount issued b′G and current aggregate productivity zˆ, expressed as
the ratio to its ergodic mean.
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fall in productivity, the shift implies that a lower price of debt is compatible with any
given choice of debt issued. Equivalently, a lower amount of debt must be issued by
the government for the debt price to remain constant. The nature of the default policy
function described is the cause of such shift, jointly with the presence of autocorrelation
in the process for z. A low realization of current productivity implies that a similarly low
realization is more likely in the following period. Lenders thus attach a high probability
of default to low values of debt when current productivity is low, as default will be chosen
for low values of debt if productivity will remain low in the following period. In turn, the
increase in the default probability causes the price of sovereign debt to fall.
Second, the price at which debt is issued is decreasing in the amount of debt issued
itself. This is a typical property of models of endogenous sovereign default, again following
directly from the the properties of the default policy function. As the level of debt
increases, default is chosen under a wider range of values for aggregate productivity.
Hence, next-period default becomes more likely as debt rises and international lenders
are willing to purchase sovereign debt only at a lower price.
Finally, the fact that the function qG (z, b
′
G) is decreasing in b
′
G implies that the planner
faces an upper bound on the amount of resources that she can obtain from international
financial markets. In addition, the distortionary nature of taxes implies the presence of
an upper bound on the amount of tax revenue. Jointly, these two bounds place a limit
on the feasible amount of external debt repayment. The presence of a bound on the
amount of debt that can be feasibly repaid influences default incentives for the planner.
Importantly, the presence of financial frictions in the firms’ problem affects the amount
of resources that can be raised by the planner via taxes. As the ability of the planner to
raise tax revenues determines its incentive to default and the price of sovereign debt, the
severity of financial frictions faced by firms affects in turn the severity of the constraint
faced by the government.
Optimal fiscal policy The planner’s choice of fiscal policy variables such as the tax
rate and government borrowing is crucial in determining all quantities and prices in the
equilibrium of this model. Policy functions for government net saving and for the labor
income tax rate are presented in Figure 2.6, as resulting from the solution to (2.23).
Government surplus is defined as the policy function for the change in government-held
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assets. The government is the only agent in the economy who engages in intertemporal
trade with foreign lenders, so net saving by the government corresponds with net saving
of the economy as a whole. Government surplus is decreasing in government assets, or
increasing in government debt, and it is decreasing in aggregate productivity, as shown
in the left-hand side panel in Figure 2.6.22 The high cost of borrowing that is associated
with issuing large amounts of debt induces the government to run a positive surplus
when owing a relatively large amount of debt. On the other hand, relative impatience
of the domestic household compared to foreign lenders induces the government to run
a deficit, allowing the household to front-load consumption when both government debt
and government borrowing costs are low. A positive productivity shock causes a shift
in the sovereign debt price function, relaxing the constraint on external borrowing faced
by the government. Hence, by lowering borrowing costs, an improvement in aggregate
productivity allows the government to choose a lower surplus.
Taxes on labor income allow the government to raise resources from the private sector,
to be used to finance expenditure and payments to foreign lenders. The planner’s optimal
choice for the tax rate is displayed in the right-hand side panel in Figure 2.6, again as
function of government held assets and for three different values of aggregate productivity.
Three main facts can be noted regarding the policy function for the labor income tax rate.
First, the tax rate chosen by the planner is relatively high as the government needs to
finance high levels of government expenditure and debt. The tax rate set by the planner
equals on average 28%, in the ergodic distribution of simulated series from the model
solution. By comparison, the average implicit tax rate on labor income equalled 42% in
Italy between 2001 and 2007.23
Second, the policy function for the tax rate largely inherits the properties of the tax
policy for government surplus: the tax rate policy function is decreasing in government-
22Note that while assets are divided by four, to be expressed as the ratio of a stock variable to a
yearly flow, this is not necessary for the government surplus, which is a flow variable already. This
fact needs to be taken into account when comparing the policy function for government surplus
with the level of government debt.
23Note that it would be possible to generate in the model a higher average tax rate by calibrating
default costs for average sovereign debt to match the entire stock of general government debt owed
by Italy, rather than the fraction of it held by foreign residents. Data source: Eurostat database,
Implicit tax rate on labour, table tec00119.
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held assets as well as in aggregate productivity. Intuitively, a higher tax rate needs to
be set in order to generate high government savings, especially given the fact that the
planner has no control over the level of expenditure.
Finally, the distortionary nature of taxation implies that the tax rate increases non-
linearly with government surplus. Due to the presence of a concave “Laffer curve” in tax
revenue, a higher increase in the tax rate is necessary to generate the same increase in tax
revenue, when starting from a higher tax rate. In particular, the tax rate increases when
productivity falls for two reasons. First, a higher government surplus is chosen given
higher borrowing costs, as discussed above. Second, it is harder to generate tax revenues
when productivity is lower. Indeed, a higher tax rate would have to be set, even when
choosing to maintain a constant tax revenue.
Sovereign and firms’ interest rates Borrowing costs of government and firms
positively comove in this model economy. Several papers in this literature have studied
the interaction between government default and the financial frictions faced by firms.24
To my knowledge, however, this is the first paper where the positive comovement emerges
due to positive correlation in the endogenous default risk of government and firms. The
ability of the government to transfer its own default risk to the private sector via the
channel of fiscal policy causes in the model the observed correlation between government
and firms’ default risk. This mechanism differs from the one of transmission via domestic
financial intermediaries, which has extensively been studied in the literature. According
to that channel, a fall in the value of sovereign debt held by domestic banks tightens their
balance sheet, leading to a contraction in credit to firms. Here, the government directly
achieves via taxation a transfer of resources from the private sector to the government
itself. Such transfer causes an increase in the risk of default faced by firms, allowing for
a relaxation in the budget constraint faced by the government. Policy functions for the
interest rates on government and firms’ debt are displayed in Figure 2.7.25
24See the literature review in Section 2.2 for a more extensive discussion of this strand of
research.
25I define the interest rate as the inverse of the debt price, minus one. For ease of exposition, I
consider annual interest rates, obtained by taking the fourth power of the debt price: rG =
1
q4
G
−1.
The firms’ interest rate displayed is a weighted average of the interest rate paid by firms in tradable
and non-tradable sectors.
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Figure 2.6: Policy functions for government surplus and labor income tax rate
The policy functions are displayed as function of the state variables of the model, government-held
assets bG and aggregate productivity, zˆ.
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Figure 2.7: Policy functions for the interest rate paid by government and firms on
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The policy functions are displayed as a function of the state variables of the model, government-
held assets bG and aggregate productivity, zˆ.
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Interest rates paid by both government and firms reflect, in the model, equilibrium
default probabilities. Both are increasing in the amount of government debt |bG| and
decreasing in aggregate productivity z. Different mechanisms, however, lie behind the
behavior of the two variables. First, the increase in interest rates paid by firms as gov-
ernment debt rises is solely due to the increase in taxes through which sovereign risk
is transmitted to the private sector. An increase in government debt from 34% to 38%
of GDP causes an increase in firms’ interest rate by 300 basis points, when aggregate
productivity is equal to its mean. A higher level of debt causes the government to set a
higher labor income tax rate, to generate higher government surplus. Firms’ production
costs rise along with the increase in the tax rate. In turn, their profits fall and the prob-
ability of default by firms rises, leading to a higher interest rate on their debt. For the
government, a higher level of initial debt |bG| induces a corresponding increase in the level
of debt issued in the current period |b′G|. The choice for debt issuance thus moves along
the sovereign debt price function of Figure 2.5 and debt is issued at a lower price, corre-
sponding to a higher interest rate on government debt. The same increase in government
debt from 34% to 38% of GDP causes the interest rate on government debt to rise by 35
basis points. The relatively moderate increase in government borrowing costs is partly
due to the ability of this agent to shift the cost of repayment to firms, by increasing taxes
to run a larger government surplus as debt rises.
Second, a fall in aggregate productivity also leads to a rise in the interest rate paid by
firms. This result would occur already in the absence of fluctuations in fiscal variables, as
lower productivity reduces the profits of firms and it leads to an increase in their default
probability. The increase in tax rate that is associated with a decrease in productivity,
however, magnifies the fall in profits, interacting with the direct effect of lower productiv-
ity and generating a rise in firms’ interest rates. For the government, lower productivity
leads to an increase in the probability of next-period defautl and to a shift in the sovereign
default price function, causing the cost of sovereign borrowing to be higher for any given
choice of debt issued. In turn, the shift in the curve leads the government to pay a higher
interest rate on its debt in equilibrium given its choice for optimal fiscal policy.26 A 2%
fall in aggregate productivity from its unconditional mean value causes the interest rate
26This is a standard result in the endogenous sovereign default literature, as in e.g. Arellano
(2008).
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on firms’ and government debt to rise by 250 and 10 basis points, respectively, when
government debt equals 36% of GDP.
Finally, note that the interest rate on debt issued by firms is also defined in the region
of the state space where sovereign default occurs. The interest rate on government debt
is not defined in that region, as the government does not have access to international
financial markets. The interest rate on firms’ debt is determined there by the level of ag-
gregate productivity and by the tax rate set in autarky to balance the government budget
constraint, according to (2.22). In particular, the default cost has no bearing on firms’
interest rate, as it only determines an exogenous reduction in household welfare. Default
has no adverse impact per se on financial frictions faced by firms in this model. Rather, it
is default risk and the incentive for the government to avoid default by increasing taxation
that cause disruption to the performance of firms.27
Heterogeneous firm-level effects of sovereign debt Sovereign debt has hetero-
geneous effects on the two sectors of firms that inhabit the economy, producing tradable
and non-tradable goods. High sovereign debt has more severe detrimental effects for firms
in the non-tradable sector. These firms are exposed to fluctuations in domestic demand,
as they cannot export and they are confined to selling their production locally. Domestic
demand is lower when sovereign debt is higher, as the economy runs a current account
surplus to eschew high costs of external borrowing.28
The heterogeneous effects of sovereign debt on the relative price of goods, on firms’
interest rates, and on labor demand are presented graphically in Figure 2.8. First, a high
amount of government debt causes a fall in the relative rice of the non-tradable good.
Domestic demand for consumption goods is lower when government debt is high. Hence,
a lower relative price of non-tradable is necessary to induce a rebalancing of consumption
towards this good. As relative consumption of non-tradable to tradable rises, firms in
the non-tradable sector are able to sell the entirety of their production domestically. An
increase in government debt from 34% to 38% of GDP causes a 6% fall in the relative
27In light of this fact, joint consideration of the transmission channel through fiscal policy
presented here and the one through domestic financial intermediaries appears as a promising
avenue for future research.
28A current account surplus follows uniquely in this model from the presence of a government
surplus, as the government is the only agent trading in intertemporal assets with foreign lenders.
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Figure 2.8: Heterogeneous firm-level effects of sovereign debt
The three panels display equilibrium values of variables as a function of the state variables of
the model, government-held assets bG and aggregate productivity, zˆ. The top panel displays the
relative price of non-tradable good, expressed as deviation from its ergodic mean. The middle
panel displays the difference between the interest rates paid on debt by firms in the non-tradable
and in the tradable sector. The bottom panel displays the logarithm of relative labor input of
firms in the two sectors.
price of non-tradable good, when aggregate productivity is equal to its unconditional
mean value. The equilibrium relative price of non-tradable good is represented in the
upper panel of Figure 2.8, as a function of the state variables, aggregate productivity and
government-held assets.
Second, firms in the non-tradable sector pay a higher interest rate than their tradable-
sector counterparts when sovereign debt is higher. The difference between the interest
rates paid by firms in the two sectors is shown in the the middle panel of Figure 2.8.
The low relative price of output hinders performance of firms in the non-tradable sector,
while profits of all firms are depressed by the high taxes that are associated with high
debt. Low relative demand interacts with high taxes, leading to a higher than average rise
in the default probability of non-tradable firms and in their borrowing costs. Sovereign
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default risk is thus transmitted to firms to a heterogeneous degree, with firms that are
more exposed to domestic demand suffering from a stronger contagion of sovereign risk.
The difference between the interest rate paid by non-tradable and tradable sector firms
rises by 140 basis points as debt rises from 34% to 38% of GDP and the relative price of
non-tradable falls by 6%.
Finally, the low relative price of non-tradable induces a relative contraction in the
production of this good, when government debt is high. Relative labor input of firms
in the non-tradable sector is presented in the bottom panel of Figure 2.8. Firms in
the non-tradable sector individually contract their production so that, on aggregate, a
higher fraction of labor input is reallocated towards the tradable sector. Relative labor
demand by non-tradable sector firms falls by sixteen percentage points, as debt rises from
34% to 38% of GDP, when aggregate productivity is equal to its unconditional mean
value. Individual firms in the non-tradable sector would find it optimal to reallocate
towards production of tradable goods, as domestic demand is low and expected dividends
are higher in the tradable sector. Were such reallocation to be possible, the shift in
relative supply would ensure the absence of fluctuations in the relative price of goods.
The inability of firms in this model to choose the type of good they produce results in
an incomplete reallocation of factors of production, in fluctuations in the relative price of
non-tradable, and in equilibrium heterogeneity in firm size across sectors. In presence of
decreasing returns to scale, as implied by α < 1, the heterogeneity in firm size caused by
the constraint on firms’ reallocation is costly from an aggregate welfare perspective.
2.6 Sovereign debt crisis
I analyze in this section a sovereign debt crisis episode, studying its implications for
the conduct of fiscal policy and for the performance of firms. First, I describe in detail
the crisis episode considered, consisting of a shock to default incentives that reduces the
amount of sustainable sovereign debt. Second, I analyze the implications of the crisis
on the planner’s choice for fiscal policy variables, namely for the amount of government
borrowing and for the tax rate on labor income. Third, I show that the crisis is transmitted
to the private sector, through its effect on fiscal policy. In particular, I show that the crisis
leads to a rise in the cost of borrowing for firms, as well as for the government. Finally,
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I discuss how the effects of the crisis are heterogeneous for firms in the two sectors. The
crisis causes a sharper contraction in credit and output for non-tradable firms, by inducing
a fall in domestic demand.
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Figure 2.9: Sovereign debt crisis, shock
Shift in sovereign debt price function due to a shock to the welfare cost of default. The dashed,
red line represents the sovereign debt price function under the baseline calibration of this model,
for aggregate productivity equal to its ergodic mean. The solid, blue line represents the same
sovereign debt price function after the sovereign crisis shock, as implied by the lower welfare cost
of default.
Sovereign crisis shock I introduce a sovereign crisis as a shock giving rise to a
contraction in lending to the government. In the model, the supply of funds to the
government is expressed by the debt price function (2.24) which is determined, in turn,
by the incentive for the government to default and by the optimality condition of lenders.
A contraction in the supply of funds to the government follows in the model from a
decrease in the welfare cost of sovereign default. A weaker incentive for the government
to repay leads to a rise in the probability of default for any given level of debt. A higher
probability of default reduces the price at which foreign lenders are willing to purchase
sovereign debt, or to a contraction in the sovereign debt price function.
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Analyzing the euro area sovereign debt crisis through the lens of this model, we can
interpret events surrounding the Greek sovereign debt bailout in the summer of 2011 as
an external shock causing a contraction in lending to other euro area economies with high
debt, such as Italy.29 In the initial phase of the crisis, EU officials had reassured financial
markets stating that “In the Euro Area, the default does not exist.”30 Losses imposed
on private sector lenders as part of the bailout package can be seen as disproving such
statements, and showing that default in the Euro Area did, indeed, exist.
I model a sovereign debt crisis as an entirely unexpected shock amounting to a fall
in the welfare cost of default. The steady state level of sovereign debt consistent with
the new default cost is equal to 28% of yearly GDP, as opposed to 36% in the baseline
calibration. The rise in borrowing costs associated with the sovereign debt crisis shock
can be represented as a shift in the sovereign debt price function, as displayed in Figure
2.9 for aggregate productivity equal to its ergodic mean.
In the remainder of this section, I will analyze the implications of the sovereign cri-
sis shock for fiscal policy and for variables of interest in the competitive equilibrium of
the model. The effects of the crisis on equilibrium are different according to the state
of the economy at the time of the shock, due to the presence of non-linearities in the
policy functions that emerge from the solution of the model. I will consider here a crisis
episode that hits the economy when aggregate productivity is at its ergodic mean and
when sovereign debt equals 31% of yearly GDP. Finally, the dynamic implications of the
crisis that emerge from a simulation of the model economy may differ depending on the
particular path of exogenous shocks that is considered. This issue is due, again, to the
non-linear nature of the solution of the model. To address this concern, I consider a large
number of draws for the path of exogenous aggregate productivity shocks after the initial
period. I compute the median path of each endogenous variable across the individual
simulations that are consistent with each draw, and I show the difference between the
median path after the sovereign crisis and the one in a baseline economy with no crisis.
The baseline economy is not subject to the sovereign debt crisis shock, while it receives
29For a detailed analysis of the Greek bailout, see Ardagna and Caselli (2014).
30The quote was pronounced in January 2010 by Mr. Joaqu´ın Almunia,
then European Commissioner for Economic and Financial Affairs. See Reuters,
http://uk.reuters.com/article/davos-almunia-idUSLAE00004520100129.
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the same aggregate productivity shocks as the crisis economy and it starts from the same
initial value of sovereign debt.
Fiscal policy in a sovereign crisis The optimal reaction of the fiscal planner to a
sovereign crisis is to reduce the reliance of the domestic economy on international financial
markets, increasing government surplus and taxes. The effects of the sovereign debt crisis
on government surplus and on the labor income tax rate are displayed in Figure 2.10. I
analyze here the impact of the crisis by studying the difference in the path of key fiscal
policy variables between the crisis economy and the baseline no-crisis one. Government
surplus rises on impact by 8% of quarterly GDP when the crisis hits. The higher cost
of borrowing implied by the crisis makes it less desirable for the government to have a
large and negative asset position. Hence, it is optimal for the planner to run a surplus,
thus reducing the amount of external liabilities owed by the government. The increase in
government surplus then gradually falls, as the stock of debt falls too.
The fiscal planner sets a higher tax rate on labor income to achieve the increase in
government surplus. The median increase in the tax rate is very large, amounting to an
increase of 23.5 basis points on impact. The increase in the tax rate is the largest in the
first period of the crisis when the increase in government surplus is also the largest. The
increase in the tax rate is proportionally larger than the increase in government surplus,
however, due to the presence of a concave Laffer curve in tax revenue. After a sufficient
number of periods following the crisis, the tax rate in the crisis economy is lower than in
the baseline one. As the economy converges towards a new lower level of sovereign debt,
a lower steady state tax rate is eventually required to cover for interest payments on debt
and for government expenditure.
Finally, both the crisis economy and the baseline one converge towards a steady-
state level of government debt. The two steady-state levels obviously differ, due to the
difference in the incentive to default across the two economies. The median transitions
of government assets in the crisis economy and in the baseline economy are displayed in
Figure 2.11.
Government and firms’ interest rates The cost of borrowing rises for both gov-
ernment and firms in the event of a sovereign debt crisis. The effects of the crisis on
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Figure 2.10: Sovereign debt crisis, fiscal policy
Government surplus and labor income tax rate after a crisis episode that hits the economy at
t = 1. Series displayed are computed as the difference between the crisis and baseline economies
for the median path of variables across simulations for exogenous aggregate productivity shocks.
0 8 16 24 32
−0.37
−0.36
−0.35
−0.34
−0.33
−0.32
−0.31
−0.3
−0.29
−0.28
−0.27
b G
Government assets transition
quarters
Fiscal Crisis
Baseline
Figure 2.11: Sovereign debt crisis, transition
Transition of government-held assets in the crisis and in the baseline economy. Series displayed
are the median across simulations for a large number of draws of exogenous aggregate productivity
shocks.
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interest rates paid by government and firms on their debt are presented in Figure 2.12.
Interest rates on government debt rise as a result of the interaction between fiscal
policy choices and the crisis shock. On impact, the crisis causes a median increase in the
interest rate on sovereign debt of 215 basis points.31 A direct implication of the sovereign
crisis is a fall in the price of sovereign debt for any given amount issued, i.e. a shift
in the sovereign debt price function. The planner responds to this shock by letting the
government run a larger surplus, hence reducing the amount of debt issued, as discussed.
The reduction in the amount of debt issued is not large enough to completely undo the
effects of the crisis, so that the interest rate on government debt rises in equilibrium. A
larger increase in government surplus would be needed to completely offset the events of
the shock on government debt prices. A large government surplus would be accompanied
by a large rise in taxation, and by welfare losses that are associated with its distortionary
effects. Such an increase would not be optimal from the point of view of the benevolent
planner.
The sovereign crisis is transmitted to the private sector through the action of fiscal
policy, inducing a rise in the interest rate paid by firms on their debt. The median increase
in firms’ interest rate due to the crisis equals 470 basis points.32 The increase in taxes
set by the planner in response to the crisis reduces the ability of firms to generate profits.
Higher taxes result in a reduction in the probability of government default, by allowing
for a higher government surplus. However, taxes cause resources to be transferred from
the private sector to the government, increasing the probability of default by firms, as
their profits fall. In turn, the rise in the probability of firms’ default results in an increase
in the interest rate they pay on their debt.
The transmission of the sovereign crisis to firms’ borrowing costs is not due to changes
in the net worth of lenders induced by the rise in sovereign default risk. In this model,
firms are able to finance their working capital by borrowing from risk-neutral foreign
residents. Hence, changes in the interest rate paid by firms are entirely due to changes in
31In the series for the government interest rate, the median is only computed in the subset of
draws where the government has access to international financial markets, as the interest rate on
government debt is not defined otherwise.
32The interest rate for firms is computed as the weighted average of the interest rate paid by
firms in the two sectors, with weights given by the relative masses of firms.
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their default probability, caused in turn by the evolution of fiscal policy.33 If considering
an economy characterized by the presence of a domestic banking sector holding claims on
the domestic government, a sovereign crisis would potentially have important implication
on the net worth of such domestic banks. In turn, the net worth of the domestic banking
sector would affect the abundance of credit to firms, their borrowing costs, and, in general,
their performance. This chapter abstracts from this particular transmission channel of a
sovereign crisis to firms, which has previously been analyzed in the literature.34 I focus
instead on the effects of the crisis on domestic firms that arise due to the reaction of fiscal
policy to such crisis. The two transmission channels are likely to be complementary to
each other, for example if a fall in the net worth of lenders causes a rise in the required
compensation for risk, at a time when the severity of firms’ default risk rises due to
contractionary fiscal policy.
Finally, the rise in interest rate on firms is more persistent than the one in government
interest rates. The steepness of the sovereign debt price function makes it optimal for
the planner to ensure that government debt quickly reverts to a level that is compatible
with low borrowing costs, after the crisis. Even after government borrowing costs have
fallen to a low level in the median simulation, however, the planner continues to let the
government run a positive surplus, in order to further reduce the level of debt. As long as
taxes remain higher than in the baseline simulation, firms’ performance will be impaired,
and their borrowing costs will remain high.
Heterogeneous firm-level implications of a debt crisis The sovereign crisis
has heterogeneous implications for firms in the domestic economy, depending on the type
of good they produce. I discuss here implications of the sovereign crisis shock on the
relative price of non-tradable good, on the difference between the interest rates paid
by firms in the two sectors, and on their relative demand for labor input. A graphical
representation of these effects is presented in Figure 2.13.
First, the relative price of non-tradable goods falls in a crisis. Domestic absorption of
goods contracts when the crisis hits due to the increase in government surplus. Demand
33I can ignore here shocks to aggregate productivity, as I analyze the median simulation from a
large number of draws for the aggregate productivity process.
34Again, see Section 2.2 for a review of the literature in this field.
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Figure 2.12: Sovereign debt crisis, interest rates
Government and firms’ interest rates after a crisis episode that hits the economy at t = 1. Series
displayed are computed as the difference between the median path of variables across simulations
of the economy with and without crisis.
0 4 8 12 16 20 24
−0.08
−0.06
−0.04
−0.02
0
Relative price of non-tradable
∆
p
N
0 4 8 12 16 20 24
0
0.02
0.04
Relative firm interest rate
∆
(r
F
,N
−
r F
,T
)
0 4 8 12 16 20 24
−0.2
−0.1
0
Relative labor demand
∆
(l
N
/
l T
)
Figure 2.13: Sovereign debt crisis, heterogeneous firm-level effects.
Relative price of non-tradable good, difference in firms’ interest rates across sectors and relative
labor demand after a crisis episode that hits the economy at t = 1. Series displayed are computed
as the difference between the median path of variables across the simulations of the economy with
and without crisis. The relative price of non-tradable and the relative labor demand are presented
in log-deviations from their ergodic mean.
122
for all goods falls, but as the non-tradable cannot be exported by domestic producers, its
relative price must fall for this market to clear. The fall in this relative price also follows
from the fact that the relative supply of non-tradable does not sufficiently contract during
the crisis. In particular, the inability of firms to choose the type of good they produce
causes goods’ relative prices to fluctuate. In the presence of perfect mobility of firms
across the two sectors, the relative price of non-tradable would be unitary independently
of the state of the economy, by equalization of expected profits and wages across sectors.
The relative price of non-tradable falls by 8.5% on impact due to the crisis in the median
simulation.
Second, the interest rate on firms’ debt rises by more for firms in the non-tradable
sector than for those in the tradable sector. The median difference between the interest
rates paid by firms in the two sectors is of 360 basis points when the crisis hits. The
increase in nominal wage due to the rise in the labor income tax rate is the same across
the two sectors. However, the fall in the relative price of non-tradable causes the value
of output of firms producing this good to fall, at a time when their production costs are
high. Their default probability thus rises by more than for tradable firms, as their average
profits fall by more, too. The non-linear interaction between the tax rate increase and
the fall in the non-tradable good price contributes to a sharp increase in the interest rate
on debt for firms in this sector.
Finally, labor demand falls significantly for firms in the non-tradable sector as a con-
sequence of the crisis. Relative median labor demand in the non-tradable sector falls by
24%. The larger fall in non-tradable sector labor demand is due to the combination of a
fall in the relative price of output and a larger rise in production costs, due to the larger
increase in interest rates. First, as the relative price of non-tradable falls, equalization of
marginal products of labor across the two sectors implies that the amount of labor em-
ployed in the non-tradable sector is relatively lower. Second, the higher interest rate on
debt paid by firms in the non-tradable sector implies that production costs are higher for
these firms. The combination of higher production costs and lower marginal product of
labor thus implies a strong contraction in labor demand by non-tradable firms. Finally,
the reduction in labor demand implies a fall in the amount of non-tradable good that
is produced domestically, as factors of production are partially reallocated towards the
tradable sector. The fall in the amount produced of non-tradable good curbs the fall in
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its price.
2.7 Concluding remarks
This chapter shows that fiscal policy can act as a powerful transmission channel of a
sovereign debt crisis to firms. I develop a framework where the actions of a government
to avert sovereign default cause the profits of firms to deteriorate and default risk to
be passed on to the private sector. In the model, no direct linkage is assumed between
borrowing costs of the government and firms. However, a fundamental linkage is present
between the two agents. Both the government and firms jointly rely on resources available
in the domestic economy to satisfy their objectives. Domestic households represent for
firms the key source of productive inputs. At the same time, the government relies on
households’ labor income as its tax base. Ultimately, the joint reliance of government and
firms on the same pool of resources causes financial stress to be transmitted between the
two.
Two main avenues for future research follow naturally from this chapter. First, the
model can be extended to allow for an endogenous choice on the amount of government
expenditure. Cuts in public expenditure were an important feature of fiscal austerity
measures in crisis-stricken countries of the euro area. The analysis conducted here would
be enriched by allowing for direct effects of government actions on domestic demand,
especially when considering their heterogeneous implications for different types of firms.
From a theoretical perspective, consideration of realistic forms of nominal rigidities would
be of interest in this setting, in order to analyze aggregate demand externality effects of
government expenditure.
Second, it would be promising to consider in the model the role of domestic financial
intermediaries. This framework would allow for an analysis of the degree of complemen-
tarity between the crisis transmission channel through the balance sheet of domestic banks
that has been studied in the literature and the one through fiscal policy here considered.
In light of the recent crisis, several policy proposals have been made to address jointly the
issue of high sovereign debt in euro area countries and the governance of the banking sys-
tem.35 The framework introduced here, if suitably extended to allow for domestic banks,
35Notable examples are Corsetti et al. (2015) and Brunnermeier et al. (2016).
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would allow for example for an analysis of the costs and benefits of government-funded
bank recapitalization. While such recapitalization could strengthen the domestic banking
sector, its cost could weaken the fiscal position of the government. In turn, a higher level
of government debt could be detrimental for the severity of financial frictions faced by
firms.
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2.A Market clearing conditions
In each sector X, where X corresponds to either T or N , the average amount of output
produced by a firm is given by
yX =
∫ ∞
sˆX
[
zsl1−αX − ϕ
]
fs (s) ds+∫ sˆX
ˆˆsX
[
zsl1−αX − ϕ− (1− ξ)
(
zsl1−αX − ϕ− (1− ζ)wlX
)]
fs (s) ds+
∫ ˆˆsX
ϕ
zl
1−α
X
[
zsl1−αX − ϕ− (1− ξ)
(
zsl1−αX − ϕ
)]
fs (s) ds =
=
∫ ∞
sˆX
[
zsl1−αX − ϕ
]
fs (s) ds+
ξ
∫ sˆX
ϕ
zl
1−α
X
[
zsl1−αX − ϕ
]
fs (s) ds+ (1− ζ)wlX Pr
[
s ∈
(
ˆˆsX , sˆX
)]
(2.31)
where lX is the amount of hours employed by a firm in sector X. Aggregate output
equals aggregate output of non-defaulting firms, plus output net of liquidation costs of of
defaulting firms.
Firms whose productivity falls below the threshold ˆˆsX , as defined in (2.16), are un-
able to fully compensate their workers as promised. The aggregate amount of resources
promised to workers by these firms, in each sector, is given by
wlX (1− ζ) Pr
[
s < ˆˆsX
]
.
The amount of goods that these firms are able to pay workers, after liquidation, is equal
to
ξpX
∫ ˆˆsX
ϕ
zl
1−α
X
[
zsl1−αX − ϕ
]
fs (s) ds.
The loss suffered by workers in defaulting firms in each sector is denoted by hX and it is
given by the difference between the two above defined terms:
hX =wlX (1− ζ) Pr
[
s < ˆˆsX
]
+ ξpXϕPr
[
s ∈
(
ϕ
zl1−αX
, ˆˆsX
)]
−ξzl1−αX Pr
[
s ∈
(
ϕ
zl1−αX
, ˆˆsX
)]
E
[
s| s ∈
(
ϕ
zl1−αX
, ˆˆsX
)]
.
(2.32)
Finally, the total loss suffered by workers in all sectors is given by
h = mThT + (1−mT )hN . (2.33)
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The aggregate amount of dividends paid by firms in sector X and is given by
dX =
∫ ∞
sˆX
[
pX
(
zsl1−αX − ϕ
)− (1− ζ)wlX − bX] fs (s) ds
=Pr (s ≥ sˆX) pXzl1−αX [E (s| s ≥ sˆX)− sˆX ]
(2.34)
It can be shown that, in each sector, aggregate output equals the sum of wage and
dividend payments made by firms, net of losses suffered by workers
yX = wlX + dX − hX . (2.35)
This follows from:
dX = Pr (s ≥ sˆX) pX
[
zl1−αX E (s| s ≥ sˆX)− ϕ
]− Pr (s ≥ sˆX)wlX
(
1− ζ + ζ
qF,X
)
so that
dX + wlX − hX =Pr (s ≥ sˆX) pX
[
zl1−αX E (s| s ≥ sˆX)− ϕ
]
+wlX
[
1− (1− ζ) Pr (s ≥ sˆX)− ζPr (s ≥ sˆX)
qF,X
]
− hX
=Pr (s ≥ sˆX) pX
[
zl1−αX E (s| s ≥ sˆX)− ϕ
]
+wlX [(1− ζ) Pr (s ≤ sˆX)]
+wlXζ
qF,X − Pr (s ≥ sˆX)
qF,X
− hX .
Noting that bX =
ζwlX
qF,X
,
wlXζ
qF,X − Pr (s ≥ sˆX)
qF,X
= ξ
∫ sˆX
ˆˆsX
[
pX
(
zsl1−αX − ϕ
)− (1− ζ)wlX]
and imposing the definition of hX , we obtain the desired result.
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Chapter 3
Time-Varying Volatility in
Sovereign Interest Rates: The
Role of Default Risk
3.1 Introduction
Interest rates on debt issued by emerging market economies display substantial fluctu-
ations in volatility.1 What is the driver of the observed fluctuations in the volatility of
interest rates? Fluctuations in sovereign default risk can explain why emerging market
interest rates display high volatility and a negative correlation with output.2 Can fluc-
tuations in endogenous default risk also explain the time-varying nature of volatility in
interest rates on external debt of emerging market economies? What is the role played by
shocks to exogenous financial variables for a country’s incentive to default? Are fluctua-
tions in the volatility of the world risk-free interest rate an important driver of uncertainty
in emerging market economies?
This chapter introduces two main results. First, fluctuations in interest rate uncer-
1This observation is documented by Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2011) for Argentina, Brazil,
Ecuador and Venezuela.
2Arellano (2008) develops a quantitative, calibrated model where limited commitment to repay
sovereign debt leads to countercyclicality in both the current account and borrowing costs for the
government of an emerging market small open economy.
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tainty emerge endogenously from a standard model of sovereign default a la Arellano
(2008). This result occurs in the absence of shocks to the second moment of exogenous
variables. Endogenous fluctuations in uncertainty emerge as the outcome of the same force
driving fluctuations in the level of the interest rate, sovereign default risk. The intrinsic
non-linearity of the sovereign default model considered implies that shocks leading to a
high interest rate also cause such interest rate to be highly volatile. Second, fluctuations
in the world risk-free real interest rate and in its volatility do not play a quantitatively
important role in this framework. In particular, I show that for a standard calibration
of the model, the role of output shocks is significantly larger than that of shocks to the
world risk-free interest rate.
From a methodological point of view, this chapter builds on the framework developed
by Arellano (2008). First, I define a model-based measure of interest rate uncertainty.
Interest rate uncertainty is measured as the conditional variance of the error made by
agents in the model when forecasting the next-period value of the interest rate on sovereign
debt. I analyze the properties of this measure of uncertainty to study the ability of this
model to replicate the observed pattern of interest rate volatility. Second, I extend the
baseline model to consider shocks to the world risk-free interest rate. I simultaneously
consider shocks to the level and to the volatility of this variable, as well as shocks to the
level of output in the economy. Importantly, as the model is solved by means of a global
solution method, no substantial modification of the solution algorithm is required when
introducing shocks to the second moment of the risk-free interest rate.3
Quantitative properties of interest rate uncertainty in the model replicate the em-
pirical features of time-varying volatility in emerging market economies’ interest rates.
In particular, the model-generated fluctuations in interest rate uncertainty are counter-
cyclical and positively correlated with the level of the interest rate on external debt. A
fundamental non-linearity in default risk lies behind this result. Default risk is bounded
below by zero. In a boom, the cost of borrowing is close to the risk-free rate and it does
not fluctuate substantially. In a recession, the economy is charged a premium for default
3The solution method adopted here is value function iteration with grid search over a finely
discretized state space. Benigno, Benigno and Nistico` (2013) and Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-
Ramirez (2013) discuss techniques to allow for second-moment shocks in larger models, for solution
methods based on local approximation.
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risk. Shocks cause the severity of default risk to fluctuate, leading to fluctuations in the
cost of borrowing. The presence of fluctuations in the volatility of interest rates follows
from this key mechanism, as does the fact that volatility correlates positively with the
level of the interest rate and negatively with output.
Shocks to the level of the risk-free interest rate lead to fluctuations in the relative
benefit from defaulting on external debt, as opposed to repaying. Intuitively, changes
in interest rates have implications for the cost of refinancing debt, while leaving largely
unaffected welfare under default and the subsequent exclusion from financial markets.
Hence, a shock that causes the risk-free rate to rise strengthens the incentive to default.
In turn, risk-free rate shocks affect interest rate spreads, the cost of borrowing and the
choice over the amount of external debt to issue. The quantitative relevance of this
qualitative mechanism is however minor in this framework. The level of debt owed by
the small open economy to foreign lenders is low, on average, in this model. Hence, large
shocks to the risk-free interest rate have minor implications for the amount of resources
available for consumption. Shocks to the level of output have larger effects, both directly
and through their effects on the severity of default costs. A fortiori, the implications of
exogenous changes in the volatility of the risk-free interest rate process are negligible. In
the absence of large and non-linear effects of shocks to the level of the risk-free interest
rate, shocks to the volatility of this process do not significantly alter the equilibrium
values of endogenous variables.
This chapter is related to three strands of the literature on business cycles in emerging
market economies. First, I contribute to the literature investigating the role of interest
rate uncertainty on emerging market economies’ business cycles. Fernandez-Villaverde et
al. (2011) document the presence of time-varying volatility in interest rates on sovereign
debt of emerging market economies. In light of this observation, they calibrate a real
business cycle model for a small open economy where the interest rate on external debt is
driven by an exogenous process displaying time-varying volatility. I show that fluctuations
in interest rate uncertainty can be explained without recourse to shocks to the second
moment of exogenous variables. In the quantitative framework of Arellano (2008), I show
that the non-linearities that characterize this workhorse model of sovereign default give
rise to time-varying volatility in interest rates, when only a simple process for shocks to
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the level of output is considered.4
Second, this chapter is related to the literature on the effects of shocks to the world
risk-free interest rate on emerging market economies’ business cycles. Neumeyer and
Perri (2005) find that while fluctuations in country spreads can explain a sizable fraction
of volatility in emerging market business cycles, the contribution of risk-free interest rate
shocks is more modest. Uribe and Yue (2006) argue that volatility in country spreads
is itself explained to an important degree by shocks to the world risk-free interest rate.
They find that US real interest rate shocks can significantly contribute to the volatility
of business cycles in emerging markets, through their effect on these economies’ interest
rate spread. I contribute to this debate by analyzing the role of risk-free interest rate
shocks in a model where the interest rate spread is determined endogenously. A similar
analysis is conducted by Guimaraes (2011). He finds that risk-free rate shocks explain
an important fraction of the volatility of external debt in small open emerging market
economies, in a model of sovereign debt with costless renegotiation. I find that the
quantitative effect of risk-free rate shocks is minor in the Arellano (2008) framework of
endogenous sovereign default. Given the calibration of default costs in this model, output
shocks have significantly larger effects than risk-free rate ones. Relatedly, Foley-Fisher and
Guimaraes (2013) find that the overall correlation between emerging economies’ default
risk and the US real interest rate is negative.
Finally, I contribute to the literature on exogenous uncertainty shocks, by analyzing
the role of shocks to the volatility of the risk-free real interest rate in an endogenous
sovereign default model. Bloom (2009) is a seminal contribution on the aggregate impli-
cations of uncertainty shocks. I show that while a model of endogenous sovereign default
can deliver endogenous fluctuations in interest rate uncertainty, the role of shocks to the
risk-free rate volatility is extremely small. This result follows from the small role that
shocks to the level of the risk-free rate have in this model. The role of exogenous uncer-
tainty shocks has been analyzed in this strand of the literature by Seoane (2015), who
4This flexible framework is based on the seminal work by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981). It
has been widely adopted in the literature on international capital flows and business cycles in
emerging market economies. A non-exhaustive list of contributions in this strand of the literature
includes Aguiar and Gopinath (2006), Mendoza and Yue (2012), Durdu, Nunes and Sapriza (2013),
Hatchondo, Martinez and Sosa-Padilla (2016).
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considers fluctuations in the volatility of the output process. In advanced economies, Be-
nigno, Benigno and Nistico´ (2012) show that fluctuations in monetary policy uncertainty
have significant implications for fluctuations of the exchange rate.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the model. Section
3.3 analyzes the properties of interest rate uncertainty in the model economy. In section
3.4 I analyze the role of shocks to the world risk-free interest rate. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Model
The model closely follows Arellano (2008). I extend the framework therein by introducing
a stochastic process driving the world risk-free real interest rate and its volatility. I present
here the model equations, highlighting the key differences from the original setup.
I consider an infinite-horizon small open economy trading in goods and assets with
the rest of the world. Time is discrete and it is indexed by t. The small open economy
is inhabited by a representative household and by a government. The household derives
utility from consumption of a homogeneous, tradable and non-storable good. Welfare of
the representative household is given by
E0
[
∞∑
t=0
βt
1
1− γ c
1−γ
t
]
(3.1)
where ct denotes consumption of the homogeneous good. As in previous chapters, E0 is
the expectation operator conditional on information available at time 0. The subjective
discount factor is denoted by β < 1 and the coefficient of relative risk aversion by γ > 0.
The government is a benevolent agent. Its objective is to maximize welfare of the
representative household. The government can trade bonds in international financial
markets, and it can transfer resources to the representative household. The government
can also tax the household in order to repay liabilities issued to foreign residents. The
government has access to lump-sum taxes and transfers on the representative household.
Markets are incomplete and the government can only trade one-period, non-contingent
bonds. The government can also choose whether to repay or to default on external debt,
so that bonds are defaultable. By defaulting on external debt, the government loses access
to international financial markets.
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We can derive the aggregate resource constraint of the small open economy by con-
solidating the budget constraints of the government and of the representative household,
due to the presence of lump-sum taxes and transfers. If the government has access to
international financial markets, the resource constraint is given by
c = y + b− q (x, b′) b′. (3.2)
The amount of foreign assets held by the government is given by b. The amount of bonds
maturing in the next period that are purchased by the government in the current period
is given by b′, adopting recursive notation. c denotes current-period consumption. The
household receives a stream of endowments of homogeneous good according to a stochastic
process. y denotes the current-period realization of this process. The function q (x, b′)
describes the unit price at which the government trades bonds with the rest of the world.
The price q is a function of the amount of bonds traded b′ and of the current-period
realization of the stochastic process x. x subsumes all the stochastic shocks that impinge
on the small open economy. In particular, x includes the endowment process y, as well as
a process for the risk-free real interest rate and its volatility. The presence of a stochastic
process driving risk-free rates represents a departure from the model in Arellano (2008).
If the government does not have access to international financial markets, the small
open economy is forced into financial autarky. Consumption of the representative house-
hold is given in autarky by
c = y − δ (y) (3.3)
where δ (y) represents an exogenous cost of default. In this model, the default cost is given
by a reduction in the amount of endowment available for consumption by the household.
The severity of the default cost is a function of the realization of the endowment process.
The choice problem of the government is the same as in Arellano (2008) and it is very
similar to the one introduced in the previous chapter. When the government has access
to international financial markets, it can choose to repay or to default on external debt.
If choosing to default, the government loses access to markets. If choosing to repay, the
government decides on the amount of assets to issue or purchase in the current period.
The amount of assets traded with international financial markets determines the amount
of taxes or transfers that are set on the representative household, given the financial
position of the government as it enters the period, according to (3.2). The state variables
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for the government choice problem are given by the amount of foreign assets it holds b
and by the realization of the exogenous process x, which determines the realization of the
process for the endowment, for the risk-free rate and for the risk-free rate volatility.
When the government enjoys access to international financial markets, the value func-
tion for the representative household is given by V (x, b). The default choice by the gov-
ernment is taken comparing the value function implied by default, VD (x), with the one
implied by the choice to repay debt and to maintain access to international financial
markets, VR (x, b). The discrete choice default problem is given by
V (x, b) = max
D∈{0,1}
DVD (x) + (1−D)VR (x, b) , (3.4)
where D denotes an indicator for the choice of default. This discrete choice problem
defines the policy function for default:
D (x, b) = 1 (VR (x, b) > VD (x)) . (3.5)
The value function of the representative household under default and autarky is given
by
VD (x) =
{
u (y − δ (y)) + βE [λV (x′, 0)+ (1− λ)VD (x′)∣∣x]} . (3.6)
If the government chooses to default, no other meaningful choice is made by domestic
agents, as the small open economy is in financial autarky. Consumption is given by the
domestic endowment net of the default cost, according to (3.3). Default implies immediate
exclusion from international financial markets, but the economy can be readmitted to
markets in the following period with probability λ. If readmitted, the government regains
access to markets with neither debt nor assets, so that the value function upon readmission
is given by V (x, 0). With complementary probability 1 − λ the government remains
in autarky in the following period. The expectation operator on next-period variables,
conditional on information summarized by the current-period realization of exogenous
variables, is denoted by E [ ·|x].
When it has access to international financial markets, the government decides over the
amount of assets to trade with foreign residents. When issuing debt, the government takes
the function q (x, b′) into account, understanding how the amount of debt it issues affects
the price at which this is traded. The value function of the representative household is
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given by
VR (x, b) =max
b′
{
u
(
y + b− q (x, b′) b′)+ βE [V (x′, b′)∣∣x]} . (3.7)
I impose the resource constraint (3.2) to determine household consumption. The contin-
uation value V (x′, b′) takes into account the option for the government to default in the
next period. The solution to this maximization problem defines a policy function for the
amount of assets traded as a function of the state variables, b′pf (x, b). In turn, the policy
function for assets traded defines a policy function for the unit price of such assets:
qpf (x, b) = q
(
x, b′pf (x, b)
)
. (3.8)
The world economy is inhabited by a large number of foreign lenders, residing outside
the small open economy. Foreign lenders are risk neutral, and they have access to a risk-
free asset with unit price qRF . When purchasing one unit of the risk-free asset, foreign
lenders obtain with certainty one unit of consumption good in the following period. On
the other hand, assets issued by the small open economy only pay off when the government
does not default. For bonds issued by the government of the small open economy to be
traded in equilibrium, their return has to be such that foreign lenders are indifferent
between holding government bonds or risk-free assets. Hence, the price of bonds issued
by the small open economy has to satisfy
q
(
x, b′
)
= qRF Pr
[
D
(
x′, b′
) |x] . (3.9)
The interest rate on a risk-free asset is defined as
r˜RF =
1
qRF
− 1. (3.10)
The model will be calibrated at quarterly frequency. We can then define the annualized
risk-free interest rate as:5
rRF =
(
1
qRF
)4
− 1. (3.11)
The risk-free real interest rate is determined according to an autoregressive stochastic
process of order one
rRF = (1− ρr)µr + ρrrRF,−1 + exp (σr) ǫr (3.12)
5Equivalently, we can define the risk-free asset price from the interest rate as qRF =
(1 + rRF )
−
1
4 .
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where µr denotes the unconditional mean of the process, ρr the autocorrelation coefficient,
rRF,−1 the previous period realization of the process and σr the logarithm of the standard
deviation. ǫr is a normally distributed i.i.d. process with zero mean and unitary standard
deviation. In turn, σr is also determined according to an autoregressive process, as in
Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2011):
σr = (1− ρσ)µσ + ρσσr,−1 + ησǫσ. (3.13)
The parameters of the process for the logarithm of the standard deviation are defined
as those of the process for the risk-free rate. µσ denotes the unconditional mean of the
logarithm of the standard deviation, ρσ the autocorrelation coefficient, σr,−1 the previous
period realization, and ησ is the standard deviation of the process. Again, ǫσ is a normally
distributed i.i.d. process with zero mean and unitary standard deviation. Finally, the
endowment y is determined according to an autoregressive process in the logarithm
log (y) = (1− ρy)µy + ρy log (y−1) + σyǫy (3.14)
with the ususal definition of parameters. All stochastic processes impinging on the model
economy are summarized by the stochastic vector x:
x ≡


rRF
σr
y

 (3.15)
whose distribution follows from that of its individual components.
Equilibrium In the equilibrium of this model, the government sets the policy for
default or repayment and for issuance or purchase of asset, in order to maximize welfare
of the representative household, subject to the resource constraint of the small open
economy and to the constraint implied by foreign lenders’ pricing of debt. The equilibrium
is formally defined below.
Definition 5. A recursive equilibrium in the small open economy is characterized by
• A set of value functions for the representative household V , VR, and VD,
• Government policy for default D and asset holdings b′
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• Government debt price function q
such that:
• The debt price function is consistent with optimization by foreign lenders, (3.9),
• Given the debt price function q, the value functions of the household and the policy
functions of the government solve the maximization problem (3.4), (3.6), (3.7).
• The resource constraint of the small open economy, (3.2) or (3.3), is satisfied
Calibration The model is calibrated at quarterly frequency. Parameter values are
standard and they are largely drawn from the literature on endogenous sovereign default.
The main exception is given by parameters governing the exogenous process driving the
risk-free real interest rate and its volatility. These variables are typically assumed to be
constant in this literature. Parameter values are summarized in Table 3.1.
The parameter governing relative risk aversion, γ, is set to 2, as standard in the
international real business cycles literature, and as in Arellano (2008). The subjective
discount factor β is set to 0.97 as in Cuadra et al. (2010), who target through this
parameter the volatility of consumption of Mexico. The probability of re-admission to
financial markets, λ, is set to 0.1, again following Cuadra et al. (2010). This value
implies an average period of exclusion from international financial markets of 10 quarters.
Finally, default costs are asymmetric as in Arellano (2008). In models of endogenous
sovereign default, asymmetric default costs deliver a relatively high level of sovereign
debt to be sustainable in equilibrium. The small open economy does not suffer from an
output cost of default if the realization of its endowment falls below a given threshold δ.
For realizations of the endowment above the threshold, the amount of output available
for consumption simply equals the threshold itself. This formulation implies that default
costs are increasing in the endowment realization in a piecewise linear fashion. I set
the threshold equal to 97% of the unconditional mean of the endowment process, as in
Arellano (2008).
I feed the model with the same endowment process as Arellano (2008), who uses
estimates from a process for Argentina’s GDP. The autoregressive parameter ρy is set to
0.945 and the standard deviation σy is 0.0245. I normalize the unconditional mean of the
endowment to unity by setting µy = .5σ
2
y/
(
1− ρ2y
)
.
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The process for the risk-free interest rate is calibrated by using parameter estimates
from a quarterly process for the real interest rate on risk-free dollar-denominated debt.
I construct a series for the risk-free rate as the quarterly average of the interest rate
on the 3-month Treasury bill, net of expected inflation. I measure expected inflation as
the growth of the United States GDP deflator over the past four quarters.6 I estimate
an AR(1) process over this measure of the risk-free real interest rate, including a linear
trend in order to account for the observed secular decline in real interest rates.7 I use the
estimated autoregressive parameter and standard deviation to calibrate ρr and the mean
standard deviation µσ. I calibrate µr as the unconditional mean of the real risk-free rate
in the sample.
Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2011) estimate a process for the time-varying volatility
of risk-free real interest rates. I calibrate the autoregressive parameter ρσ using their
estimate. I set the standard deviation ησ to a higher value than the one estimated in that
paper, 0.6 rather than 0.13. The effects of uncertainty shocks remain negligible in this
model even under this exaggerated value of this process’s standard deviation, as discussed
in Section 3.4.
I study three different versions of the model. First, I ignore shocks to the risk-
free rate, and I set this variable equal to its unconditional mean. The volatility of the
risk-free rate obviously plays no role, either. For this version of the model, I discretize
the process for the endowment on a vector of 551 points. The large number of points
ensures that the discretized distribution approximates relatively well a continuous one.
In particular, the function for q does not feature large discrete jumps as b′ varies. Second,
I consider shocks to the risk-free rate, as well as endowment shocks. In this version of
the model, the standard deviation of the risk-free rate process is constant and equal to
its unconditional mean. Finally, I consider all three shock processes simultaneously. The
curse of dimensionality poses a limit on the fineness of the vectorized shock processes
when multiple shocks are considered. In the versions of the model with two or three
6The same backward looking measure is adopted by Uribe and Yue (2006). The sample consid-
ered goes from 1987 to 2015, corresponding to the period from the beginning of the Greenspan era
to the last available full year. All data are drawn from the Fred database of the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis.
7See King and Low (2014), Thwaites (2015).
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Table 3.1: Parameter values in the sovereign default model
Parameter Value
Discount factor β 0.97
Relative risk aversion γ 2
Output cost of sovereign default δ 0.97 E (y)
Readmission probability λ 0.1
Endowment, autoregressive ρy 0.945
Endowment, standard deviation σy 0.025
Endowment, mean µy .5 σ
2
y/
(
1− ρ2y
)
Risk-free rate, autoregressive ρr 0.95
Risk-free rate, mean standard deviation µσ -5.5
Risk-free rate, mean µr 0.01
Volatility, autoregressive ρσ 0.94
Volatility, standard deviation ησ 0.6
shocks, I discretize the process for y on a vector of 111 points. I discretize the process
for r on a vector of 15 points in the version of the model with constant volatility. When
considering volatility shocks, too, I discretize the vector for σr on a vector of 3 points and,
for each value of σr, I discretize the process for r on a vector of 5 points. All stochastic
processes are discretized according to the procedure described in Tauchen (1986).
3.3 Endogenous fluctuations in interest rate un-
certainty
The interest rate on external debt issued by the small open economy of this workhorse
model of endogenous sovereign default displays time-varying volatility. Time-varying
volatility is a well-documented empirical feature of emerging market economies.
This result emerges already when abstracting from exogenous volatility shocks. In
order to inspect the mechanism through which time varying volatility arises endogenously,
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I focus in this section on the version of model with endowment shocks, only. First, I
discuss some features of the model that are crucial for this result. In particular, I show
that the policy function for the interest rate on external debt is non-linear. Second, I
introduce a model-based measure of interest rate uncertainty. This measure is defined as
the conditional variance of the one-period forecast error made by agents in the model when
forming expectations over interest rates on external debt. Third, I show that this model
generates substantial fluctuations in uncertainty. To this purpose, I analyze the dynamics
of the above-defined measure of uncertainty, in a simulation of the model solution. Fourth,
I show that interest rate uncertainty is positively correlated with the level of the interest
rate in the model economy. Variation in interest rates explains a substantial fraction of the
variation in uncertainty. This result is consistent with the observation that, in the model,
the degree of non-linearity in the interest rate policy function increases along with the
interest rate itself. Finally, I document how interest rate uncertainty is countercyclical.
Interest rate uncertainty is negatively correlated with the endowment realization and
positively correlated with the amount of debt of the economy.
Non-linearities in the interest rate policy function The interest rate on
sovereign debt paid by the small open economy of this model is a non-linear function
of the model state variables. The policy function describing how the interest rate de-
pends on the level of assets held by the government and on the current-period realization
of the endowment is defined as
rypf (x, b) =
(
1
qpf (x, b)
)4
− 1 (3.16)
where ry denotes the yearly interest rate and the policy function for the quarterly debt
price is defined in (3.8). The policy function in (3.16) is presented graphically in Figure
3.1.
The policy function for the interest rate increases in the level of sovereign debt of the
economy and it decreases in the level of the endowment. In addition, the first derivative
of this function is also increasing in debt and decreasing in the endowment. The interest
rate rises by 80 basis points when the endowment realization falls by 1% from its uncon-
ditional mean, when debt owed by the small open economy amounts to its mean level in
a simulation of the model economy. The interest rate rises instead by 190 basis points for
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Figure 3.1: Policy function for the yearly interest rate on sovereign debt.
The policy function is presented as a function of the endowment realization y for three different
levels of assets b. The three curves represent the policy function for a zero level of debt (dotted,
blue line), for debt given by the ergodic mean of this variable in the simulation of the model (black,
dashed line) and for debt given by the ninetieth percentile of this variable in the simulation (red,
solid line). The model version considered here is the one with endowment shocks, only.
the same fall in the endowment when the economy owes a higher level of debt to foreign
lenders, corresponding to the ninetieth percentile of the ergodic distribution of debt.8
When the economy enters the period with no debt, it is optimal for the government to
borrow at the risk-free rate independently of the endowment realization. In this region
of the state space, the elasticity of the interest rate paid on external debt with respect to
the endowment is thus equal to zero.9
8The mean level of debt corresponds to 11% of mean quarterly output. The high level of debt
is equal to 22% of mean quarterly output.
9The effect on the interest rate of the same percentage fall in the endowment is lower when
measured around a higher realization of the endowment. The elasticity of rypf with respect to y is
zero when the endowment is two standard deviations σy above its unconditional mean and debt
is at its mean level. The interest rate rises instead by 165 basis points when the endowment falls
by 1% from two standard deviations above the unconditional mean and debt is at the high level
given by the ninetieth percentile of the ergodic distribution.
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The non-linearity in the policy function for interest rates arises due to two facts,
the presence of a lower bound on the interest rate that the small open economy pays
on its debt, and the joint action of two forces leading the interest rate to rise when the
endowment falls. First, the interest rate at which the small open economy trades assets
with the rest of the world is bounded below by the risk-free interest rate. The presence of
a perfectly elastic supply of risk-free assets ensures that when debt decreases the interest
rate paid by the small open economy stops falling as debt once the probability of default
reaches zero.
Second, two forces imply that the interest rate on sovereign debt rises as the level of
the endowment falls. On the one hand, when the endowment falls the small open economy
has a stronger desire to borrow, as the domestic supply of goods becomes scarcer. An
increase in borrowing implies a higher probability of default and an increase in the interest
rate paid on debt, given the sovereign debt price function (3.9). On the other hand, a
fall in the endowment causes an increase in the cost of borrowing for any amount of debt
issued. This is due to the fact that the sovereign debt price function is decreasing in
y, as a low endowment implies a higher default probability.10 The two effects jointly
cause the interest rate at which the small open economy borrows to rise when the current
endowment realization falls.
The presence of non-linearities in the policy function for the interest rate implies that
shocks to the endowment cause fluctuations in the volatility of interest rates. As the
degree of non-linearity of the function is increasing in the interest rate, the volatility of
this variable is positively correlated with its level. To see this, first consider an economy
receiving a sequence of positive endowment shocks. This economy pays a low and constant
interest interest rate on its debt, moving towards the right-hand side of the graph in Figure
3.1. Second, consider an economy receiving instead a sequence of negative endowment
shocks. This economy moves towards the left-hand side of the graph in Figure 3.1. It pays
a high interest rate on debt and further shocks will cause such interest rate to fluctuate.
Adverse endowment shocks thus imply a high and volatile interest rate. A discussion of
the quantitative relevance of these effects is presented in the remainder of this section.
10Arellano (2008) analyzes these effects in detail. Chapter 2 of this dissertation also discusses
in more detail the effects of exogenous productivity shocks on the tightness of the sovereign debt
price function faced by a small open economy.
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Model-based measure of interest rate uncertainty The model provides a mea-
sure of uncertainty over the interest rate on external debt as faced by agents in the model
economy. This measure of uncertainty is given by the conditional variance of the error
made by agents when forming expectations over the interest rate. Agents’ conditional
expectation over the next-period interest rate is defined as
r¯ypf (y, b) = E
[
rypf
(
y′, b′pf (y, b)
) ∣∣y,D (y′, b′pf (y, b)) = 0] (3.17)
where the expectation is formed conditioning on those next-period states of the world
where the government does not default, as the policy function for the interest rate is not
defined otherwise. This conditional expectation is a function of the state variables of the
model, y and b.11
The conditional variance is analogously defined as
v (y, b) = E
[(
rypf
(
y′, b′pf (y, b)
)− r¯ypf (y, b))2 ∣∣y,D (y′, b′pf (y, b)) = 0
]
. (3.18)
We can interpret the conditional variance as a measure of the precision of agents’ forecast
over interest rates. A high value of the variance implies that agents cannot form a precise
forecast over the interest rate, or that a high degree of uncertainty is present. A graphical
representation of the realized measure of uncertainty against the conditional mean of the
interest rate is presented in Figure 3.2, displaying data from a long simulation of the
model.
Time series estimates of interest rate uncertainty I analyze here the dynamic
behavior of interest rate uncertainty. I estimate a time series process over realizations of
this variable, from a long simulation of the model solution. Given a series of realizations
for the conditional variance of interest rates, {vt}Tt=1, I estimate by ordinary least squares
the following process in the logarithm of the standard deviation of interest rates in the
model
log (
√
vt) = (1− ρv)µv + ρv log (√vt−1) + ηvǫv,t. (3.19)
The choice to estimate a process in this particular transformation of the variance makes
it easy to compare parameter estimates with the ones obtained by Fernandez-Villaverde
11As risk-free rate and volatility shocks are not considered here, x and y describe the same
information set.
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Figure 3.2: Conditional mean and standard deviation of the interest rate in the
model simulation.
Each dot represents a time period in a simulation of the model for 25,000 periods. The horizontal
axis represents the conditional expectation of the interest rate, defined in (3.17). The vertical axis
represents the standard deviation, defined as the square root of the variance in (3.18). The model
version considered here is the one with endowment shocks, only.
et al. (2011) for the interest rate on Argentine debt. A caveat is in order: while this
model is calibrated at quarterly frequency, the process estimated in Fernandez-Villaverde
et al. (2011) is monthly.
The model is simulated for 25,000 periods. To minimize the effects of the choice for
the initial period state variables, I conduct the estimation starting from the first period in
which the economy regains access to international financial markets, after the first episode
of default. I thus ignore the initial T1 time periods, where T1 is defined as the first time
period in which default by the small open economy occurs.
Parameter estimates from simulated data are extremely close to the ones estimated
on Argentine debt. Both sets of parameter estimates are reported in Table 3.2. The
volatility of the log-standard deviation, ηv is only slightly above the median posterior
estimate for Argentina and within the 95% probability set of the posterior estimate. The
autoregressive parameter estimated on the model-generated process is lower than the one
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Parameter Simulated data Argentina
µv
-5.15
[−5.35, −4.96]
-5.71
[−6.39, −4.89]
ρv
0.79
[0.78, 0.80]
0.94
[0.83, 0.99]
ηv
0.52
[0.515, 0.524]
0.46
[0.33, 0.63]
Table 3.2: Interest rate uncertainty, time series parameter estimates.
Number in square brackets report the 95% confidence interval for the OLS estimates on simulated
data and the 95% probability set of the posterior estimate on Argentine data. Estimates on
Argentine data are drawn from Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2011). Note that the estimated
process on Argentine data is monthly. The model is calibrated instead at quarterly frequency.
measured in the data. This estimate falls slightly below the 95 percent probability set
of the posterior estimate reported by Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2011). Finally, the
unconditional mean of the log-standard deviation is very close to the one estimated on
Argentine data. This result is not surprising, as the model analyzed here is known to be
able to replicate the average volatility of interest rates on external debt. In light of these
results, it is possible to argue that the baseline model of endogenous sovereign default is
not only able to quantitatively replicate the average standard deviation of the interest
rate on external debt, but also its dynamic behavior.
Cyclical behavior of interest rate uncertainty Fluctuations in interest rate
uncertainty are systematically related to fluctuations in the other key variables of the
model economy. I discuss here the correlation between interest rate uncertainty, the
conditional expectation of the interest rate, and the state variables of the model. There
are three key findings: interest rate uncertainty is positively correlated with the level of
the interest rate, it is countercyclical, and it is related to the state variables of the model
in a non-linear way.
First, the correlation between interest rate uncertainty and the interest rate paid by
the small open economy on its debt is positive. The mechanism through which this result
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arises has been discussed above, and it hinges on the fact that the degree of non-linearity
of the interest rate policy function increases as the interest rate itself increases. Figure 3.2
graphically illustrates the presence of positive correlation between the conditional stan-
dard deviation of the interest rate and the conditional expectation of the same variable.
I formally test for the presence of such positive correlation by running a simple regression
of the conditional standard deviation on the conditional expectation of the interest rate.
Parameter estimates are reported in the first column of Table 3.3. The estimate for the
regression coefficient of the conditional standard deviation on the conditional expectation
is positive and significant. A 100 basis points increase in the interest rate results in an
increase of the standard deviation by 78.5 basis points. In other words, the standard devi-
ation roughly doubles when the interest rates rises from 1.5% to 2.5%. The fraction of the
dispersion in interest rate uncertainty that is explained by the conditional expectation is
high, as summarized by the regression R2 of 0.64. Empirically, interest rate uncertainty
is also found to be strongly positively correlated with the level of the interest rate by
Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2011).
Second, I analyze how interest rate uncertainty is related to the state variables of
the model, namely to the realization of the endowment shock y and the asset position
of the government b. To this purpose, I estimate a regression for the realized values of
the interest rate standard deviation on the endowment shock and of the asset position.
Results are presented in the second column of Table 3.3. Estimates from this regression
show that uncertainty rises in bad times, as the regression coefficient is negative on both
the endowment realization and on the government asset position. The R2 of this regression
is equal to 0.31, substantially lower than the one from the regression on the conditional
mean, only. As the standard deviation of the interest rate is affected in a non-linear
fashion by the state variables of the model, this simple linear regression is only able to
explain a relatively small fraction of the dispersion in interest rate uncertainty.
Third, I present estimates from a regression of the standard deviation of the interest
rate on its conditional mean and on the realizations of the endowment and of the govern-
ment asset position. Results are reported in the third column of Table 3.3. All parameter
estimates maintain their sign from the previous regression estimation, but the point es-
timate for the endowment process falls substantially in magnitude. When combined, the
two state variables and the conditional expectation of the interest rate are able to explain
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Dependent variable
(1)
√
vt+1
(2)
√
vt+1
(3)
√
vt+1
r¯yt+1
0.785
(0.0027)
0.714
(0.0020)
yt
-0.019
(0.0006)
-0.001
(0.0003)
bt
-0.063
(0.0006)
-0.036
(0.0003)
R2 0.639 0.307 0.805
Table 3.3: Cyclical behavior of model-based measure of interest rate uncertainty
Parameter estimates from a regression of simulated data for the conditional standard deviation
of the interest rate on other key variables of the model economy. Variables analyzed are the
conditional expectation of the interest rate and the state variables of the model, the endowment
realization y and the asset position of the government b. All parameter estimates are significant
at the 95% level. I do not report parameter estimates for the intercept of the regression equation.
80.5% of the dispersion in the standard deviation of interest rates. The inclusion of the
conditional mean improves the fit of the regression as it is able to capture part of the
non-linear relationship between interest rate uncertainty and the state variables.
Finally, I analyze the degree of non-linearity of the relationship between interest rate
uncertainty and the state variables of the model. I estimate a regression of the standard
deviation of the interest rate on a polynomial in the endowment realization and in the asset
position of the government. The goodness of fit of the individual regressions is reported
in Table 3.4 as a function of the order of the polynomial.12 A second order polynomial
is able to explain 87.6% of the disperison in interest rate uncertainty, amounting to 2.85
times the fraction explained by the simple linear regression on b and y. The fraction of
the dispersion explained by the polynomial rises to 98.2% for a fourth order polynomial.
12Individual parameter estimates are omitted for brevity.
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n 1 2 3 4 5
R2 0.307 0.876 0.899 0.982 0.988
Table 3.4: Non-linearity of interest rate uncertainty.
R2 from regressions of the conditional standard deviation of interest rates
√
vt+1 on a polynomial
of order n in the endowment realization y and in the asset position of the government b.
3.4 Interest rate shocks and sovereign default risk
Fluctuations in the risk-free real interest rate do not significantly affect the equilibrium of
the model economy. I show in this section that the inclusion in the model of a stochastic
process driving the risk-free real interest rate does not alter in a quantitatively significant
way the behavior of the model economy. I discuss here the solution of the model economy
when the risk-free rate follows a process that replicates the main empirical features of
the risk-free real interest rate on US dollar-denominated debt, as discussed in Section 3.2.
Unless specified otherwise, I consider here the solution of the model where the standard
deviation of the risk-free interest rate is constant. First, I compare how the policy function
for government default is affected by shocks of similar magnitude to the risk-free rate and
to the endowment process. Second, I analyze the implications of the exogenous shocks for
the interest rate at which the government can borrow on international financial markets.
As changes in the risk-free interest rate and in the endowment level affect the probability
of future default, shocks can affect the cost of borrowing both directly and through the
spread over the risk-free rate that the government is charged. Third, I study how the
policy functions for government borrowing and for the current account balance depend
on the two stochastic processes that impinge on the small open economy in the model.
Finally, I briefly analyze the implications of shocks to the volatility of the risk-free rate
process.
Sovereign default incentives and the risk-free rate The incentive for the gov-
ernment to default is only marginally affected by the level of the risk-free real interest
rate. Shocks to the endowment level, on the other hand hand, play an important role in
affecting the decision for the government to default. The region of the endowment-assets
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Figure 3.3: Policy function for sovereign default.
The light grey area labelled “High rRF ” represents the region of the endowment-assets state space
where it is optimal for the government to default, when the risk-free interest rate is one standard
deviation above the unconditional mean of the process. The dark-shaded area labelled “Low rRF ”
represents the region where it is optimal to default when the risk-free interest rate is one standard
deviation below the unconditional mean.
state space where it is optimal for the government to default is presented graphically in
Figure 3.3. The two areas represented in the Figure correspond to the optimal default set
for two different levels of the risk-free real interest rate. The light-shaded area represents
the region where it is optimal to default when the risk-free interest rate is high, one stan-
dard deviation above the unconditional mean. The dark-shaded area represents instead
the optimal default region when the risk-free interest rate is low, one standard deviation
below the unconditional mean.13
The region of the state space where default is optimal is larger when the risk-free
rate is high. Intuitively, a higher interest rate makes it more expensive to repay debt.
In turn, as refinancing outstanding debt becomes more expensive, the value of accessing
international financial markets diminishes. On the other hand, welfare under default is
13I refer here to the unconditional standard deviation of the process for the risk-free real interest
rate, given by exp (σr)/
√
1− ρ2r.
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largely unaffected by the value of the risk-free rate. This occurs because the small open
economy is excluded from international financial markets when defaulting on external
debt.14 Hence, an increase in the risk-free interest rate strengthens the incentive for the
government to default, by reducing the incentive to maintain access to financial markets
without affecting the payoff to default.
The quantitative magnitude of the effects of risk-free rate shocks on default incentives
is small relative to that of shocks to the endowment process. An increase of the risk-free
rate by two standard deviations causes the level of debt at which it is optimal to default to
fall by 0.3% of mean quarterly output, when the risk-free rate is one standard deviation
below its unconditional mean and output is equal to its mean. By comparison, a fall
in the endowment realization of the same relative magnitude, namely of two standard
deviations of the process, causes the default threshold for debt to fall by 64% of mean
quarterly output, from 72% to 8%.
Two main facts explain the larger impact of endowment shocks on default incentives,
relative to shocks to the risk-free rate. First, endowment shocks have a significantly larger
impact on the amount of output available for consumption, relatively to shocks to the risk-
free rate. This result is a direct implication of the low level of debt that is typically owed by
the small open economy in models of endogenous sovereign default. When the small open
economy owes a low amount of debt to foreign lenders, even relatively large shocks to the
risk-free rate have small implications for consumption. In this model, the average amount
of debt owed by the small open economy is equal to 11% of mean quarterly output. Second,
endowment shocks directly affect the cost of default. The cost of default on external debt
is increasing in the realization of the endowment process, given the functional form for
the default cost δ (y) that is typically assumed in this literature. Shocks to the risk-free
rate also generate a time-varying default cost, as default incentives are stronger when
the risk-free interest rate is high. Given the present calibration of the model economy,
however, these shocks are unable to affect the incentive for the government to default in
a quantitatively substantial way.
14Since exclusion is only temporary, welfare is adversely affected by an increase in the risk-free
rate even under exclusion. These effects are however negligible when compared to those of shocks
to the endowment process.
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Government borrowing costs Shocks to the risk-free real interest rate affect the
interest rate at which the government can borrow, both directly and through their effects
on the interest rate spread over the risk-free rate. As this spread is determined by the
probability of next-period default, shocks to the risk-free real interest rate affect the spread
through their impact on default incentives. The interest rate at which the government can
borrow is presented graphically in Figure 3.4, as a function of the amount of debt issued.
The Figure displays the interest rate spread over the risk-free rate, thus abstracting from
the direct effect of the risk-free interest rate on the cost of borrowing.
The effects of shocks to the endowment process on the cost of government borrowing
are, again, significantly larger than those of shocks to the risk-free rate. A fall in the risk-
free rate reduces the interest rate spread on government debt, for all levels of debt issued
by the government. For a one standard deviation fall in the risk-free rate, equivalent to a
fall by 130 basis points, the shift in the function describing government borrowing costs
implies a rise by 0.15% of mean quarterly output in the amount of debt at which the
government can borrow for a spread of 50 basis points, when the endowment is equal to
its mean. An increase in the endowment of comparable magnitude causes a significantly
larger relaxation of borrowing costs for the government. A 7% rise in the endowment
from its unconditional mean, equivalent to one standard deviation of this process, results
in an increase by 22.5% of mean quarterly output in the amount of debt at which the
government can borrow for the same 50 basis points spread, when the risk-free interest
rate is equal to its mean.
The larger effect of endowment shocks on the interest rate spread follows directly from
their larger effect on default incentives, relative to risk-free rate shocks. As processes for
both the endowment and the risk-free rate display positive autocorrelation, a low current
value of the risk-free rate is associated with a low expected value for the next-period
realization of this variable. Hence, a low current risk-free rate helps predict a weak
next-period incentive to default and it determines a low spread in the current cost of
borrowing. The same mechanism applies if the endowment realization is relatively high in
the current period. Given the significantly larger impact of endowment shocks on default
incentives, however, the implications of endowment shocks for the cost of borrowing are
consequentially larger.
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Figure 3.4: Interest rate spread on government debt over the risk-free interest rate,
as a function of the amount of debt issued and of exogenous shocks.
The upper panel presents the function for three values of the endowment process, corresponding
to the mean and to one standard deviation above and below it, for a risk-free real interest rate
equal to its mean. The lower panel presents the same function for three values of the risk-free
interest rate, again given by the mean and by realizations one standard deviation above and below
it, for a mean value of the endowment. The horizontal axis represents the amount of government-
purchased assets. Negative values denote debt issued. The interest rate spread is in basis points,
where 100 basis points denote an interest rate spread of 1%. The two panels are presented in
different scales.
Government borrowing, the current account and risk-free interest rate
shocks Shocks to the risk-free real interest rate affect the government borrowing deci-
sion through their impact on the cost of government borrowing. A low risk-free interest
rate causes the government to issue a higher level of debt, by lowering the cost of borrow-
ing both directly and through a lower interest rate spread. A qualitatively similar effect is
caused by a positive realization of the endowment process. A relatively high endowment
causes the cost of borrowing to fall, by reducing the probability of next-period default
associated with any level of debt issued. For a standard calibration in the endogenous
sovereign default literature, the effects of endowment shocks on borrowing costs dominate
the standard permanent-income mechanism that would cause borrowing to fall in times
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Figure 3.5: Policy function for government borrowing, as a function of the amount
of assets held by the government and of exogenous shocks.
The upper panel presents the function for three different values of the endowment realization,
equivalent to the unconditional mean of the process and to a level one standard deviation above
and below the mean, for a risk-free real interest rate equal to its unconditional mean. The lower
panel presents the same function for three different values of the risk-free interest rate, again given
by the unconditional mean and by realizations one standard deviation above and below it, for a
mean value of the endowment process. The horizontal axis represents the amount of asset held
by the government, so that negative values denote debt. The two panels are presented in different
scales, as the effects of the two shocks have substantially different magnitudes.
of high output.A common feature of models in this tradition is the prediction of a coun-
tercyclical current account balance, as commonly observed in emerging market economies
(Aguiar and Gopinath, 2006, Arellano, 2008).
The impact of risk-free rate shocks on the government borrowing choice is relatively
smaller than that of endowment shocks, given their relatively smaller impact on bor-
rowing costs. The policy functions for assets purchased by the government is presented
graphically in Figure 3.5. Figure 3.6 displays the policy functions for the current account,
defined as the change in government assets. The amount of debt issued by the government
equals 4.2% of mean quarterly output when the risk-free rate is one standard deviation
below its mean and 3.5% when it is one standard deviation above it, when the small open
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Figure 3.6: Policy function for the current account balance, as a function of the
amount of assets held by the government and of exogenous shocks.
The current account balance is defined as the change in government assets over one period. The
upper panel presents the function for three different values of the endowment realization, equivalent
to the unconditional mean of the process and to a level one standard deviation above and below
the mean, for a risk-free real interest rate equal to its unconditional mean. The lower panel
presents the same function for three different values of the risk-free interest rate, again given by
the unconditional mean and by realizations one standard deviation above and below it, for a mean
value of the endowment process. The horizontal axis represents the amount of asset held by the
government, so that negative values denote debt. The two panels are presented in different scales,
as the effects of the two shocks have substantially different magnitudes.
economy does not owe any debt to the rest of the world nor does it have any assets and
the endowment level equals the unconditional mean of the process. For the same level
of initial assets, a high realization of the endowment process causes the government to
issue debt amounting to 4.7% of mean output, while the amount issued falls to 3% if the
endowment is low, when the risk-free interest rate is equal to its mean.15
The policy function for the current account that results from the government optimal
choice is increasing in the level of debt of the economy, as the cost of refinancing such
15By “low” and “high” realization of the endowment process, I again refer here to realizations
one standard deviation above and below the unconditional mean, respectively.
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debt increases in the amount issued. When the economy enters the period with debt
corresponding to 5% of output, the government runs a current account surplus of 2.4%
of output if the risk-free rate is low, as opposed to 1.9% if the risk-free rate is high. For
this level of assets, shocks to the endowment process have a substantially larger impact
on the current account, as borrowing costs react sharply to these shocks. If the economy
receives a low endowment shock, the government runs a current account surplus of 0.8%
of mean quarterly output. On the other hand, if the endowment process realization is
high, the government issues further debt by running a current account deficit amounting
to 4% of mean output.
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Figure 3.7: Effects of shocks to the volatility of the risk-free interest rate on key
variables of the model.
The three panels describe the equilibrium of the model when the volatility of the risk-free interest
rate is high or low, one standard deviation above or below the unconditional mean of the pro-
cess, respectively. In all panels, the endowment and the risk-free interest rate are equal to their
unconditional mean. The top panel describes the interest rate spread over the risk-free rate as a
function of the amount of debt issued, for the two values of volatility. The middle panel describes
the policy function for government borrowing, as a function of the amount of assets held by the
government. The bottom panel describes the policy function for the current account balance.
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Uncertainty shocks to the risk-free real interest rate The effects of uncer-
tainty shocks on the model economy are minimal, at best. I discuss here the version of
the model where all three exogenous shock processes are considered, focusing on the im-
plications of changes in volatility for the interest rate at which the government borrows,
for the government borrowing policy function, and for the current account. Results are
presented graphically in Figure 3.7.
For all three variables considered, there are no visible implications of a shock to the
volatility of the risk-free rate process. An increase in uncertainty does neither lead to
a change in the interest rate at which the government borrows, nor to a change in the
actual quantity of debt that the government chooses to issue.
The insignificance of the effects of a volatility shock is a direct implication of the small
magnitude of the effects of shocks to the risk-free rate. As discussed above, even relatively
extreme shocks to the level of the risk-free rate have only minor implications for the
endogenous variables of the model. An increase in uncertainty amounts to an increase in
the probability associated with the realization of tail events. In the absence of sizable and
non-linear implications of such tail events, however, an increase in uncertainty is unable
to generate substantial quantitative effects on the equilibrium of the model economy.
3.5 Concluding Remarks
This chapter highlights two important properties of a popular quantitative model of en-
dogenous sovereign default. First, I document that in the absence of exogenous uncer-
tainty shocks this model generates time-varying volatility in interest rates on external
debt. The non-linearity of the policy functions that characterize the solution of this
model lies at the heart of this result. Second, I show that in a standard calibration of
the model, shocks to the level and to the volatility of the world risk-free interest rate
have minor quantitative implications. Shocks to the level of output have significantly
stronger effects on default incentives and on the choice for the external asset position of
the economy.
In future research, I will investigate further the role of asymmetric default costs in
relation to the two main results of this chapter. This assumption is likely to have im-
portant implications for both sets of findings. First, asymmetric default costs in output
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lead to stronger non-linarities in the policy function for the interest rate. Relaxation of
this assumption is likely to lead to less sharp fluctuations in interest rate uncertainty.
Second, the role of output shocks in driving default incentives is weaker in the absence of
asymmetric default costs. The naturally asymmetric implications of risk-free rate shocks
on default and repayment incentives would be likely to play a more important role in this
setting.
158
Bibliography
[1] Acharya, Viral V., Itamar Drechsler Philipp Schnabl (2014). A Pyrrhic Victory? Bank
Bailouts and Sovereign Credit Risk, The Journal of Finance, 69: 2689 - 2739.
[2] Acharya, Viral V., Sascha Steffen (2013). The “Greatest” Carry Trade Ever? Under-
standing Eurozone Bank Risks, NBER Working Papers 19039, National Bureau of
Economic Research.
[3] Ag˘ca, S¸., Deniz Igan (2015). Fiscal Consolidation Policies and the Cost of Credit,
mimeo.
[4] Aguiar, Mark, Manuel Amador, Emmanuel Farhi, Gita Gopinath (2015). Coordination
and Crisis in Monetary Unions, Staff Report 511, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
[5] Aguiar, Mark, Gita Gopinath (2006). Defaultable Debt, Interest Rates and the Cur-
rent Account, Journal of International Economics, vol. 69(1), pages 64-83, June.
[6] Altavilla, Carlo, Domenico Giannone, Michele Lenza (2014). The Financial and
Macroeconomic Effects of OMT Announcements, Working Paper Series 1707, Eu-
ropean Central Bank.
[7] Anderson, James E., Eric van Wincoop (2004). Trade Costs, Journal of Economic
Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 42(3), pages 691-751, September.
[8] Aoki, Kosuke, Gianluca Benigno, Nobuhiro Kiyotaki (2010). Adjusting to Capital
Account Liberalization, CEPR Discussion Papers 8087, CEPR.
[9] Ardagna, Silvia, Francesco Caselli (2014). The Political Economy of the Greek Debt
Crisis: A Tale of Two Bailouts, American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 6(4):
291-323.
159
[10] Arellano, Cristina (2008). Default Risk and Income Fluctuations in Emerging
Economies, American Economic Review, vol. 98(3), pages 690-712, June.
[11] Arellano, Cristina, Yan Bai (2014). Linkages across Sovereign Debt Markets, Research
Department Staff Report 491, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
[12] Arellano, Cristina, Narayana Kocherlakota (2014). Internal Debt Crises and
Sovereign Defaults, Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 68(S), pages S68-S80.
[13] Arteta, Carlos O., Galina Hale (2008). Sovereign Debt Crises and Credit to the
Private Sector, Journal of International Economics, vol. 74(1), pages 53-69, January.
[14] Ayres, Joao Luiz, Gaston Navarro, Juan Pablo Nicolini, Pedro Teles (2015). Sovereign
Default: The Role of Expectations, Research Department Working Paper 723, Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
[15] Backus, David, Patrick J. Kehoe, Finn E. Kydland (1994). Dynamics of the Trade
Balance and the Terms of Trade: The J-curve. American Economic Review vol.84(1),
pages 84-103.
[16] Bank of Italy (2016). Survey of Industrial and Service Firms - 2015, Supplements to
the Statistical Bulletin, Sample Surveys, n.34, 2016.
[17] Bartelsman, Eric, John Haltiwanger, Stefano Scarpetta (2013). Cross-Country Dif-
ferences in Productivity: The Role of Allocation and Selection, American Economic
Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(1), pages 305-34, February.
[18] Baskaya, Yusuf Soner, Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan (2016). Sovereign Risk and Bank
Lending: Evidence from 1999 Turkish Earthquake, mimeo.
[19] Benigno, Gianluca, Pierpaolo Benigno and Salvatore Nistico` (2012). Risk, Monetary
Policy, and the Exchange Rate, NBER Macroeconomics Annual, University of Chicago
Press, vol. 26(1), pages 247 - 309.
[20] Benigno, Gianluca, Pierpaolo Benigno and Salvatore Nistico` (2013). Second-Order
Approximation of Dynamic Models with Time-Varying Risk, Journal of Economic
Dynamics and Control, vol. 37(7), pages 1231-1247.
160
[21] Benigno, Gianluca, Huigang Chen, Christopher Otrok, Alessandro Rebucci, Eric R.
Young (2013). Financial Crises and Macro-Prudential Policies, Journal of Interna-
tional Economics, vol. 89(2), pages 453-470.
[22] Benigno, Pierpaolo and Federica Romei (2014). Debt Deleveraging and the Exchange
Rate, Journal of International Economics, vol. 93(1), pages 1-16.
[23] Betts, Caroline M., Timothy J. Kehoe, (2001). Tradability of Goods and Real Ex-
change Rate Fluctuations, Research Department Staff Report 415, Federal Reserve
Bank of Minneapolis.
[24] Bianchi, Javier (2011). Overborrowing and Systemic Externalities in the Business Cy-
cle, American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(7), pages
3400-3426, December.
[25] Bloom, Nicholas (2009). The Impact of Uncertainty Shocks, Econometrica, Econo-
metric Society, vol. 77(3), pages 623-685, 05.
[26] Bocola, Luigi (2016). The Pass-Through of Sovereign Risk, Journal of Political Econ-
omy, forthcoming.
[27] Bofondi, Marcello, Luisa Carpinelli, Enrico Sette (2013). Credit Supply during a
Sovereign Debt Crisis, Temi di discussione 909, Bank of Italy, Economic Research
and International Relations Area.
[28] Broner, Fernando, Aitor Erce, Alberto Martin, Jaume Ventura (2014) Sovereign
Debt Markets in Turbulent Times: Creditor Discrimination and Crowding-out Effects,
Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 61(C), pages 114-142.
[29] Brunnermeier, Markus K., Luis Garicano, Philip R. Lane, Marco Pagano, Ricardo
Reis, Tano Santos, David Thesmar, Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh, Dimitri Vayanos (2016).
The Sovereign-Bank Diabolic Loop and ESBies, American Economic Review, Ameri-
can Economic Association, vol. 106(5), pages 508-12, May.
[30] Brutti, Filippo, Philip Ulrich Saure´ (2014). Repatriation of Debt in the Euro Crisis:
Evidence for the Secondary Market Theory, Working Papers 2014-03, Swiss National
Bank.
161
[31] Buiter, Willem H., Anne Sibert (2005). How the Eurosystem Treatment of Collateral
in its Open Market Operations Weakens Fiscal Discipline in the Eurozone (and What
To Do About It), CEPR Discussion Papers 5387, CEPR.
[32] Chari, V.V., Alessandro Dovis, Patrick Kehoe (2016). On the Optimality of Financial
Repression, mimeo.
[33] Chen, Ruo; Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti, Thierry Tressel (2013). External Imbalances
in the Eurozone, Economic Policy, vol. 28(73), pages 101-142, 01.
[34] Clarida, Richard H. (1990). International Lending and Borrowing in a Stochastic,
Stationary Equilibrium, International Economic Review, vol. 31(3), pages 543-58, Au-
gust.
[35] Coeurdacier, Nicolas, Philippe Martin (2009). The Geography of Asset Trade and the
Euro: Insiders and Outsiders, Journal of the Japanese and International Economies,
vol. 23(2), pages 90-113, June.
[36] Cole, Harold L., Timothy J. Kehoe, (2000). Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises, Review of
Economic Studies, vol. 67(1), pages 91-116.
[37] Conesa, Juan Carlos, Timothy J. Kehoe (2015). Gambling for Redemption and Self-
Fulfilling Debt Crises, NBER Working Papers 21026, National Bureau of Economic
Research.
[38] Corsetti, Giancarlo, Luca Dedola, Sylvain Leduc (2008). International Risk Sharing
and the Transmission of Productivity Shocks, The Review of Economic Studies, 75.2,
443-473.
[39] Giancarlo Corsetti, Lars P Feld, Philip R. Lane, Lucrezia Reichlin, Helene Rey,
Dimitri Vayanos, Beatrice Weder di Mauro (2016). A New Start for the Eurozone:
Dealing with Debt. Monitoring the Eurozone 1, London: CEPR.
[40] Corsetti, Giancarlo, Keith Kuester, Andre´ Meier, Gernot Mu¨ller (2014). Sovereign
Risk and Belief-Driven Fluctuations in the Euro Area, Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics, vol. 61, January 2014, Pages 53-73.
162
[41] Cuadra, Gabriel, Juan Sanchez, Horacio Sapriza (2010). Fiscal Policy and Default
Risk in Emerging Markets, Review of Economic Dynamics, vol. 13(2), pages 452-469,
April.
[42] De Santis, Roberto (2012). The Euro Area Sovereign Debt Crisis: Safe Haven, Credit
Rating Agencies and the Spread of the Fever from Greece, Ireland and Portugal,
Working Paper Series 1419, European Central Bank.
[43] Eaton, Jonathan, Mark Gersovitz (1981). Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theo-
retical and Empirical Analysis, Review of Economic Studies, vol. 48(2), pages 289-309,
April.
[44] European Commission (2007). Employment in Europe 2007, Directorate-General for
Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities; Employment Analysis Unit.
[45] Eurostat (2014). Taxation Trends in the European Union, 2014 Edition, Eurostat
Statistical Books.
[46] Eurostat (2015). Taxation Trends in the European Union, 2015 Edition. Eurostat
Statistical Books.
[47] Durdu, C. Bora, Ricardo Nunes, Horacio Sapriza (2013). News and Sovereign Default
Risk in Small Open Economies, Journal of International Economics, vol. 91(1), pages
1-17.
[48] Fernandez-Villaverde, Jesus, Pablo Guerron-Quintana, Juan F. Rubio-Ramirez, Mar-
tin Uribe (2011). Risk Matters: The Real Effects of Volatility Shocks, American Eco-
nomic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(6), pages 2530-61, October.
[49] Fernandez-Villaverde, Jesus, Juan F. Rubio-Ramirez (2013). Macroeconomics and
Volatility: Data, Models, and Estimation, in Advances in Economics and Economet-
rics: Theory and Applications, Tenth World Congress of the Econometric Society,
Cambridge University Press.
[50] FoleyFisher, Nathan, Bernardo Guimaraes (2013). U.S. Real Interest Rates and De-
fault Risk in Emerging Economies, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, vol. 45(5),
pages 967-975, 08.
163
[51] Fornaro, Luca (2014). International Debt Deleveraging, CREI Working Paper.
[52] Gennaioli, Nicola, Alberto Martin, Stefano Rossi (2014). Sovereign Default, Domestic
Banks, and Financial Institutions, Journal of Finance, American Finance Association,
vol. 69(2), pages 819-866, 04.
[53] Gopinath, Gita, Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan, Loukas Karabarbounis, Carolina Villegas-
Sanchez (2015). Capital Allocation and Productivity in South Europe, NBER Working
Papers 21453, National Bureau of Economic Research.
[54] Greenwood, Jeremy, Zvi Hercowitz, Gregory W. Huffman (1988). Investment, Capac-
ity Utilization, and the Real Business Cycle, American Economic Review, vol. 78(3),
pages 402-17, June.
[55] Guerrieri, Luca, Matteo Iacoviello, Raoul Minetti (2013). Banks, Sovereign Debt,
and the International Transmission of Business Cycles, NBER International Seminar
on Macroeconomics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 9(1), pages 181 - 213.
[56] Guerrieri, Veronica, Guido Lorenzoni (2011). Credit Crises, Precautionary Savings,
and the Liquidity Trap, NBER Working Papers 17583, National Bureau of Economic
Research.
[57] Guimaraes, Bernardo (2011). Sovereign Default: Which Shocks Matter?, Review of
Economic Dynamics, vol. 14(4), pages 553-576, October.
[58] Hale, Galina, Maurice Obstfeld (2014). The Euro and The Geography of International
Debt Flows, NBER Working Papers 20033, National Bureau of Economic Research.
[59] IMF (2012). Managing Director’s Global Policy Agenda International Monetary and
Financial Committee, October 2012.
[60] Jaccard, Ivan, Frank Smets (2015). Structural Asymmetries and Financial Imbal-
ances in the Eurozone, mimeo.
[61] Kalemli-Ozcan, Sebnem, Elias Papioannou, Jose´ Luis Peydro (2010). What Lies Be-
neath the Euro’s Effect on Financial Integration? Currency Risk, Legal Harmonization
or Trade?, Journal of International Economics 81: 75-88.
164
[62] Keynes, John Maynard (1929). The German Transfer Problem, The Reparation
Problem: A Discussion. II. A Rejoinder, Views on The Transfer Problem. III. A
Reply, Economic Journal 39 (March 1929), 1-7, (June 1929), 172-178, (September
1929), 404-408.
[63] King, Mervyn, David Low (2014). Measuring the “World” Real Interest Rate, NBER
Working Papers 19887, National Bureau of Economic Research.
[64] Kopecky, Karen A., Richard M.H. Suen, (2010). Finite state Markov-chain approxi-
mations to highly persistent processes, Review of Economic Dynamics, 13.3: 701-714.
[65] Lane, Philip R., Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti (2007). The External Wealth of Nations
Mark II: Revised and Extended Estimates of Foreign Assets and Liabilities, 1970 -
2004, Journal of International Economics, 73, November, 223-250.
[66] Lane, Philip R. (2012). The European Sovereign Debt Crisis, Journal of Economic
Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 26(3), pages 49-68, Summer.
[67] Lane, Philip R. (2013). Capital Flows in the Euro Area, European Economy - Eco-
nomic Papers 497, Directorate General Economic and Financial Affairs, European
Commission.
[68] Lipsey, Richard G., Kelvin Lancaster (1956). The General Theory of Second Best.
The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 24, No. 1, pp. 11-32
[69] Mallucci, Enrico (2015). Domestic Debt and Sovereign Defaults, International Fi-
nance Discussion Papers 1153. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
[70] Martin, Philippe, Thomas Philippon (2015). Inspecting the Mechanism. Leverage
and the Great Recession in the Eurozone, mimeo.
[71] Martinez, Leonardo, Juan Carlos Hatchondo, Cesar Sosa-Padilla (2016). Debt Dilu-
tion and Sovereign Default Risk, Journal of Political Economy, forthcoming.
[72] Mendoza, Enrique G. (2010). Sudden Stops, Financial Crises, and Leverage, Amer-
ican Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(5), pages 1941-66,
December.
165
[73] Mendoza, Enrique G., Vivian Z. Yue (2012) A General Equilibrium Model of
Sovereign Default and Business Cycles, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol.
127(2), pages 889-946.
[74] Neumeyer, Pablo A., Fabrizio Perri (2005). Business Cycles in Emerging Economies:
the Role of Interest Rates, Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 52(2), pages 345-380,
March.
[75] Nouy, Danie`le (2012). Is Sovereign Risk Properly Addressed by Financial Regula-
tion?, Financial Stability Review, Banque de France, 16, 95-106, April.
[76] OECD (2011a). OECD Economic Outlook, Vol. 2011/2, OECD Publishing, Paris.
[77] OECD (2011b). STAN indicators Rev. 3, 2011, STAN: OECD Structural Analysis
Statistics (database). DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00561-en
[78] OECD/WTO (2015). Trade in Value Added, OECD-WTO: Statistics on Trade in
Value Added (database). DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00648-en
[79] Perez, Diego (2015). Sovereign Debt, Domestic Banks and the Provision of Public
Liquidity, mimeo, New York University.
[80] Reichlin, Lucrezia, Huw Pill (2016). Exceptional Policies for Exceptional Times: The
ECBs Response to the Rolling Crises of the Euro Area. Routledge Handbook of the
Economics of European Integration, 351-375.
[81] Reis, Ricardo (2013). The Portugese Slump and Crash and the Euro Crisis, Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution,
vol. 46-1 (Spring), pages 143-210.
[82] Rouwenhorst, K. Geert (1995). Asset Pricing Implications of Equilibrium Business
Cycle Models, in Cooley, T.F. (Ed.), Frontiers of Business Cycle Research, 294-330.
[83] Sachs, Jeffrey (1982). The Current Account in the Macroeconomic Adjustment Pro-
cess, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, vol. 84, issue 2, pages 147-59.
[84] Seoane, Hernan D. (2015). Time-Varying Volatility, Default and the Sovereign Risk
Premium, mimeo.
166
[85] Shambaugh, Jay C. (2012). The Euro’s Three Crises, Brookings Papers on Economic
Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 44(1 (Spring),
pages 157-231.
[86] Schmitt-Grohe´, Stephanie, Martn Uribe (2003). Closing Small Open Economy Mod-
els, Journal of international Economics vol. 61.1, 163-185.
[87] Siena, Daniele (2015). The European Monetary Union and Imbalances: Is it an
Anticipation Story? mimeo.
[88] Sosa-Padilla, Cesar (2015). Sovereign Defaults and Banking Crises, mimeo, McMaster
University.
[89] Stockman, Alan C. Linda L. Tesar (1995). Tastes and Technology in a Two-Country
Model of the Business Cycle: Explaining International Comovements, American Eco-
nomic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 168-85.
[90] Surico, Paolo, Riccardo Trezzi (2015). Consumer Spending and Fiscal Consolidation:
Evidence from a Housing Tax Experiment, Finance and Economics Discussion Series
2015-57, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), revised 20 Jan
2016.
[91] Tauchen, George (1986). Finite State Markov-Chain Approximations to Univariate
and Vector Autoregressions, Economics Letters, vol. 20(2), pages 177-181.
[92] Thwaites, Gregory (2014). Why Are Real Interest Rates so Low? Secular Stagnation
and the Relative Price of Investment Goods, Centre for Macroeconomics Discussion
Paper, 2014-28.
[93] Uribe, Martin, Vivian Z. Yue (2006). Country Spreads and Emerging Countries:
Who Drives Whom?, Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages
6-36, June.
[94] Waysand, Claire, Kevin Ross, John de Guzman (2010). European Financial Linkages:
A New Look at Imbalances, IMF Working Paper, WP/10/295.
167
